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January 30, 1989

National Security Directive 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council  
System (S)

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities in the area of national security, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be organized as follows:

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

1. The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential determination. The functions of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and this Directive. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic. Along with its subordinate bodies, the NSC will be my principal means for coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy. (U)

2. The NSC shall have as its members the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, as prescribed by statute. The Director of Central Intelligence and

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the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall attend NSC meetings, as will the Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Secretary of the Treasury normally will attend NSC meetings, except that on occasions when the subject matter so indicates, he will be asked not to attend. The Attorney General will be invited to attend meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction, including covert actions. I intend to invite the heads of other Executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisors to the NSC, and other senior officials to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed. (U)

3. The NSC shall meet regularly at my direction. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. (U)

B. The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) (C)

1. An NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is hereby established as the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC shall review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security policy. (C)

2. The NSC/PC shall have as its members the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as Chairman), the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Chief of Staff to the President. Participation of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the Attorney General will be governed by the guidelines in paragraph A.2. above. In consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President may invite the heads of other Executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisors to the NSC, and other senior officials to attend meetings of the NSC/PC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed. (C)

3. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, for calling meetings of the NSC/PC, for determining the agenda, and for ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. (C)

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C. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) (C)

1. An NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) is hereby established as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process (including the interagency groups established pursuant to Section D of this Directive) and make recommendations concerning the development and implementation of national security policy. (C)

2. The NSC/DC shall have as its members the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as the Chairman), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the NSC/DC may convene at the deputy secretary level for the Departments of State and Defense. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, may invite representatives of other Executive departments and agencies and other senior officials, to attend meetings of the NSC/DC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed. When meeting on covert actions, the attendees will include a representative of the Attorney General. (C)

3. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible, in consultation with the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, for calling meetings of the NSC/DC, for determining the agenda, and for ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. The NSC/DC shall ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of each. The NSC/DC may task the interagency groups established pursuant to Section D of this Directive. (C)

D. NSC Policy Coordinating Committees (NSC/PCC's) (C)

1. An NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (NSC/PCC) is hereby established for each of the following regional areas; Europe, the Soviet Union, Latin America, East Asia, Africa, and the Near East/South Asia. An NSC/PCC is hereby established in each of the following functional areas; defense, international economics, intelligence, and arms control. Each NSC/PCC shall be

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the principal interagency forum for the development and implementation of national security policy for that regional or functional area. The NSC/PCC shall be responsible for identifying and developing policy issues for consideration by the NSC, including preparation of the necessary papers for such consideration. (C)

2. Each NSC/PCC shall have as its members a representative at the Assistant Secretary level from each of the Executive departments or agencies that have members on the NSC/DC. The NSC/PCC's established pursuant to this Directive shall be chaired by a person of Assistant Secretary rank appointed as follows: for each regional NSC/PCC, by the Secretary of State; for the defense NSC/PCC, by the Secretary of Defense; for the international economics NSC/PCC, by the Secretary of the Treasury; for the intelligence NSC/PCC, by the Director of Central Intelligence; and for the arms control NSC/PCC, by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (C)

3. An NSC staff member appointed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall serve as the Executive Secretary of each NSC/PCC. The Executive Secretary shall assist the Chairman in scheduling the meetings of the NSC/PCC, in determining the agenda, in preparing a brief statement of the actions taken and tasks assigned, in ensuring timely responses to decisions and tasking from more senior NSC interagency groups, and in ensuring timely transmission of papers and recommendations for consideration by the NSC/DC, the NSC/PC, and the NSC. The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, may invite representatives of other Executive department and agencies to attend meetings of the NSC/PCC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed at the meeting. (C)

4. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, may establish additional NSC/PCC's as appropriate. (C)

E. Existing Interagency Groups

1. The National Security Planning Group (NSPG), the Senior Review Group (SRG), the Policy Review Group (PRG), and the Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) are hereby abolished. All other existing NSC interagency groups are hereby abolished effective March 1, 1989, unless specifically reestablished as of that date. Cabinet officers and the heads of other Executive agencies shall advise the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of those specific NSC interagency groups chaired

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by their respective departments or agencies that are either mandated by statute or are otherwise of sufficient importance and vitality as to warrant being reestablished. In each case the Cabinet officer or agency head should describe the scope of the activities proposed for the interagency group and specify the particular NSC/PCC that should exercise supervision over its work. (U)

2. It is my intention that crisis management be handled through the interagency committees established by this Directive rather than through a separate interagency structure. (U)

F. Existing Presidential Guidance

This Directive shall take precedence over NSDD 266, NSDD 276, and all other existing presidential guidance on the organization of the National Security Council system. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall review and revise such prior guidance as appropriate. (U)

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January 30, 1989

National Security Directive 2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Disposition of National Security Decision  
Directives (U)

All extant National Security Decision Directives and other active  
National Security Council decision memoranda shall remain in  
force until further notice. (C)

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5-10-95  
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March 18, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Legislation to Authorize the Transfer of Funds to  
the Agency for International Development (AID) for  
Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (U)

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the  
anticipated fall of the Soviet puppet regime will usher in a  
period when the provision of humanitarian aid will be essential  
to the reconstruction and recovery of Afghanistan and to the  
establishment of a legitimate Afghan government. (C)

In order to provide the necessary assistance to the people of  
Afghanistan, I hereby direct that draft legislation be submitted  
to the Congress which authorizes such assistance and provides for  
the transfer of funds and other resources from any department or  
agency to the Agency for International Development for this  
purpose. (U)

AID should take the lead to develop, submit and manage  
legislation. The other departments and agencies should support  
AID as required. (U)

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*George Bush*

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March 22, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Security of U.S. Government Personnel  
in Panama (S)

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue, until after the May 7 elections, their current policy of reducing off-post DoD military families through normal personnel rotation and restriction of incoming dependents. The Embassy and its component agencies will also continue its draw down policy. (S)

The Policy Coordinating Committee will continue to monitor the situation involving the harassment of USG personnel and report any significant change. It will also keep under continuous review the treatment of non-governmental U.S. citizens. (S)

Once the Panamanian elections take place, or sooner if circumstances change significantly or if the elections are cancelled, this policy will be reexamined. (S)

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May 1, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF  
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan  
Resistance (G)

U.S. objectives with respect to Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance are to prevent Soviet strategic use of Nicaragua, to include withdrawal of the Soviet and Cuban military presence and the sharp reduction of Soviet bloc assistance; to reduce the threat posed by Nicaragua to its neighbors and other countries in Latin America by ending Nicaraguan subversion; to reduce the size and capability of the Nicaraguan military to levels commensurate with Central American stability; and to achieve democracy in Nicaragua in order to guard against future strategic or regional threats and to facilitate the region-wide economic development necessary for long-term stability. We seek a democratic opening sufficient to foster conditions for fair national elections and to create on-going internal checks and balances on Nicaraguan behavior. (S)

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1. The immediate priority is to engage in active diplomacy on a sustained basis for a democratic opening in Nicaragua. We should move toward direct involvement in negotiations among the five Central American countries. Bilateral relations with Nicaragua are not excluded, but should be held in reserve as an incentive for the Government of Nicaragua, and undertaken only at my direction and in consultation with the Central American democracies and the internal opposition. (S)

2. We will continue to press the Soviet Union to reduce its military relationship with Nicaragua, taking the position that the Soviet response will affect our overall bilateral relationship. (S)

3. We will devise and implement a series of incentives and sanctions, including those involving trade, economic development, and bilateral discussions, which the United States will link to Sandinista performance in meeting their commitments. (S)

4. We will maintain as far as possible the Nicaraguan Resistance as a viable entity. The Resistance should not be demobilized and voluntarily reintegrated into Nicaraguan society unless democratic conditions have been established which guarantee their physical safety and safeguard their political rights. (S)

5. We will assist the internal opposition in Nicaragua and, if democratic reforms have been adequately implemented, encourage their full participation in the Nicaraguan elections as a referendum on Sandinista rule. We will encourage the Resistance to cooperate with the internal opposition with the goal of uniting the entire opposition behind a single presidential candidate. (S)

6. We will establish and publicize criteria for judging whether Sandinista performance is adequate to satisfy our objectives. While we should cooperate with the Latin American and West European democracies and international organizations such as the UN and the OAS as part of our diplomatic strategy, we should not defer to others on the issue of the adequacy of Sandinista performance. (S)

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7. We will work to ensure that there are adequate mechanisms to monitor Nicaraguan compliance with its political and security commitments. Political verification should begin early and not be limited to the electoral campaign and balloting. The United States should become actively involved in helping shape the size, character, and mandate of the security verification effort, insisting as well that establishment of international border monitoring be linked to progress on mechanisms for political verification. (S)

8. Every effort will be made to pursue a bipartisan approach to development and execution of our policy, including consultation with the Congress in policy development and legislative endorsement of the approach. (C)

#### Implementation

The Secretary of State, drawing on other departments and agencies as needed and appropriate, should:

-- Develop a plan for discussions with the Soviets which implements this Directive;

-- Develop a list of incentives and sanctions to affect Sandinista behavior, including those involving trade and economic development, which may be implemented depending upon Nicaraguan performance in meeting its commitments;

-- Encourage OECD countries to condition their assistance programs on Nicaraguan steps toward implementation of its commitments to democratic reform;

-- Seek continued humanitarian assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance for a period through the Nicaraguan election in February 1990 at levels of funding similar to the current program;

-- Develop a plan to support the Nicaraguan internal opposition;

-- Take the lead in inter-agency planning to elaborate a list of criteria by which to judge Sandinista performance in meeting their commitments. Consideration should be given to securing legislative endorsement for this list;

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-- Develop, through the Latin American Policy Coordination Committee, an effective mechanism for verification of both political and security commitments. The Secretary of State will work with the Central American democracies, the other Latin American countries, the UN, the OAS, and others to implement this plan;

-- Develop and implement a public diplomacy plan to support the decisions in this Directive; and

-- Consult with the Congress in order to develop, implement, and monitor a bipartisan policy. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE - 9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Actions to Respond to Polish Roundtable Agreement  
(U)

I hereby direct that the eight measures listed below be taken in response to the Polish Roundtable agreement. (U)

- The United States will indicate to its Allies willingness to consider substantial rescheduling of Poland's official debt within the Paris Club. (C)
- The United States will inform its allies and IMF management that the United States supports negotiations between Poland and the IMF on a stand-by arrangement subject to normal IMF conditions. (U)
- The United States will publicly indicate willingness to support viable private sector loans by the International Finance Corporation. (U)
- Legislation will be sought to accord Generalized System of Preferences to Poland. GSP treatment eliminates tariffs on a variety of products. (C)
- Legislation will be sought to make Poland eligible for OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) insurance. (C)

Private Sector Involvement

- The United States will offer to negotiate a government-to-government Small/Private Business Agreement to facilitate direct contacts with Poland's private business sector. (C)

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- The United States will expand training and exchange programs, targeted at the emerging private sector, in Poland. (U)
- The United States will signal support for voluntary private sector swaps of existing Polish debts for equity in Polish enterprises, or environmental, educational or other humanitarian programs. (U)

*By Bush*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE - 10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
THE ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
AGENCY  
THE ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES  
INFORMATION AGENCY  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY  
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Creation of New Policy Coordinating Committees (U)

Pursuant to National Security Directive 1, I hereby direct the creation of the following additional Policy Coordinating Committees, with chairmen as indicated:

- Counter-terrorism. This committee is to assume the previous responsibilities of the interdepartmental group on terrorism and will lead the formulation of Administration counter-terrorism policy and implementation efforts. (Chairman: Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism, Department of State) (C)
- Special Activities. This PCC will coordinate the development and conduct of special activities, under Executive Order 12333 and NSDD 286, in accordance with established statutes and procedures. (Chairman: NSC Senior Director for Intelligence Programs) (C)

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- Refugees. This committee is to assume the responsibilities of the former Senior Interagency Group on Refugee Policy and will establish annual refugee quotas to be submitted to Congress as well as coordinate Administration policy on refugee issues. (Chairman: Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State) (S)
- International Oceans, Environment, and Science Affairs. This committee is to coordinate Administration policy on the international and foreign affairs issues arising in the areas of oceans policy (Law of the Sea, freedom of navigation, fisheries, etc.), environmental policy (Arctic, Antarctica, deforestation, atmosphere, etc.), and science (S & T agreements and exchanges, telecommunications, etc.). (Chairman: Department of State) (S)
- Resources for International Affairs Programs. This committee is to coordinate interagency action on the range of issues in budget function 150, including foreign economic and security assistance allocations, U.S. contributions to the U.N. and multilateral banks, refugee and humanitarian assistance, and public diplomacy resource questions. (Chairman: Department of State) (C)
- Emergency Preparedness/Mobilization Planning. This committee is to assume the responsibilities of the former Senior Interagency Group on National Security Emergency Preparedness. It will coordinate Administration policy with respect to the domestic aspects of national security, including mobilization, non-military air and seahift, and the industrial base. (Chairman: Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (C)
- Nonproliferation Policy. This committee is to take the lead in coordinating Administration policy on all nonproliferation issues, including those involving nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical and biological weapons. (Chairman: Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) (S)
- Technology Transfer Policy. This committee is to take the lead in coordinating Administration policy on national security and foreign policy export control and technology transfer issues, including COCOM and third country cooperation issues, and on export cases submitted by other COCOM member governments. (Chairman: National Security Council) (C)

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- National Security Telecommunications. This committee is to assume the responsibilities of the NSDD-97 Steering Group in coordinating Administration policy on improving the interoperability, security, survivability, and emergency availability of national security telecommunications. (Chairman: Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I) (C)


In addition, I hereby direct the continuation of the Coordinating Sub-Group (CSG) on counter-terrorism and the Crisis Management Working Group (to be renamed the Situation Support Working Group) as subcommittees of the NSC Deputies Committee. Further, I have designated the Low Intensity Conflict Board to meet at the level of the Deputies of the Cabinet Departments and Agencies. (C)

In order to clarify the responsibilities of NSC Policy Coordinating Committees, responsibility for U.S.-Soviet military-to-military talks, for nuclear powered warship visits, and for the U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons is hereby assigned to the Defense Policy Coordinating Committee. (C)

The Arms Control Verification Committee, established by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 65, and the Standing Committee on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established by NSDD 301, are hereby disestablished. Their functions are to be assumed by the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee. NSDD 65 is hereby cancelled. The Director, United States Risk Reduction Center, shall serve as an advisor to the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee when matters relating to Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers are under consideration. Issues relating to arms control compliance also will be the responsibility of the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee. (C)

It is the responsibility of the chairmen of individual Policy Coordinating Committees to establish those subcommittees or working groups deemed necessary to support the work of the individual Policy Coordinating Committees and to designate the chairmen of such subcommittees or working groups. (U)

While Policy Coordinating Committees are as a general rule to be chaired at the Assistant Secretary level, there will be circumstances in which the scope of responsibility and the subject matter of individual Policy Coordinating Committees will require higher level chairmen. In such instances Policy Coordinating Committees shall be chaired by the most senior official appropriate. (U)



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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June 6, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Lifting the No-Exceptions Policy (U)

In January 1980, the United States imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union because of its invasion of Afghanistan. One of those sanctions was the policy of permitting no exports of controlled high technology to the Soviet Union, which became known in COCOM as the "No-Exceptions Policy." (C)

In light of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, I have determined that the No-Exceptions Policy should be lifted and that we should return to case-by-case consideration of export cases for the Soviet Union, both within the U.S. Government and in COCOM. This policy is effective as of May 27, 1989. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Cocaine Trafficking (S)

The United States has as a major foreign policy objective preventing the flow of cocaine into the U.S. Pursuant to the May 25 NSC meeting of the National Security Council, I direct that the following actions be taken in support of that objective.  
(C)

1. The Secretary of State shall vigorously pursue the "Maintenance Program" at the Santa Lucia base with emphasis on constructing a runway capable of handling C-123 aircraft and completing the security perimeter. If required, the Secretary of Defense, consistent with applicable law, shall provide and transport appropriate construction equipment, without personnel, to the base. (S)
2. The Secretary of State shall instruct the U.S. Ambassador to Peru to inform the government of Peru of our commitment to the Santa Lucia base, and request increased Peruvian military support for the base and for our counternarcotics program in the Upper Huallaga Valley. The Ambassador is not to discuss any proposals concerning U.S. military assistance, although he should attempt to determine what the Peruvian attitude toward the enlarged military role might be, and whether they would desire assistance from the U.S. (S)

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3. The Director of the National Drug Control Policy shall complete within four weeks, for submission to the National Security Council, a study of other options to disrupt the production of cocaine in South America and its movement to the United States. Particular emphasis is to be placed on Bolivia and Colombia, but all other countries in which the United States has counter-cocaine operations underway should also be reviewed. All appropriate support required to complete this study is to be provided to the Director of National Drug Control Policy. (S)

*G. Bush*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ADMINISTRATOR OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT  
COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE  
COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: International Counternarcotics Strategy ~~(S)~~

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The impact of illegal narcotics use on our society has been and continues to be devastating. Moreover, the violence and corruption of the drug traffickers and their alliance with insurgent groups has had a destabilizing effect on friendly governments. It is thus imperative for our own well-being and the development of democratic and economically stable governments around the world that this problem be dealt with aggressively. To that end, I approve the "United States International Drug Control Policy and Strategies" paper prepared by the Office of National Drug Control Policy for inclusion in the report to Congress in September. (U)

After thorough review, I have decided that the first priority of our international drug control strategy will be to enhance greatly our counternarcotics programs in the Andean region. Colombia, as the home of the major trafficking organizations and the principal production facilities for U.S. destined cocaine,

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will be the primary focus of our effort. To ensure that our Colombia effort is not thwarted by the shifting of trafficking organizations and infrastructure to locations in Bolivia and Peru, we will mount simultaneous expanded efforts in those two countries. These programs will involve expanded assistance to indigenous police, military, and intelligence officials in all three countries, for the purpose of assisting them to regain control of their countries from an insidious combination of insurgents and drug traffickers and to suppress the flow of narcotics to the United States. In particular, we should pursue the major Andean drug cartels wherever and however they choose to operate with all means available to our government consistent with applicable law. ~~(S)~~

Should these anti-trafficking programs be successful, there will be a major economic impact resulting from suppression of the drug trade. Under those circumstances, I would be prepared to consider expanded economic assistance to Peru and Bolivia, conditioned on continued counternarcotics performance and sound economic policy. (U)

This effort will require the support of the Andean governments affected, as well as the support of our major allies. To that end, I wish plans to proceed for a summit meeting with the South American countries involved. In addition, I anticipate a request to our economic partners to join with us in the provision of economic assistance to these countries should they prove capable of suppressing the drug trade. ~~(S)~~

It should be recognized that this will be a long and difficult struggle, working with governments already weakened by the impact of drug traffickers, insurgencies and economic instability. Success will require the enthusiastic support of all agencies, rising above jurisdictional conflicts to pursue our national objective. I will continue to look to the Director of National Drug Control Policy, supported by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to ensure effective coordination among all agencies involved in the international counternarcotics effort. Even with these greatly expanded resources, this Andean strategy will succeed only if the programs are effectively coordinated and managed. (U)

I, therefore, direct the following actions under the coordination of the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council:

- The Director, Office of Management and Budget, together with the effected agencies, shall prepare amendments to the FY 90 budget to support the first year of a five-year \$2 billion budget to support the Andean regional countercocaine strategy pursuant to the attached budget chart at Tab I. The program shall include as a baseline the full amount of our existing FY 90, \$119 million Andean counternarcotics budget

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request, subject to final Congressional appropriation. The existing FY 90 program shall be augmented by an additional \$142.1 million, divided among military assistance, law enforcement, and intelligence programs. The \$142.1 million FY 90 augmentation, except for those funds made available to the Drug Enforcement Administration, shall be drawn from the Department of Defense (including funds available to the intelligence community). There will be no economic assistance component in FY 90 augmentation. The expanded FY 91-94 budgets shall also build on the FY 90, \$119 million baseline program and shall include economic assistance funds for Peru and Bolivia, contingent upon NSC evaluation that the counternarcotics programs funded in FY 90 were successful and economic assistance would be consistent with sound economic policy in these countries. The Director of OMB will work with the effected agencies to ensure that the expanded outyear programs, described in the budget chart at Tab I, are accommodated in effected agency budgets. ~~(S)~~

- The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, shall prepare detailed military assistance and law enforcement programs in support of this strategy drawing on the above budget guidance and the attached program description at Tab II. ~~(S)~~
- The Director of Central Intelligence, coordinating with the counternarcotics intelligence community, shall similarly develop detailed intelligence programs drawing on the above budget guidance and the attached program description. ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, shall revise Department of Defense (DOD) policy directives and procedures to expand DOD support of U.S. counternarcotics efforts and to permit DOD personnel to conduct training for host government personnel and operational support activities anywhere in the Andean region. DOD personnel will not accompany host government forces on actual field operations. ~~(S)~~
- The above assigned actions shall be completed by September 1, 1989, and provided to the Office of National Drug Control Policy for final consolidation and presentation to the Deputies Committee. ~~(S)~~
- In parallel, the Director of National Drug Control Policy, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall begin consultation with the Congress to develop bipartisan support for this initiative. If necessary, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Director of National Drug Control Policy and the Director, Office of Management and Budget, shall prepare legislation to support this initiative and to remove statutory barriers to program effectiveness. (U)


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-- following initial Congressional consultation, the Secretary of State shall approach the governments of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru with our assistance strategy and a proposal to hold an early Andean Drug Summit. The Secretary of State shall also seek economic assistance for counternarcotics in the Andes from our allies, using the Counternarcotics Experts Group established at the Paris Summit, if feasible. (U)



8-21-89

## Attachments

Tab I The Intensified Anti-Narcotics Budget  
Tab II Phased Three-Country Anti-Cocaine Strategy

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF  
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Towards Panama Under Noriega after  
September 1, 1989 (S)

United States policy towards Panama continues to be to achieve the departure of General Noriega from power and the establishment of a democratic government based on the will of the people as expressed in free elections. It now appears certain that General Noriega does not intend to allow this to take place on September 1, the date which the Panamanian Constitution sets for the installation of a new government. Accordingly, I direct that: (S)

1. The United States Government will withhold recognition of any Panamanian Government controlled by General Noriega or holding power at his sufferance. In announcing this fact, we will state that free elections were held in Panama on May 7, 1989, that the Endara slate clearly won those elections, and that the United States will recognize only a government which is the result of a democratic process. (S)
2. The Secretary of State should ask other governments to withhold recognition of any Noriega controlled government, to withdraw their Ambassadors and military attaches from Panama, and to limit any official contact to the minimum level possible. (S)
3. As long as current conditions prevail, the U.S. Embassy in Panama will be maintained in its present status. (S)

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
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4. The Secretary of Treasury should take the appropriate measures to continue to hold in escrow the Panamanian Government assets escrowed for the Panamanian people under the auspices of the Delvalle Government in the absence of a recognized government to alter our escrow instructions. (S)
5. The Secretary of the Treasury should continue to escrow Treaty payments to Panama until there is a Government we recognize in place there. (S)
6. Present U.S. economic sanctions in force in Panama should henceforth be strictly enforced after advance notice is provided to affected U.S. companies. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Relations with the Soviet Union (X)

For forty years the United States has committed its power and will to containing the military and ideological threat of Soviet communism. Containment was never an end in itself; it was a strategy born of the conditions of the postwar world. The United States recognized that, while Soviet military power was not the only threat to international stability, it was the most immediate and grave one. The U.S. challenge was to prevent the spread of Soviet communism while rebuilding the economic, political and social strength of the world's long-standing and new democracies. Those who crafted the strategy of containment also believed that the Soviet Union, denied the course of external expansion, would ultimately have to face and react to the internal contradictions of its own inefficient, repressive and inhumane system. (X)

This strategy provided an enduring pillar for the growth of Western democracy and free enterprise. While the most important goal of containment has been met -- the development of free and prosperous societies in Western Europe and in other parts of the world -- the Soviet military threat has not diminished. Rather, in the last two decades, the Soviet Union has increased its

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military power across the spectrum of capabilities, drawing on that power to exacerbate local conflicts and to conduct a global foreign policy opposed to Western interests. The Soviet Union has stood apart from the international order and often worked to undermine it. (X)

The character of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union leads to the possibility that a new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move beyond containment to a U.S. policy that actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into the existing international system. The U.S.S.R. has indicated an interest in rapprochement with the international order and criticized major tenets of its own postwar political-military policy. (X)

These are words that we can only applaud. But a new relationship with the international system can not simply be declared by Moscow. Nor can it be granted by others. It must be earned through the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy and reinforced by behavior consistent with the principles of world order to which the Soviet Union subscribed in 1945 but has repeatedly violated since. The Soviet Union cannot enjoy the fruits of membership in the community of states while holding ideological principles and engaging in conduct that promote the overthrow of that community. (X)

The transformation of the Soviet Union from a source of instability to a productive force within the family of nations is a long-term goal that can only be pursued from a position of American strength and with patience and creativity. Our policy is not designed to help a particular leader or set of leaders in the Soviet Union. We seek, instead, fundamental alterations in Soviet military force structure, institutions, and practices which can only be reversed at great cost, economically and politically, to the Soviet Union. If we succeed, the ground for cooperation will widen, while that for conflict narrows. The U.S.-Soviet relationship may still be fundamentally competitive, but it will be less militarized and safer. (X)

We are in a period of transition and uncertainty. We will not react to reforms and changes in the Soviet Union that have not yet taken place, nor will we respond to every Soviet initiative. We will be vigilant, recognizing that the Soviet Union is still governed by authoritarian methods and that its powerful armed forces remain a threat to our security and that of our allies. But the United States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue and institution by institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that the Soviet leadership itself has enunciated. Moscow will find the United States a willing partner in building a better relationship. The foundation of that relationship will grow firmer if Soviet reforms lead to conditions that will support a new cooperative relationship between Moscow and the West. Those conditions

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include: (C)

Deployment of a Soviet force posture that is smaller and much less threatening. The United States believes that the Soviet Union has legitimate security interests but Soviet military power is far greater than that needed to defend those interests. (S)

Renunciation of the principle that class conflict is a source of international tension and establishment of a record of conduct consistent with that pledge. (S)

Adherence to the obligation that it undertook at the end of World War II to permit self-determination for the countries of East-Central Europe. Moscow must authoritatively renounce the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and reaffirm the pledge of signatories to the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. (S)

Demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in other regions of the world and serious participation in efforts to ameliorate conflict, including bringing pressure to bear on Soviet clients who do not recognize the legitimate security interests of their neighbors. (S)

Participation in cooperative efforts to stop the proliferation of ballistic missile technology as well as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. (S)

Willingness to cooperate with the United States to address pressing global problems, including the international trade in drugs and narcotics, terrorism, and dangers to the environment. (S)

Institutionalization of democratic internal laws and human rights practices, political pluralism, and a more market-oriented economic structure, which will establish a firm Soviet domestic base for a more productive and cooperative relationship with the free nations of the world. (S)

#### Strategic-Military Objectives

The United States must maintain modern military forces that strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of our allies and friends. The United States will seek to protect and sustain its military-technological advantages. The purpose of our forces is not to put pressure on a weak Soviet economy or to seek military superiority. Rather, U.S. policy recognizes the need to provide a hedge against uncertain long-term developments in the Soviet Union and to impress upon the Soviet leadership the wisdom of pursuing a responsible course. Moscow must be convinced that nothing can be gained by turning back to a more militaristic

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policy. Most importantly, American forces are a reliable and credible guarantee of our safety and of our commitment to the security of our allies in the face of Soviet forces that, even if restructured, will be large and modern. (S)

At the same time, the United States will seek verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies. Arms control is not an end in itself and cannot take the place of robust military forces. The United States Government will ensure that our arms control proposals are consistent with our overall defense strategy. We seek agreements that:

Contribute to stability at lower numerical levels, where desirable, and encourage restructuring of Soviet forces to a less threatening force posture.

Emphasize transparency in our military relationship with the Soviet Union. The goal of greater transparency will be served through verification and confidence building measures, including increased contacts between the military officers of the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

The spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the problem of ballistic missile proliferation are increasingly threatening to our security. (S)

I direct the Secretary of State to:

Lead an interagency effort, in coordination with the review of U.S. proliferation policy, to develop a detailed plan for non-proliferation cooperation with the Soviet Union, including the boundaries of such cooperation. (S)

#### Political-Diplomatic Objectives

##### Regional Issues

U.S. policy will encourage fundamental political and economic reform, including freely contested elections, in East-Central Europe, so that states in that region may once again be productive members of a prosperous, peaceful, and democratic Europe, whole and free from fear of Soviet intervention. Our policy of differentiating among East European states based on their internal political and economic processes, and our support for the CSCE process, will help in the achievement of this goal. (S)

We will engage the Soviet Union on a variety of regional issues not only to seek their resolution, but also in order to test the reality of new Soviet thinking and whether Soviet behavior matches rhetoric in key areas around the world. We also shall seek to limit the expansion of Soviet power through arms

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transfers, force projection, and proxy forces by continued U.S. political, economic and military support for friends and allies, and for freedom fighters. (S)

I direct the Secretary of State to:

Consider the most appropriate ways to engage the Soviets in discussions on resolving regional conflicts and eliminating threatening Soviet positions of influence around the world. (S)

#### Transnational

The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in reversing the spread of drugs and narcotics. The United States must challenge the Soviet Union to refrain from directly or indirectly supporting or training terrorists and insist that its allies do the same. (S)

I direct the Secretary of State to:

Lead an interagency effort to develop a detailed plan for cooperating with the Soviet Union on these matters, including the boundaries of such cooperation given security and intelligence constraints. (S)

I also direct the Secretary of State to:

Examine ways in which the Soviet Union and the United States might cooperate on environmental issues. (S)

The Vice President should:

Explore through the National Space Council ways that the United States and the Soviet Union might jointly use space to advance our mutual interests. A particularly promising area might be research on the environment in support of multilateral efforts to protect our planet. (S)

#### Bilateral Issues

We will encourage an expansion of contacts between the Soviet and American peoples at all levels as a means of promoting Western ideas of democracy and free enterprise. We will insist on full reciprocity in all areas of bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union and in the treatment of U.S. and Soviet official representatives. (S)

The United States supports the expansion of mutually beneficial non-strategic trade on strictly commercial terms. At the same time, our economic policy toward Moscow must be considered within the context of our overall approach to the Soviet Union. In the short run, we are prepared to streamline, in conjunction with our allies, the COCOM list. In the longer run, as the Soviet Union meets appropriate political and economic criteria, the United States will remove or reduce the legislative, administrative and other obstacles to non-

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strategic trade and normal commercial and financial ties. The U.S. private sector would then have wider opportunities to pursue expanded commercial relations with the Soviet Union, except where COCOM controls on strategic trade remain in place. Increased cooperation will be revocable in the event of a reversal in Soviet policy. (S)

The Secretary of State, drawing on other departments and agencies, is directed to:

Encourage public debate on Jackson-Vanik and consult closely with Congress and the relevant public groups. With the requisite support, we will consider a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment if the Soviet Union codifies emigration laws that meet international standards and demonstrates its intent to implement them faithfully. (S)

#### Democratization

The United States is encouraged by emerging trends in the internal political processes in the Soviet Union. Our concern about the character of the Soviet system, which denies its people basic political and economic liberties and pursues a policy of expansion abroad, is at the heart of our differences with Moscow. Let no one doubt the sincerity of the American people and their government in our desire to see reform succeed inside the Soviet Union. We welcome the positive changes that have taken place and we will continue to encourage greater recognition of human rights, market incentives, and free elections. To the extent that Soviet practices are modified and institutions are built based on popular will, we may find that the nature of the threat itself has changed, though any such transformation could take decades. (S)

Where possible, the United States should promote Western values and ideas within the Soviet Union, not in the spirit of provocation or destabilization, but as a means to lay a firm foundation for a cooperative relationship. I direct the United States Information Agency, within budgetary limitations, to find new ways to promote the flow of information about American institutions and ideals to the Soviet Union. A special effort should be made to encourage private sector initiatives in support of this objective. (S)

The Secretary of State is directed to:

Review carefully Soviet compliance with the commitments that led to our conditional agreement to attend the 1991 Moscow human rights conference.

Develop new initiatives in the area of U.S.-Soviet exchanges designed to promote Soviet understanding of the rule of law, free-market economic principles, U.S. business management concepts, and other principles of free Western societies. (S)

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### Public Diplomacy

The United States should make every effort clearly and responsibly to communicate our message about U.S.-Soviet relations at home and abroad. Our goal is a consistent, responsible and sustainable policy toward Moscow. We must stress the comprehensiveness of our agenda as well as the fact that the relationship is moving forward on the basis of long-supported Western objectives to which the Soviet Union is now adapting. (S)

### Conclusion

The goal of restructuring the relationship of the Soviet Union to the international system is an ambitious task. The responsibility for creating the conditions to move beyond containment to integrate the Soviet Union into the family of nations lies first and foremost with Moscow. But the United States will do its part, together with our allies, to challenge and test Soviet intentions and, while maintaining our strength, to work to place Soviet relations with the West on a firmer, more cooperative course than has heretofore been possible. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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September 26, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Arms Control Initiatives (S)

There is an increasingly urgent need to achieve a global ban on chemical weapon (CW) production as well as use. The United States not only faces the continuing threat posed by the Soviet CW capability, but also confronts a growing danger to its own security and to regional stability as a result of the spiraling proliferation of CW capabilities among Third World states. The growing willingness of Third World nations to use CW adds to the urgency, and serves to underscore the costs of delay in fashioning an effective response to this problem. (U)

I have determined that the United States must take new initiatives in the area of CW nonproliferation and arms control to accelerate agreement on, and implementation of, a global ban on the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons and agents. These initiatives will build on the progress already made in negotiations on the chemical weapons convention in the

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Declassified/Released on 8/15/58  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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Conference on Disarmament, supplemented by our bilateral discussions and prospective CW Memorandum of Understanding with the Soviets. (2)

Verification of such a ban has been and will remain a daunting challenge. We must and will make every effort to improve our verification capabilities in this area. I have concluded, however, that the dangers of CW proliferation in the period are so serious that we must proceed with bold steps toward a global ban. We may, as a result, need to rely increasingly on our conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter threats of CW use against the United States or its forward-based forces by states that do not participate in the chemical weapons ban or that violate its provisions. (8)

I therefore direct that the following actions be taken:

- The United States will reaffirm its commitment to reach a multilateral agreement for a global ban on chemical weapons, and its support for the total elimination of chemical weapons and agents within ten years of the convention's entry into force. (4)
- The United States will commit itself to very substantial reductions in its chemical weapons stockpile (down to 500 agent tons) within eight years after entry into force of the chemical weapons convention, provided the Soviet Union is one of the parties. The United States will commit itself to the total elimination of its CW stockpile within ten years after entry into force of the chemical weapons convention, provided all CW-capable states have become party to the CW convention by year eight, or within two years of the time when all CW-capable states do become parties, whichever is later. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, will provide recommendations to me not later than September 30, 1989, on how best to define this standard of "all CW-capable states." The Secretary of Defense will report to me by November 15, 1989, on a plan to accomplish the CW destruction required by these commitments. (8)
- While negotiations on the chemical weapons convention continue, the United States will reduce its CW stockpile to less than 20 percent of its current level (e.g., down to 5000 agent tons), provided the Soviet Union agrees to reduce its CW stockpile to the same level under mutually agreed terms, including suitable provisions for the inspection of

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the CW destruction process. Not later than October 31, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will develop alternatives for review by me and the National Security Council on the specific provisions the United States should seek in such a bilateral agreement, including a plan for step-by step development and implementation of a verification regime. (S)

- The residual stockpiles that would result from the bilateral or multilateral agreement should be modernized by the continued development and deployment of binary weapons. The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will report to me by November 15, 1989, on plans for modernizing such a significantly reduced stockpile in ways that substantially increase the percentage of the stockpile devoted to filled munitions, and ensure that air-delivered weapons are included. (S)
- Not later than November 15, 1989, the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide recommendations to me and the National Security Council for any changes that may be required in our strategy of deterrence (including declaratory policy), force structure, or force deployments as a result of the reduced availability of retaliatory CW capabilities. (S)
- The current U.S. "anywhere, anytime" approach to CW verification should be reviewed with a view to taking better account of the costs and limitations, as well as the effectiveness and benefits, of such highly intrusive inspection regimes. Approaches analogous to U.S. proposals in START for suspect-site inspection with right of refusal should be analyzed as part of this review. Not later than November 15, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will develop and evaluate alternatives to the current U.S. CW verification proposals for review by me and the National Security Council. (S)
- The U.S. Government will expand its research and development efforts to improve its capabilities for verifying compliance with a global ban. Not later than November 15, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will report to me and the National Security Council on plans for doing so. (S)

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- The current U.S. position on sanctions against CW use should be reviewed and expanded to include consideration of: (a) whether to propose sanctions against treaty violations other than use and, if so, what kind of "demonstration of violation" should be required; (b) what kinds of sanctions would be most appropriate and effective for each type of violation; and (c) what kinds of sanctions could usefully be applied unilaterally by the United States, or multilaterally outside the framework of the CW convention, or before that agreement enters into force. Not later than November 15, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will report to me and the National Security Council on the results of its review of CW sanctions. (C)
- Possible approaches to increase unilateral and multilateral export controls on "dangerous chemicals," and on technologies and equipment for the production of chemical agents and weapons, should be reviewed. Potential positive and negative incentives to discourage states from constructing "dual use" chemical facilities should be included as part of this study. Not later than December 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should report to me and the National Security Council on the results of this review. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1989

National Security Directive 25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward the February 1990 Nicaragua  
Election (S)

The February 1990 election in Nicaragua can be a referendum on Sandinista rule if it is free and fair. The role of the United States Government can be a major positive factor in that referendum. Therefore, I hereby direct the following actions.  
(S)

- There shall be no covert assistance to political or other groups in Nicaragua in the upcoming election campaign. (S)
- The Department of State shall undertake a vigorous overt program to support a free and fair election process. Every effort will be made, consistent with U.S. law, to assist the democratic opposition to compete effectively with the Sandinista regime. (S)
- If the Sandinistas block overt assistance, the Secretary of State and the DCI should seek rapid consideration of other options. (S)



cc The Vice President  
The Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

Declassified/Released on 8/19/98  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND  
BUDGET

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (U)

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral U.S. military intervention. The United States also will encourage the effective support and participation of our western allies and Japan to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. (U)

Force Levels

I endorse the Secretary of Defense's decision to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean to the deployment of either a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or a Battleship Battle Group (BBBG) for six months annually. Whenever the U.S. naval presence is "gapped", the Department of Defense will designate a CVBG or BBBG to respond to contingencies in the region on short notice. The Department of Defense also should attempt to schedule other military deployments or activities in the region during such

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periods. Any future major force reductions or adjustments in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf will be undertaken only after appropriate interagency consultations. The Director of Central Intelligence should increase collection on early warning indicators in the Gulf area, particularly when there is a "gap" in the U.S. Indian Ocean presence. (S)

It is important for the United States to continue to nurture the mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships with the GCC states that grew out of the Iran/Iraq war. The Department of Defense should seek to maintain and, if possible, increase its peacetime and contingency access to friendly regional states, and to broaden the scope of security cooperation through military exercises, prepositioning arrangements and contingency planning. (S)

### Arms Sales

The United States will sell U.S. military equipment to help friendly regional states meet their legitimate defense requirements, so long as such sales do not present a security threat to Israel. (S)

The Secretaries of State and Defense should develop a strategy for a long-term program of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states that serves our national interest but does not increase Israel's security burden. This strategy should focus on those sales likely to be requested that might be controversial, such as main battle tanks and advanced fighter aircraft, and outline actions for the Administration to undertake in order to obtain congressional and domestic support for such sales. (S)

### Iraq

Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions, for which we would seek the broadest possible support from our allies and friends. Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response. Human rights considerations should continue to be an important element in our policy toward Iraq. In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating in the Middle East peace process. (S)

We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with

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our non-proliferation and other significant objectives. Also, as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis. (S)


### Iran

The United States should continue to be prepared for a normal relationship with Iran on the basis of strict reciprocity. A process of normalization must begin with Iranian action to cease its support for international terrorism and help obtain the release of all American hostages, which will not be a matter for bargaining or blackmail. Other criteria Iran must meet before full normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations include halting its subversive activities and improving relations with its neighbors, making a good faith effort toward a peace treaty with Iraq, and improving its human rights practices. (S)

It is critical that the United States continue to speak with one voice regarding Iran. The Department of State should be the conduit for all contacts with Iran, keeping other National Security Council members informed. Except for authorized U.S. Government officials meeting with any potential source who may have information that could help obtain release of our hostages in Lebanon, our dealings should be with Iranian government officials, not with factions or intermediaries. (S)

### The Soviet Union

The United States should continue to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on regional issues, doing what we can to discourage arms sales and potential meddling in Iran and elsewhere in the region. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 28

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Security Directive on Sealift (U)

Sealift is essential both to executing this country's forward defense strategy and to maintaining a wartime economy. The United States' national sealift objective is to ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources will be available to meet defense deployment, and essential economic requirements in support of our national security strategy. The broad purpose of this directive is to ensure that the US maintains the capability to meet sealift requirements in the event of crisis or war. Toward this end, the following policy guidelines are established:

1. The US-owned commercial ocean carrier industry, to the extent it is capable, will be relied upon to provide sealift in peace, crisis, and war. This capability will be augmented during crisis and war by reserve fleets comprised of ships with national defense features that are not available in sufficient numbers or types in the active US-owned commercial industry. The Department of Transportation is responsible for determining whether adequate manpower is available to support the operation of reserve ships during a crisis. In peacetime, the Department of Defense will

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5-10-95  
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by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council  
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operate the minimum number of sealift ships, including reserve ships, needed to meet the Joint Chiefs of Staff's exercise requirements and shipping requirements that cannot be accommodated by US-flag commercial ocean carriers. (U)

2. We must be prepared to respond unilaterally to security threats in geographic areas not covered by alliance commitments. Sufficient US-owned sealift resources must be available to meet requirements for such unilateral response. (U)

3. In addition to the US flag fleet we will continue to rely on U.S.-owned (Effective US Controlled (EUSC)) and allied shipping resources to meet strategic commitments to our established alliances. The Department of Transportation is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate legal and procedural mechanisms necessary for exerting effective control over EUSC ships are in place. The Department of Transportation shall also continue to seek commitment of sealift resources from NATO allies to meet alliance requirements through the NATO Planning Board on Ocean Shipping. The Departments of State and Defense shall examine the extent to which formal agreements with other maritime nations should be negotiated to provide additional sealift for strategic commitments. (U)

4. The Department of Defense will determine the requirements for sealift of deploying forces, follow-on supply and sustainment, shipbuilding and ship repair. In coordination with the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation will determine the capacity of our merchant marine industries to meet these requirements and to provide the sealift required to support essential industrial activity during wartime. Both Departments will promote the incorporation of national defense features in new and existing ships. (U)

5. The Departments of State and Transportation, the Special Trade Representative, and other appropriate agencies shall ensure that international agreements and federal policies governing use of foreign flag carriers protect our national security interests and do not place US industry at an unfair competitive disadvantage in world markets. During peacetime, federal agencies shall promote, through efficient application of laws and regulations, the readiness of the US merchant marine and supporting industries to respond to critical national security requirements. US government policies and programs shall provide for an environment which fosters the competitiveness and industrial preparedness of all industries including the maritime industry. (U)

6. Development and implementation of specific sealift and supporting programs will be made with full consideration of the costs and benefits involved. New programs to enhance our ability to meet national security sealift requirements shall compete for resources with other national security programs. (U)

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Progress towards implementation of this policy will be overseen by the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Emergency Preparedness and Mobilization. Issues associated with implementation of this policy may be resolved through this structure. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: The FY 1990 Aqueduct Nuclear Test Program (U)

Approval of the FY 1990 Aqueduct Nuclear Test Program proposed by the Secretary of Energy is granted. In implementing the Aqueduct program, the following guidance will apply:

- All tests associated with Aqueduct will be conducted in compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, with the National Environmental Policy Act and all other relevant environmental laws and regulations. (S)
- The Department of Energy shall review each test with design yields near 150 kilotons to reasonably ensure that the device yield does not exceed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit. (S)

The testing agency shall continue to coordinate public affairs activities related to the implementation of the Aqueduct program, as appropriate, in advance of test events. (U)

There has been a steady decline in the number of nuclear tests conducted over the past several years, in part because of imposed funding limits. In order to evaluate the national security implications of this reduced quantity of tests and the ability of the Department of Energy to meet its national security responsibilities, the Secretary of Energy, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a review of nuclear testing requirements. This review should consider:

- maintenance of existing stockpile weapons; (S)

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- continued enhancement of the safety and security of the existing and future stockpile; ~~(S)~~
- evolving strategic and theater military requirements; (S)
- evolving directions in arms control; ~~(C)~~
- maintenance of our nuclear technology at the forefront of scientific capability so as to avoid technological surprise; and ~~(S)~~
- new directions in testing and diagnostic capability. (S)

This report should develop testing priorities in the event that there will remain fiscal constraints on the number of tests conducted. This report should be submitted to me by March 31, 1990. ~~(C)~~

The FY 1991 Nuclear Test Program should be provided for approval by September 1, 1990. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 32

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Economic Sanctions Against Panama (C)

As an additional step in implementing U.S. policy of steadily increasing pressures against the Noriega regime in order to bring about Noriega's departure from power and the establishment of a democratic government, I have decided to prohibit vessels of Panamanian registry from entering United States ports. (S)

Accordingly, I hereby direct that:

1. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Transportation, prepare an appropriate Executive Order to implement this prohibition effective midnight, January 31, 1990. (C)
2. The Secretary of State inform interested governments of our intended action. (C)

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by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 34

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK  
OF THE UNITED STATES  
ADMINISTRATOR, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION  
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,  
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

SUBJECT: Partnership with Panama: Action Plan to Foster  
Economic Recovery (U)

The U.S. must make every effort to assist the Government of Panama (GOP) and the Panamanian people in their efforts to restore the health of Panama's economy. Private sector initiative, supported by the government's economic reform policies, will be the key to Panama's recovery. To assist Panama, I direct that the following action plan be implemented forthwith: (U)

I. Humanitarian Assistance

The Administrator of the Agency for International Development shall initiate a \$42 million humanitarian assistance program for Panama, covering:

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- replacement housing for the former residents of the Chorillo area;
- an emergency public works program, principally for Panama City and Colon, but also including rural areas;
- small business rehabilitation to assist those businesses affected by the looting that do not have access to the formal credit system; and
- technical assistance to GOP agencies. (U)

The Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense shall develop ways to assist U.S. firms wishing to donate products to Panamanian businesses. (U)

II. Loans, Guarantees and Export Opportunities to Strengthen Panama's Private Sector and to Create Jobs

The President of the Export-Import Bank (Exim) shall, consistent with statutory criteria, provide up to \$400 million in short-term and medium-term guarantees, through Exim and its affiliate, the Foreign Credit Insurance Association, to finance sales of American products. (U)

The Administrator of AID shall, consistent with statutory criteria, use \$15 million in Trade Credit Insurance Program funds authority to support additional Eximbank lending to private sector borrowers. (U)

The President of the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC) shall reopen its insurance and finance programs to support American private investment in Panama. (U)

The Secretary of Agriculture shall initiate, in cooperation with appropriate agencies, a \$15 million P.L. 480 Title 1 program and a \$15 million GSM 102/103 program for Panama. (U)

The United States Trade Representative shall:

- restore Panama's suspended 1990 sugar quota and, consistent with U.S. policy, compensate Panama for its foregone 1989 quota;
- initiate an educational program to ensure Panama makes full use of trade benefits under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and Generalized System of Preferences programs; and
- remove the quota on cotton pants. (U)

The Secretary of Transportation shall arrange for the Federal Aviation Administration to negotiate a Memorandum of Agreement

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with the GOP on the provision of technical assistance, in order to ease air travel to and from Panama. (U)

The Secretary of State shall, if the GOP so wishes, arrange that the already-negotiated bilateral investment treaty be resubmitted to Congress. (U)

The Secretary of the Treasury shall:

- discuss with the GOP the conclusion of a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA), thus permitting U.S. firms, under established tax guidelines, to deduct expenses of conventions held in Panama. A TIEA would also make Panama eligible for Section 936 funds;
- working with other interested agencies and organizations, offer technical assistance to the Panamanian banking sector;
- initiate discussions with the GOP with the view toward concluding an agreement pursuant to Section 4702 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 for the exchange of large currency transaction information. (U)

The Secretary of Commerce shall lead a business development mission to Panama and undertake other efforts to stimulate trade and investment with Panama. (U)

### III. Department of Defense Assistance

The Secretary of Defense shall:

- resume promptly preferential buying of Panamanian goods and services by U.S. military authorities in Panama, the Panama Canal Commission and all other U.S. entities, in accordance with the provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977;
- undertake a training program aimed at providing repairs to the Trans-Isthmian Highway and the Panama Railway, necessary for support of normal DOD activities in Panama;
- authorize the return of U.S. military dependents to Panama, when he determines the military situation permits;
- discuss with the GOP an acceleration of property transfers from the U.S. military to Panamanian authorities;
- working with the Secretary of State, examine with the GOP the possibility of widening the Panama Canal. (U)

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IV. Rebuilding the U.S. Working Relationship with the GOP

The U.S. Ambassador to Panama shall submit recommendations for staff and programs from other U.S. agencies such as AID, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Health and Human Resources, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Small Business Administration. ~~(C)~~

The Secretary of State, working with the GOP and the Government of Japan, shall urge resumption of the Panama Canal Alternative Study Commission. (U)

V. Promoting Sustained Economic Recovery

Significant but temporary external economic assistance will be required to assure that Panama's economy returns to a sustained growth pattern. This undertaking will be a partnership involving the United States, Panama, other donor countries and international financial institutions (IFIs). (U)

The Secretaries of State and the Treasury, in cooperation with the Director of OMB, are directed to seek an additional \$500 million in FY 90 for U.S. assistance to Panama. This amount shall be offset from other programs. They should develop a legislative strategy to support this request. The \$500 million shall be used to help Panama normalize relations with the IFIs for balance of payments support and business credit, for a public investment program, for public sector restructuring and for development support. ~~(C)~~

The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish a Support Group of friendly donor countries to help clear Panama's arrears to the IFIs. Treasury will ask the IDB to play a special role in the Support Group. (U)

The Secretaries of State and the Treasury shall work for an early and generous rescheduling of Panama's debt to foreign governments under the auspices of the Paris Club. (U)

The Secretary of the Treasury shall work toward the conclusion of a satisfactory financing package for Panama's commercial bank debt that addresses the amount of debt and the level of debt service payments in the context of the strengthened debt strategy. (U)

VI. Oversight

Agencies should report implementation of these activities to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who will coordinate and review the implementation of this economic action program. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 35

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC AND  
DOMESTIC POLICY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Economic Initiative (C)

To implement the various economic initiatives proposed at Malta, I direct that the following process be used:

1. The National Security Council and the Economic Policy Council will jointly coordinate the economic initiatives and outstanding policy differences among departments and agencies. All relevant departments and agencies will be included in NSC/EPC meetings on these economic initiatives. (C)
2. The Trade Policy Review Group has responsibility to prepare for negotiations on the trade agreement, investment treaty and GATT observership. The United States Trade Representative will have lead responsibility for conduct of negotiations on the trade agreement and issues relating to GATT observership. The Secretary of State will have lead responsibility for the conduct of negotiations on the investment treaty. (C)

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by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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3. The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs will co-chair joint meetings of the PCC for Soviet Affairs and the PCC for International Economics to develop the various technical economic cooperation issues proposed at Malta, and for managing matters dealing with the Jackson-Vanik restrictions. The joint PCCs will also be responsible for developing a legislative and public liaison strategy to explore the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees and for issues relating to improving ties between the Soviet Union and the OECD and East-West economic cooperation through the economic basket of the CSCE process. (S)

4. An ad hoc steering group co-chaired by State and Treasury at the sub-Cabinet level will have responsibility for integrating the various economic subjects discussed above in preparation for the U.S.-Soviet Summit for presentation to the joint meetings of the National Security Council and Economic Policy Council. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Decisions on START Issues (U)

At the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit, I hope to reach substantive agreement on all of the major START issues on a basis that will advance U.S. national security interests and promote international stability. The following decisions are designed to help achieve that goal by making a best faith effort to resolve the issues that they address. (C)

1. **ALCMs and SLCMs.** Building on current areas of agreement with the Soviet Union and existing guidance, the U.S. can accept a package that includes the following elements:

ALCMs

- a. 600 km range threshold provided that non-nuclear ALCMs such as Tacit Rainbow are excluded from START limits. (S)
- b. Except as provided in subparagraph (d) below, current and future U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs will be counted at 10 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber and will not be equipped for more than 20 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber. (S)
- c. Except as provided in subparagraph (d) below, current and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs will be counted at 8 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber and will not be equipped for more than 12 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber. (S)

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- d. Subject to a mutually acceptable definition of "as equipped," the U.S. may agree that any U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs in excess of 150-180 will count against the 6000 warhead limit on an "as equipped" basis. Soviet heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs in excess of 140 percent of the 150-180 threshold also will count against the 6000 warhead limit on an "as equipped" basis. (S)
- e. As an alternative to subparagraph (d), the U.S. may accept a sublimit on the number of U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs that adequately protects options for the duration of the START Treaty. Under this approach, the Soviets may deploy up to 40 percent more heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs than the U.S., subject to other START constraints, including the 1600/6000 START limits. (S)
- f. The U.S. requires a continuing right to convert up to 100 non-modern heavy bombers to "former heavy bombers" that would not be counted within the 1600/6000 START aggregates. The U.S. may propose that "non-modern" heavy bombers be defined as being those of a type that has been deployed longer than 10-15 years. (S)

SLCMs

As part of the ALCM/SLCM package, the U.S. may propose that each side make a declaration of policy concerning nuclear-armed SLCMs with ranges in excess of 600 km that includes the following elements:

- a. A statement that the declaration will be politically binding. (S)
- b. A specification of the maximum number of nuclear-armed SLCMs that will be deployed for each of the next five years. This specification would be updated annually. (S)
- c. A statement that no more than 875-1000 nuclear-armed SLCMs will be deployed at any one time for the duration of the START Treaty. (S)
- d. Information about which types of surface ships and submarines are capable of deploying nuclear-armed SLCMs. (S)

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- e. An annual exchange of data on nuclear SLCMs with ranges between 300 and 600 km. (S)
- f. A statement that nuclear-armed SLCMs with multiple independently targeted warheads will not be produced or deployed. (S)

2. **Verifying Non-Deployed Mobile Missile Production.** The U.S. may offer an approach to Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) based on the following principles:

- a. Numerical reciprocity. (S)
- b. Up to approximately four facilities in each country may be subject to PPCM. (S)
- c. The Soviet facilities at which PPCM should be established is a combination of up to approximately four solid propellant rocket motor production facilities and final assembly facilities that would give us the highest confidence in monitoring the production of mobile ICBMs. (S)

Solid rocket motor production facilities in both countries at which PPCM is not established should be subject to an annual quota of mandatory, short-notice inspections if they are determined to be capable of producing first-stage motors for mobile ICBMs. All other solid rocket motor production facilities in both countries at which PPCM has not been established should be subject to periodic, scheduled tours to confirm that they have not been given the capability to produce first-stage motors for mobile ICBMs. (S)

The U.S. and Soviet Union should first exchange lists of all their facilities that currently produce first stage motors of mobile ICBMs and other facilities at which they are prepared to accept PPCM. These lists will be mutually agreed. The two sides will then agree to establish PPCM at specified facilities on these lists. (S)

The U.S. and Soviet Union will also exchange lists of all solid propellant rocket motor production facilities. Following the identification of those facilities at which PPCM will be established, an exchange of data and one-time tours of all solid propellant rocket motor production facilities in both countries should be conducted to determine which facilities will be subject to mandatory short-notice inspections, and which will be subject to periodic, scheduled tours. (S)

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In order to implement this regime in the Soviet Union as soon as possible, the U.S. may accept the simultaneous implementation of such a regime in the United States, even if mobile ICBMs are not yet in production in the U.S. at that time. (S)

The U.S. should propose that questions about activities at facilities that are not subject to either short-notice inspections or periodic, scheduled tours may be raised in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). The two sides may agree in the JCIC to inspect such facilities to aid in resolving any compliance concerns. (S)

3. **Limits on Heavy ICBMs.** On the understanding that the U.S. will seek the ultimate elimination of heavy ICBMs in follow-on negotiations, the U.S. may accept a package of constraints on heavy ICBMs consisting of:

- a. A maximum of 1540 RVs on 154 heavy ICBMs. (S)
- b. A ban on new types of heavy ICBMs. (S)
- c. A ban on mobile heavy ICBMs. (S)
- d. Such limitations on the modernization of existing types of heavy ICBMs as may be agreed between the two sides. (S)

4. **Limits on Mobile ICBMs and Mobile ICBM RVs.** The U.S. should propose a subceiling of 800-1200 on the number of deployed mobile ICBM RVs permitted in START. The U.S. will not seek a subceiling on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs permitted in START. (S)

5. 

1.5c

Accordingly, the U.S. should address the Backfire issue by seeking Soviet undertakings in the START context that would provide added confidence that it will remain dedicated to theater missions, and will not be employed as a strategic bomber. These should include, at a minimum, an undertaking that Backfire will not be given a capability to operate at intercontinental ranges.

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Additionally, the U.S. should seek a Soviet commitment to include all Backfires based in the ATTU region in CFE limits on aircraft.  
(S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organizing to Manage On-site Inspection for Arms  
Control (U)

The On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA) has been established within the Department of Defense to coordinate on-site inspection and escort activities for the INF Treaty. On-site inspection will be a major element of future arms control agreements, including Conventional Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and Nuclear Testing Talks. (U)

To prepare and plan effectively for on-site inspection for these future arms control agreements, the mission of OSIA is hereby expanded to include planning for the manpower, operational, logistic, and administrative requirements that would ensue from on-site inspection and escort responsibilities for START, CFE, CW, and NTT. (S)

The Secretary of Defense shall assign inspection and escort functions to OSIA consistent with such detailed NSC guidance for implementing individual agreements as may be provided. He will also determine the resources required by OSIA to enable it to assume these additional responsibilities, and obtain those resources as necessary. (C)

I am committed to the prompt, effective and efficient implementation of arms control treaties once they are ratified. Accordingly, the Secretaries and Directors of all relevant agencies should be prepared to execute their responsibilities for

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Declassify on: OADR

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Declassified/Released on 11-22-  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
B. Van Tassel, National Security Council  
F89-191 (4)

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each of the treaties. They must plan for, budget and allocate resources, including reprogramming, as required. ~~(S)~~

This National Security Directive augments NSDD-296 by expanding the mission of OSIA. ~~(S)~~

*Ag Bush*

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20779 ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
POLICY  
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
AGENCY  
ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
MANAGER OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Policy for the Security of National  
Security Telecommunications and Information  
Systems (U)

Continuing advances in microelectronics technology have stimulated an unprecedented growth in the demand for and supply of telecommunications and information processing services within the government and throughout the private sector. As new technologies have been applied, traditional distinctions between telecommunications and information systems have begun to disappear. Although this trend promises greatly improved efficiency and effectiveness, it also poses significant security challenges. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

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Partially Declassified/Released on 11-22-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council  
F89-191

Telecommunications and information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception, unauthorized electronic access, and related forms of technical exploitation, as well as other dimensions of the foreign intelligence threat. The technology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is used extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist groups and criminal elements. A comprehensive and coordinated approach must be taken to protect the government's national security telecommunications and information systems (national security systems) against current and projected threats. This approach must include mechanisms for formulating policy, overseeing systems security resources programs, and coordinating and executing technical activities. (U)

This Directive establishes initial objectives, policies, and an organizational structure to guide the conduct of activities to secure national security systems from exploitation; establishes a mechanism for policy development and dissemination; and assigns responsibilities for implementation. It is intended to ensure full participation and cooperation among the various existing centers of technical expertise throughout the Executive branch, and to promote a coherent and coordinated defense against the foreign intelligence threat to these systems. This Directive recognizes the special requirements for protection of intelligence sources and methods. (U)

1. Objectives. Ensuring the security of national security systems is vitally important to the operational effectiveness of the national security activities of the government and to military combat readiness. I, therefore, direct that the government's capabilities for securing national security systems against technical exploitation threats be maintained or, if inadequate, improved to provide for:

a. Reliable and continuing assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, and implementation of appropriate, effective countermeasures; (U)

b. A technical base within the U.S. Government to achieve this security, and initiatives with the private sector to maintain, complement, or enhance that government technical base and to ensure information systems security products are available to secure national security systems; and, (U)

c. Effective and efficient application of U.S. Government resources. (U)

2. Policies. In support of these objectives, the following policies are established:



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a. U.S. Government national security systems shall be secured by such means as are necessary to prevent compromise, denial, or exploitation; (U)

b. Federal agencies shall require that national security systems operated and maintained by U.S. Government contractors likewise be secured. (U)

3. Implementation. This Directive establishes an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems, an interagency group at the operating level, an executive agent and a national manager to implement these objectives and policies. (U)

4. National Security Council/Policy Coordinating Committee for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems.

The National Security Council/Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for National Security Telecommunications, chaired by the Department of Defense, under the authority of National Security Directives 1 and 10, assumed the responsibility for the National Security Telecommunications NSDD 97 Steering Group. By authority of this Directive, the PCC for National Security Telecommunications is renamed the PCC for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems, and shall expand its authority to include the responsibilities to protect the government's national security telecommunications and information systems. When addressing issues concerning the security of national security telecommunications and information systems, the membership of the PCC shall be expanded to include representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security shall be invited as an observer. The Policy Coordinating Committee shall:

a. Oversee the implementation of this Directive; (U)

b. Develop policy recommendations and provide guidance to the operating level National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC); (U)

c. Review and resolve matters referred to it by the NSTISSC in fulfilling the responsibilities outlined in paragraph 5, below; (U)

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d. Be subject to the policies of the Director of Central Intelligence on matters pertaining to the protection of intelligence sources and methods; and, (U)

e. Recommend for Presidential approval additions or revisions to this Directive as national interests may require. (U)

5. The National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee.

a. The NSTISSC is established to consider technical matters and develop operating policies, procedures, guidelines, instructions, and standards as necessary to implement provisions of this Directive. The Committee shall be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) and shall be composed of a voting representative of each of the following:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Secretary of Transportation  
The Secretary of Energy  
Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Administrator, General Services Administration  
The Chief of Staff, United States Army  
The Chief of Naval Operations  
The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
Director, National Security Agency  
Manager, National Communications System  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (U)

b. The NSTISSC shall:

(1) Develop such specific operating policies, procedures, guidelines, instructions, standards, objectives, and priorities as may be required to implement this Directive; (U)

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(2) Provide systems security guidance for national security systems to Executive departments and agencies; (U)

(3) Submit annually to the Executive Agent an evaluation of the security status of national security systems with respect to established objectives and priorities; (U)

(4) Approve the release of cryptologic national security systems technical security material, information, and techniques to foreign governments or international organizations. The concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence shall be obtained with respect to those activities which he manages; (U)

(5) Establish and maintain a national system for promulgating the operating policies, instructions, directives, and guidance, which may be issued pursuant to this Directive; (U)

(6) Establish permanent and temporary subcommittees as necessary to discharge its responsibilities; (U)

(7) Make recommendations to the PCC for NSTISSC membership and establish criteria and procedures for permanent observers from other departments or agencies affected by specific matters under deliberation, who may attend meetings upon invitation of the Chairman; and, (U)

(8) Interact, as necessary, with the National Communications System Committee of Principals established by Executive Order 12472 to ensure the coordinated execution of assigned responsibilities. (U)

c. The Committee shall have two subcommittees, one focusing on telecommunications security and one focusing on information systems security. The two subcommittees shall coordinate their actions and recommendations concerning implementation of protective measures, which shall combine and coordinate both areas where appropriate. (U)

d. The Committee shall have a permanent secretariat composed of personnel of the National Security Agency and such other personnel from Executive departments and agencies represented on the Committee as are requested

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by the Chairman. The National Security Agency shall provide facilities and support as required. Other Executive departments and agencies shall provide facilities and support as requested by the Chairman.  
(U)

6. The Executive Agent of the Government for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security.

a. Consistent with the authority for communications security given the Secretary of Defense in Executive Order 12333, the Secretary of Defense shall serve as Executive Agent of the Government for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security and shall be responsible for implementing, under his signature, policies and procedures to:

(1) Ensure the development, in conjunction with Committee member departments and agencies, of plans and programs to fulfill the objectives of this Directive, including the development of necessary security architectures; (U)

(2) Procure for and provide to Executive departments and agencies and, where appropriate, to government contractors and foreign governments, consistent with the laws of the United States, such technical security material, other technical assistance, and other related services of common concern, as required to accomplish the objectives of this Directive; (U)

(3) Approve and provide minimum security standards and doctrine for systems subject to this Directive; (U)

(4) Conduct, approve, or endorse research and development of techniques and equipment to secure national security systems; and, (U)

(5) Operate, or coordinate the efforts, of U.S. Government technical centers related to national security telecommunications and information systems security. (U)

b. The Executive Agent shall review and assess the National Manager's recommendations on the proposed national security telecommunications and information systems security programs and budgets for the Executive departments and agencies. Where appropriate,

alternative systems security recommendations will be provided to agency heads, to National Security Council Committees, and to the OMB. In addition, the Executive Agent shall submit, annually, the security status of national security systems with respect to established objectives and priorities through the National Security Council to the President. (U)

7. The National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security.

The Director, National Security Agency, is designated the National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for carrying out the foregoing responsibilities. In fulfilling these responsibilities the National Manager shall:

- a. Examine U.S. Government national security systems and evaluate their vulnerability to foreign interception and exploitation. Any such activities, including those involving monitoring of official telecommunications, shall be conducted in strict compliance with law, Executive Order and implementing procedures, and applicable Presidential directive. No monitoring shall be performed without advising the heads of the agencies, departments, or services concerned; (U)
- b. Act as the U.S. Government focal point for cryptography, telecommunications systems security, and information systems security for national security systems; (U)
- c. Conduct, approve, or endorse research and development of techniques and equipment to secure national security systems; (U)
- d. Review and approve all standards, techniques, systems, and equipment related to the security of national security systems; (U)
- e. Conduct foreign computer security and communications security liaison, including entering into agreements with foreign governments and with international and private organizations regarding national security systems, except for those foreign intelligence relationships conducted for intelligence purposes by the Director of Central Intelligence. Any such agreements shall be coordinated with affected departments and agencies; (U)

f. Operate such printing and fabrication facilities as may be required to perform critical functions related to the provisions of cryptographic and other technical security material or services; (U)

g. Assess the overall security posture of and disseminate information on threats to and vulnerabilities of national security systems; (U)

h. Operate a central technical center to evaluate and certify the security of national security telecommunications and information systems; (U)

i. Prescribe the minimum standards, methods, and procedures for protecting cryptographic and other technical security material, techniques, and information related to national security systems; (U)

j. Review and assess annually the national security telecommunications systems security programs and budgets of Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and recommend alternatives, where appropriate, for the Executive Agent; (U)

k. Review annually the aggregated national security information systems security program and budget recommendations of the Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government for the Executive Agent; (U)

l. Request from the heads of Executive departments and agencies such information and technical support as may be needed to discharge the responsibilities assigned herein; (U)

m. Coordinate with the National Institute for Standards and Technology in accordance with the provisions of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235); and (U)

n. Enter into agreements for the procurement of technical security material and other equipment, and their provision to Executive departments and agencies, where appropriate, to government contractors, and foreign governments. (U)

8. The Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies shall:

a. Be responsible for achieving and maintaining secure national security systems within their departments or agencies; (U)

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b. Ensure that policies, procedures, guidelines, instructions, and standards issued pursuant to this Directive are implemented within their departments or agencies; and (U)

c. Provide to the NSTISSC, the Executive Agent, and the National Manager, as appropriate, such information as may be required to discharge responsibilities assigned herein, consistent with relevant law, Executive Order, and Presidential directive. (U)

9. Additional Responsibilities. The Director, Office of Management and Budget, shall:

a. Specify data to be provided during the annual budget review by Executive departments and agencies on program and budgets relating to security of their national security systems; (U)

b. Consolidate and provide such data to the National Manager via the Executive Agent; and (U)

c. Review for consistency with this Directive, and amend as appropriate, OMB policies and regulations which may pertain to the subject matter herein. (U)

10. Nothing in this Directive shall:

a. Alter or supersede the existing authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence; (U)

b. Authorize the Committee, the Executive Agent, or the National Manager authority to examine the facilities of other Executive departments and agencies without approval of the head of such department or agency, nor to request or collect information concerning their operation for any purpose not provided for herein; (U)

c. Amend or contravene the provisions of existing law, Executive Order, or Presidential directive which pertain to the protection of sensitive information, to the protection of national security information, to the privacy aspects or financial management of information systems or to the administrative requirements for safeguarding such resources against fraud, waste, and abuse; (U)


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d. Provide authority to issue policies, procedure, guidelines, instructions, standards, or priorities or operate programs concerning security of systems other than national security systems; (U)

e. Be intended to establish additional review processes for the procurement of information processing systems; (U)

f. Alter or rescind policies or programs begun under PD-24 or NSDD-145 that may be pertinent to national security systems. Policies or programs retained pursuant to this provision shall not be construed to apply to systems within the purview of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (PL100-235); or (U)

1.5(d)



11. For the purposes of this Directive, the following terms shall have the meanings indicated:

a. Telecommunications means the preparation, transmission, communication, or related processing of information (writing, images, sounds or other data) by electrical, electromagnetic, electromechanical, electro-optical, or electronic means; (U)

b. Information Systems means any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data and includes computer software, firmware, and hardware; (U)



c. Telecommunications and Information Systems Security means protection afforded to telecommunications and information systems, in order to prevent exploitation through interception, unauthorized electronic access, or related technical intelligence threats, and to ensure authenticity. Such protection results from the application of security measures (including cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and computer security) to systems which generate, store, process, transfer, or communicate information of use to an adversary, and also includes the physical protection of technical security material and technical security information; (U)

d. Technical security material means equipment, components, devices, and associated documentation or other media which pertain to cryptography, or to the securing of telecommunications and information systems; (U)

e. National security systems are those telecommunications and information systems operated by the U.S. Government, its contractors, or agents, that contain classified information or, as set forth in 10 U.S.C. Section 2315, that involves intelligence activities, involves cryptologic activities related to national security, involves command and control of military forces, involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapon system, or involves equipment that is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions. (U)

12. Except for ongoing telecommunications protection activities mandated by and pursuant to PD-24 and NSDD-145, NSDD-145 is hereby rescinded. (U)





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
materials, as may be agreed to by DOE and DOD. These parts may be used in nuclear weapons training programs, research and development, and production. Additionally, DOE may temporarily transfer parts or test units containing fissile materials or plutonium power supplies for development and flight testing programs. (U)

3. DOE, in coordination with DOD, shall make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads during FY 1990-1995 as may be necessary to accommodate changes in DOE materials availability, production and retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements; or as necessary to accommodate changes required by DOD because of adjustments in force structure requirements. These changes may not exceed plus or minus 10 percent of the totals each year in each of the categories of the active stockpile. In addition, any other change which indicates a significant shift in defense requirements or DOE production capabilities, will be submitted to me for approval. ~~(SFRD)~~

4. DOD, in coordination with DOE, may retain custody of nuclear warheads that are designated as retired for a period of up to 24 months from the designation date to reduce DOE requirements for weapons storage. (C)

5. Nuclear warhead modernization programs will incorporate insensitive high explosive, as technically and operationally feasible, to minimize the potential for nuclear material scattering in an accident or sabotage situation. Older weapons lacking modern safety and security features, that are planned for extended retention, will be reviewed annually by DOD and DOE to determine if they should be included in the Stockpile Improvement Program. (U)

6. DOE shall provide the capacity and capability for nuclear materials and weapon production throughout the full planning and projection periods covered by the stockpile plan to include provisions for reasonable future contingencies. DOE shall establish and maintain to the extent feasible, a reserve of weapon-grade plutonium metal and highly enriched uranium metal to support the equivalent of approximately one year of weapons production. (U)

 1.50  
(S)  
There are considerable uncertainties that will affect the future size and characteristics of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile,

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
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including the probability of conclusion of new arms control treaties, possible unilateral actions with respect to U.S. weapon deployments, the schedule for resumption of the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and the capacity of the production complex. To be prepared to address these uncertainties and their potential impact, the following studies and plans shall be accomplished:

- o The Nuclear Weapons Council shall review the requirements for reserves of plutonium, uranium, and tritium and report detailed recommendations on the size of the reserves, how they are determined, the form of the material, and the plan for achieving the reserves. This report should be included in the FY 1992-1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. (S)
- o The Secretary of Energy shall provide a detailed report on the location, quantity and form of significant amounts of highly enriched uranium including that in weapon inventories. He shall report plans and schedules for recovery of highly enriched uranium from retired weapons and provide options for producing additional material for weapon production if required, including the costs and schedule. The report shall be submitted to me by August 31, 1990. (S)
- o The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should report on the stockpile adjustments that would be required in the FY 1992 to FY 1996 period if no more highly enriched uranium is made available during the period. This report shall be submitted to me by August 31, 1990. (S)

The FY 1996-2000 Stockpile Projection, which was submitted with the Stockpile Plan, has been noted for planning purposes. The FY 1991-1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan should be submitted by January 31, 1991. A FY 1997-2001 Stockpile Projection should also be included as part of the same submission. (U)

This directive supersedes National Security Decision Directive 325 (January 19, 1989). (U)



Attachment:  
As stated

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NWSM90G

ENCLOSURE 1  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM	YIELD (KT)	FIVE YEAR PROGRAM					STOCKPILE PROJECTION **				
		FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99

A. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

MINUTEMAN II W56  
MINUTEMAN III W62  
MINUTEMAN III W78  
PEACEKEEPER W87  
SICBM W87-1

SUBTOTAL (LAND-BASED MSL)

POSEIDON W68  
TRIDENT I W76 [a]  
TRIDENT II W88 [a]

SUBTOTAL (SEA-BASED MSL)

B28Y1  
B53 [b]  
B61-1  
B61-7  
B63  
B63 (904) [c]

SUBTOTAL (BOMBS)

SRAM A W69  
SRAM II W89  
ALCM/ACM W80-1  
EPW W61

SUBTOTAL (AIR-SURF MSL)

TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

B. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE  
NONE

TOTAL STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

C. TACTICAL

B43Y2  
B57  
B61-0  
B61-2  
B61-3 [d] [e]  
B61-4 [d]  
B61-5  
B61-6  
B61-8  
B61-9  
B61-10 [e]  
NDSB 890  
SRAM T WXX

SUBTOTAL (BOMBS/ASM)

TOMAHAWK W80-0  
GLCM W84

SUBTOTAL (CRUISE MSLS)

1.50  
424  
210  
Atom  
Energy  
Oct  
8/19

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SECRET - INFORMATION REPORT DATA

NWSM90G

## ENCLOSURE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM

YIELD  
(KT)

FY90

FIVE YEAR PROGRAM

FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95

STOCKPILE PROJECTION \*\*  
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00

PERSHING Ia W50Y1  
PERSHING Ia W50Y2  
PERSHING Ia W50Y3  
PERSHING II W85  
LANCE W70-1,2  
LANCE (ER) W70-3  
FOTL WXX

SUBTOTAL (SURF-SURF MSL)

3-INCH W33Y1,3,4  
3-INCH W33Y2  
3-INCH W79-0 (f)  
3-INCH W79-1 (f)  
155MM W48  
155MM W62 (f)

SUBTOTAL (ARTILLERY)

SUBTOTAL (ADM)

SUBTOTAL (AIR DEFENSE)

TOTAL TACTICAL

D. FLEET

SUBROC W55  
DEPTH BOMB B57  
NDSB B90

TOTAL FLEET

A. TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

B. TOTAL STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

C. TOTAL TACTICAL

D. TOTAL FLEET

-- GRAND TOTAL ACTIVE --

1.5  
424  
216  
Atom  
Emer  
Ack  
195

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

NWSM90G

## ENCLOSURE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM	YIELD (KT)	FIVE YEAR PROGRAM					STOCKPILE PROJECTION **				
		FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99

### E. INACTIVE RESERVE

MINUTEMAN III	W62 (903)	(g)
SPARTAN	W71	(h)
GLCM	W84	(i)
PERSHING II	W85	

TOTAL INACTIVE RESERVE

--TOTAL STOCKPILE--

### FOOTNOTES:

- \* Lower selectable yield(s) are available.
- \*\* FY 1996 - FY 2000 projections are beyond the FYDP and may not reflect firm DoD system decisions.
- † Yield under discussion. Highest estimate used for SNM purposes.

(a)  
(b)  
(c)  
(d)

- (e) If Rocky Flats plutonium operations do not resume in time to meet all FY 1990 deliveries, B61-10 deliveries will substitute as feasible
- (f) Based on FY 85 Defense Authorization Act which limits total W79/W82 warheads to 925.
- (g) Alt 903 provides a new charge code allowing the tritium reservoirs to be removed and returned to DOE while SAC retains possession of the warheads. These Alt 903 warheads are for support of contingency deployments in MINUTEMAN II/PEACEKEEPER silos.
- (h) Retention of these warheads will be reviewed annually to ensure a credible delivery vehicle exists before the warheads will be retained further
- (i) Warhead material may be used to meet new program requirements

### ABBREVIATIONS:

ACM - Advanced Cruise Missile  
ADM - Atomic Demolition Munition  
ASM - Air-to-Surface Missile  
ALCM - Air Launched Cruise Missile  
EPW - Earth Penetrator Weapon  
ER - Enhanced Radiation  
FOTL - Follow-On To LANCE  
FYDP - Five Year Defense Plan  
GLCM - Ground Launched Cruise Missile  
NDSB - Nuclear Depth/Strike Bomb  
SICBM - Small ICBM  
SRAM - Short Range Attack Missile  
SRAM T - Short Range Attack Missile---Tactical  
SUBROC - Submarine Rocket  
WXX - Warhead, Undesignated

# UNCLASSIFIED

1.5  
42  
2162  
Atomic Energy Act  
of 1954

1.5(g)  
42 U.S.C. 2162  
Atomic Energy Act  
of 1954

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

20769

July 18, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organizing to Manage On-site Verification of  
Nuclear Testing (U)

This directive defines organizational structures and responsibilities to implement the on-site monitoring and inspection provisions of the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and defines the policy structure for making compliance judgments. This directive complements National Security Directive 41 which expanded the mission of the On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA).  
(C)

Background (U)

Verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET provide for on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements, in-country seismic measurements, and on-site inspection procedures for certain U.S. and Soviet nuclear explosions. Once the treaties come into force, and depending on the nature of the Soviet test program, the U.S. may require the frequent, relatively long-term, presence of U.S. personnel at the Soviet nuclear test site. Given U.S. nuclear testing requirements, frequent and relatively long-term presence of Soviet personnel at the Nevada Test Site is likely. There is also the prospect of U.S. inspectors at remote seismic stations in the Soviet Union and Soviet inspectors at seismic stations in

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by D. Van Tasson, National Security Council

F89-191



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the U.S. Depending on the future of the Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions program, U.S. inspectors may be required at other remote locations in the Soviet Union. (U)

Monitoring of nuclear tests is not a cooperative venture, but is rather part of an inherently adversarial process of verification. U.S. inspectors must obtain the necessary technical information to allow the United States to make independent judgments of Soviet compliance with the 150 kt yield threshold of the TTBT and PNET, while not taking any action during monitoring which could prejudice U.S. rights or compliance judgments. (U)

Soviet monitoring of U.S. tests at the Nevada Test Site presents a complex situation with conflicting requirements among test operations, statutory responsibilities, and U.S. treaty obligations. Successful implementation of the treaty -- granting the Soviets the access allowed by the treaty while protecting classified information and minimizing interference in the U.S. test program -- will require careful and close cooperation among U.S. agencies. (U)

#### Responsibilities (U)

The On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will be responsible for overall management and support of in-country nuclear test monitoring in the U.S. and USSR, including scheduling, transportation, linguistic, communications, escort, housing, [REDACTED] 1.5(0)

[REDACTED] (C)

A Team Leader/senior U.S. representative, appointed by OSIA shall lead each team of U.S. inspectors sent to the Soviet Union and shall have final authority over the team and in all dealings with the Soviet counterparts. The Department of Energy will provide the technical/operations members of the team to conduct CORTEX and the other on-site inspection activities permitted by the treaties, augmented by DOD as appropriate. The Department of Defense will provide the technical/operations members of the team for tests involving "hydro-plus" and for in-country seismic measurements, augmented by DOE as appropriate. OSIA may augment the U.S. team of inspectors with personnel from other agencies as appropriate. (C)

DOE (for CORTEX) and DOD (for hydro-plus and seismic) shall designate a chief of technical operations for each event who will also participate on the U.S.-USSR Coordinating Group established by the treaties. The chiefs of technical operations will operate under the overall direction of the Team Leader [REDACTED] 1.5 (A)

[REDACTED] (C)

Funding for inspection and monitoring activities and required equipment will be addressed by the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). (C)

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
To help maintain effective coordination between OSIA and DOE, a senior DOE representative will be assigned to OSIA. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for all activities related to Soviet monitoring of U.S. tests at designated seismic stations and will designate the U.S. representative who will be responsible for the U.S. escorts and for all dealings with the Soviet inspection team. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for all escort activities related to the Soviet monitoring of tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and will appoint a Team Leader who will have overall responsibility for dealing with the Soviet inspection team. At NTS, DOE will oversee technical operations and advise the U.S. Team Leader at the U.S.-USSR Coordinating Group. DOE will retain responsibility for testing operations, matters of safety, safeguarding classified information, and public affairs on the Nevada Test Site. (S)

For tests subject to the TTBT verification protocol that are conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency, the division of responsibilities between DOE and DNA will parallel the responsibilities of the DOE test controller and the DNA test director for the nuclear device and the conduct of the experiments. (S)

Intelligence Functions (U)



1.5  
(S)  
(S)  
(d)

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1.5cc  
4  
(d)

2. Ensure that U.S. commitments are met so that the Soviet Union can conduct the appropriate monitoring specified by the TTBT and PNET. (U)

1.5cc  
4cd

Policy Guidance (U)

The Arms Control PCC will provide overall policy guidance for implementation of the verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET and will also provide instructions to the U.S. inspection teams. The PCC will develop U.S. compliance judgments and will provide public affairs guidance on implementation and compliance. (C)

1.5cc

There will be a single United States delegation to the consultative commissions established for the TTBT and the PNET. I will appoint the U.S. Commissioner. (U)

Communications between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning monitoring activities shall be through normal diplomatic channels except as specifically provided for in the treaties. Any future nuclear testing negotiations shall be kept separate from all aspects of monitoring existing treaties. (C)


Any disputes with the Soviet Union about implementing treaty provisions or questions about proper procedure will be promptly reported to Washington for attention by the Arms Control PCC.

(S)

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Technical monitoring of the explosive yield, while the most important determinant, is not the only factor to be considered in making compliance judgments. Therefore, no member of any monitoring team shall offer, either to the Soviets or to the public, any judgment about Soviet compliance. (C)

1.5  
(c)

Implementation (U)

Planning to implement this directive should begin immediately so that the United States may be fully prepared to conduct appropriate monitoring of Soviet nuclear tests, and to support appropriate Soviet monitoring of U.S. nuclear tests, as soon as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty enter into force. (U)

*Ag Bunk*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 20, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF  
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL  
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion  
of Kuwait (C)

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to the national security. These interests include access to oil and the security and stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also will support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense. The United States will encourage the effective expressions of support and the participation of our allies and other friendly states to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. (S)

Declassified/Released on 11-22-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12812  
D. Ann Tassel, National Security Council  
F89-191

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

On Thursday, August 2, 1990 the government of Iraq, without provocation or warning, invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait, thereby placing these vital U.S. interests at risk. Four principles will guide U.S. policy during this crisis: (S)

- the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (S)
- the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq; (S)
- a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; and, (S)
- the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. (S)

To meet these principles and to bring the crisis to an immediate, peaceful, and just end, I hereby direct that the following diplomatic, economic, energy and military measures be undertaken. (S)

#### Diplomatic

The United States will continue to support the precepts of UNSC resolution 660 and 662 condemning Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait and calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Secretary of State should continue to work bilaterally with our allies and friends, and in concert with the international community through the United Nations and other fora, to find a peaceful solution to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait's legitimate government. (S)

#### Economic

Consistent with my authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, the United Nations Participation Act, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, the Executive Orders signed on August 2 and August 9, 1990 freezing Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in this country and prohibiting transactions with Iraq and Kuwait remain in force. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, should continue to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of these Orders. Furthermore, the United States will continue to support UNSC Resolution 661 imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We will emphasize individual and collective compliance with these

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sanctions, but are prepared, if necessary, to enforce them in the exercise of our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. (S)

### Energy

The United States now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and, as a result of the current crisis, could face a major threat to its economy. Much of the world is even more dependent on imported oil and more vulnerable to Iraqi threats. To minimize any impact that oil flow reductions from Iraq and Kuwait will have on the world's economies, it will be our policy to ask oil-producing nations to do what they can to increase production to offset these losses. I also direct the Secretaries of State and Energy to explore with the member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) a coordinated drawdown of strategic petroleum reserves, and implementation of complementary measures. I will continue to ask the American public to exercise restraint in their own consumption of oil products. The Secretary of Energy should work with various sectors of the U.S. economy to encourage energy conservation and fuel switching to non-oil sources, where appropriate and economic. Finally, I will continue to appeal to oil companies to show restraint in their pricing of crude oil and products. The Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, should work with oil companies in this regard. (S)

### Military

To protect U.S. interests in the Gulf and in response to requests from the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Kuwait, I have ordered U.S. military forces deployed to the region for two purposes: to deter and, if necessary, defend Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the Gulf region from further Iraqi aggression; and to enforce the mandatory Chapter 7 sanctions under Article 51 of the UN Charter and UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to preserve their national integrity and to deter further Iraqi aggression. Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi Arabia and other regional states to defend themselves. (S)

I also approve U.S. participation, in conjunction with the forces of other friendly governments, in two separate multinational forces that would provide for the defense of Saudi Arabia and enforce the UN mandated sanctions. These two groups will be called the Multinational Force for Saudi Arabia (MNFSA) and the Multinational Force to enforce sanctions (MNFES) against Iraq and Kuwait. The United States should coordinate closely with the Saudis, the Kuwaitis and others on the composition and organization of these forces. (S)

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- **The MNFSA:** The MNFSA is to deter aggression by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and other friendly Arab states in the Gulf, to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Saudi Arabia and other members of the GCC, and to conduct exercises and training to enhance the proficiency of Saudi forces in the defense of the Kingdom. (S)

Adequate legal basis exists under the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions for the implementation of multinational efforts. I do not believe it is necessary now for the United States to seek additional UN endorsement for the MNFSA. If I subsequently determined that further UN endorsement is required, we should ensure that any UN-led effort is acceptable to U.S. military commanders and an adequate command structure is established and operating beforehand. (S)

In concert with the other UNSC Permanent members, I authorize U.S. participation in discussions of the UN Military Staff Committee on the MNF operation for Saudi Arabia. If such talks are initiated, they should be of lower priority than talks concerning the MNFES. (S)

Soviet participation in the MNFSA is warranted only if the Saudis request it. If so, we should work with the Saudis to insure that the Soviet mission is acceptable to us and that Soviet forces are deployed at a distance from U.S. operations in these countries. Soviet assistance in providing lift support to others providing forces inside Saudi Arabia should be encouraged. (S)

- **The MNFES:** The MNF to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait is designed to bring about the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Participating countries would seek to prevent the export of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait, regardless of port of embarkation or transshipment point, and prevent the shipment to Iraq or Kuwait, regardless of declared port of destination or transshipment point, of any commodities or supplies whose provision to Iraq or Kuwait is contrary to UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661. These efforts should complement individual and collective compliance measures already in force. (S)

In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions 660 and 661, I hereby direct that all imports and exports, except medicines and food for humanitarian purposes (i.e., natural disasters) bound to and from Iraq and Kuwait be intercepted immediately. I direct the

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Secretary of Defense to immediately organize and coordinate a multinational force as requested by the Government of Kuwait. U.S. forces, in coordination with other cooperating national forces, should take necessary action to intercept vessels on a case-by-case basis until sufficient U.S. and other forces are available for more comprehensive enforcement. I also approve the submission to Congress of a separate letter informing it of the character and basis for our intercept operations in keeping with my commitment to congressional consultations on matters of national importance. The GCC states and potential contributors to the MNFES should be notified of the implementation of the intercept operation. I also agree to Soviet participation in the MNFES. (S)

Since the UN Charter provides the legal basis for the conduct of this operation, I do not believe it is necessary now to obtain additional UN endorsement for the MNFES. Subject to the consent of the UNSC Permanent members, I agree to allow U.S. participation in discussions of the MNFES operation for enforcing sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait by the UN Military Staff Committee. (S)

*Ag Bush*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 7, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
AGENCY  
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND  
SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Cape York (U)

The long-term goal of U.S. commercial space launch policy is free and fair trade. We must also balance our efforts to achieve this goal with other important considerations: preventing ballistic missile proliferation, upholding our technology transfer policy objectives, and dealing with non-market economies which provide commercial launch services. (U)

Consistent with these policy considerations, the U.S. will grant a license to United Space Boosters Inc. for participation in the planning phase of the Cape York space launch project once the following conditions have been met:

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
D. M. Tassel, National Security Council  
F89-191 (46)

- (1) The Soviet Union will agree to provide launch services (i.e. boosters, launch equipment, technology or training) in the international commercial market only from Cape York, Australia (or alternatively any other single location agreed upon by the two governments) for a period of ten years after the date of the first launch of a Soviet-manufactured launch vehicle from said location;
- (2) The USSR and Australia will observe the Guidelines and Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and
- (3) U.S. regulations regarding technology transfer to the Soviet Union must be upheld. (C)

Further participation will be approved provided these conditions continue to be observed and we have negotiated agreements with the European Space Agency and Australia ensuring free and fair trade in the international commercial space launch market. (C)

To enforce compliance with these conditions, I will continue to hold open an array of options, including enforcement provisions negotiated in the agreements on free and fair trade in the international commercial space launch market, trade sanctions, and licensing authority under the Arms Export Control Act. (C)



**UNCLASSIFIED**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures  
(U)

The decade of the 1990s will pose new challenges and opportunities for U.S. counterintelligence (CI) and security countermeasures (SCM). By the end of the 1990s, we will probably see a markedly different threat environment. This dynamic situation requires thoughtful and systematic CI and SCM planning, resource commitment, and imaginative implementation. We must enhance our ability to anticipate the scope and pace of changing intelligence threats and to respond with successful operational initiatives. CI and SCM matters should continue to be handled in the 1990s as strategic issues requiring priority attention. TCX

This decade will be marked by political turbulence and economic, social, and cultural stresses in every region. We must be prepared for diverse political transformations, for intense international economic competition, increased North-South tensions, and for growing foreign intelligence access to U.S. targets here and abroad. Through it all, classified and proprietary U.S. foreign policy, military, intelligence, and technological information, plans, and programs as well as U.S. economic strategies will remain priority strategic targets for our adversaries. U.S. technologies, both classified and proprietary, will remain a high priority for those seeking a competitive edge in international markets. U.S. policymakers will continue to be targets of covert-influence operations. TCX

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~


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**UNCLASSIFIED**

Partially Declassified/Released on 11-22-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by U. Van Tassel, National Security Council  
F89-191 (47)



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In this changing environment, our CI and SCM initiatives should focus on the following goals. We must:

- o Anticipate, detect, and neutralize human and technical operations conducted by foreign intelligence services targeting U.S. interests. (C)
- o  1.5 (C)
- o Adapt to the CI and security implications of the new U.S. policy of furthering the political and economic integration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into the world economy. (U)
- o Reduce our vulnerabilities to intelligence exploitation by foreign services within the United States and abroad by enhancing the security and CI integrity of our programs, operations, personnel, and installations worldwide. (S)
- o Maintain an effective mechanism to plan for and forecast the changing CI and SCM environments worldwide; to recommend operational, analytic, and security initiatives; to identify priority targets and resources; and to address evolving issues. (S)

To achieve these goals, we should emphasize offensive initiatives but also provide defensive enhancements and allocate resources in accordance with these priorities as ranked. (C)

Offensively, we shall:

- o Enhance our ability to make early identification of U.S. persons who volunteer to commit espionage and refer those cases to the appropriate agency to pursue investigation and prosecution. (C)
- o 
- o 

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1.5 (C)

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- o [REDACTED] 1.5 (c)
- o Use our control of the domestic environment to anticipate, detect, and disrupt efforts by foreign intelligence services to exploit new operational opportunities in the United States. ~~(C)~~
- o [REDACTED] 1.5 (c)
- o Improve the focus and integration of CI analysis into operational targeting programs. ~~(S)~~
- o Build new Automated Data Processing capabilities using expert systems and artificial intelligence to better support interagency analytic exploitation of data bases. ~~(S)~~
- o Mount aggressive programs to enable us to identify and operate against foreign government-sponsored or government-subsidized operations targeted against U.S. technological and economic competitiveness. ~~(S)~~
- o [REDACTED] 1.5 (c)

Defensively, we shall:

- o Enhance our ability to identify foreign intelligence targeting against U.S. information security systems and keying material through better exploitation of all-source information. ~~(C)~~
- o Provide more secure working environments within U.S. diplomatic establishments abroad by instituting coordinated technical and personnel security standards. ~~(C)~~
- o Expand development and implementation of information systems security programs that dramatically improve U.S. posture in the areas of network and technical security. Evaluate espionage vulnerabilities of secure telecommunications and automated information systems. ~~(S)~~

o [REDACTED]

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1.5(C)X  
(d)

- o Conduct thorough espionage damage assessments to learn how the damage done in one case relates to damage from another and to implement lessons learned. (S)
- o Improve our security awareness programs to ensure a full understanding of the threat and the attendant security practices necessary to limit vulnerabilities. (U)

**Organizationally, we shall:**

- o Establish interagency training programs of CI analytic and operational elements to address new and evolving issues and threats and to disseminate key findings throughout the national security community. (S)
- o Integrate analysis with CI operations to produce new methodologies, to identify our programmatic strengths and weaknesses, and to better project and forecast the changing human and technical threat environment. (C)
- o Develop a highly skilled corps of CI professionals with substantive expertise and a strong commitment to better equip us to meet the CI threats in the 1990s. (S)

**Legislatively, we shall:**

- o Ensure the administration continues to work closely with Congress on CI and SCM legislation seeking to improve U.S. Government capabilities in these areas. (S)

Furthermore, with respect to polygraph examinations, there is interagency agreement and administration endorsement of continuing a polygraph component in the overall personnel security effort. This polygraph component should be implemented by and within each agency in accordance with the policy of that agency. Agencies implementing polygraph programs will ensure that their efforts are closely coordinated to achieve maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. (U)

Finally, when matters involving CI or security issues are referred to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation, the FBI will be responsible for the conduct of polygraph examinations as may be appropriate. (U)


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IMPLEMENTATION

I hereby direct the recipients of this memorandum to implement the recommendations cited in NSR-18 and charge the Director of Central Intelligence, under the guidance of the National Security Council, with coordinating the interagency effort towards these goals. I also charge the DCI with soliciting specific plans of each concerned agency for implementing the strategy for the 1990s. Major issues that may arise in the implementation of this strategy shall be resolved through the NSC process in accordance with NSD 1. ~~(S/NF)~~

On an annual basis, the National Advisory Group for Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures shall review the progress being made to implement NSR 18 recommendations and report this progress as deemed appropriate. ~~(S)~~



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for  
FY 1990 and FY 1991 (U)

The Secretary of Defense is authorized to deploy nuclear weapons during FY 1990 and FY 1991 as indicated in Tables 1 and 2, subject to future policy and programming decisions. Deployment figures are end-fiscal-year levels and are to be achieved in an orderly manner consistent with operational requirements. (U)

a.



b. Subject to the specified conditions, the conditional authorizations in Table 3 are approved. Those that support SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study 1991-1998 (NWRS-88) are approved for implementation by the Secretary of Defense, subject to Department of State coordination. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is authorized to implement conditional

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(a) 4 (d) [REDACTED]  
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will be apprised of the implementation of these authorizations as soon as possible. For all other conditional authorizations in Table 3, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will be apprised of the politico-military and foreign policy implications when these conditional authorizations are scheduled for implementation. (S)

c. [REDACTED]  
1.5  
(a) [REDACTED] (S)

d. [REDACTED]  
1.5  
(a) [REDACTED] (S)

Any other changes to the approved deployment levels must be coordinated between the Departments of State and Defense, then submitted to me for approval. (S)

The following additional policies govern nuclear weapon deployments:

a. The support of non-U.S. forces will be in accordance with the levels listed in Table 4. (U)

b. [REDACTED]  
1.5  
(a) 4 (d) [REDACTED] (S)

(1) Desired changes in the levels of support provided to non-U.S. forces are to be proposed, to the maximum extent practical, in the context of the annual Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization request. Extraordinary requests are to be submitted in accordance with PD/NSC-47. (U)

(2) In the event of unexpected delays in scheduled adjustments to the levels of support provided to non-U.S. forces, weapons may be deployed up to the previous year's levels provided the approved deployment levels in Tables 1 and 2 are not exceeded. (U)

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1.5(a)  
(d)  
~~(S/FRD)~~

d. This directive supersedes NSD-38, "Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1990 and FY 1991." (S)

e. The proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1991 and FY 1992 should be submitted for Presidential approval not later than 15 days after the FY 1991 through FY 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan is approved. (U)

*Cap Bzl*

Attachments  
As stated

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APPENDIX A

- Table 1 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization by Location and Supported Force
- Table 2 Nuclear Weapon Deployment Authorization by Region and Category
- Table 3 Conditional Nuclear Weapon Deployment Authorizations
- Table 4 Authorized Program of Cooperation for Nuclear Support of Non-US Forces

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

20527

October 12, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 49

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Freedom of Navigation Program (U)

United States security and commerce depend upon the internationally recognized freedoms of navigation and overflight of the seas. Since 1979, the United States has successfully conducted a Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to protect U.S. navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas against excessive maritime claims. The purpose of the FON program is to preserve the global mobility of U.S. forces by avoiding acquiescence in excessive maritime claims of other nations. (U)

This directive provides current guidance for the management and organization of the FON program and supersedes National Security Decision Directive 265. (C)

Policy

While not a signatory to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), the United States considers the Convention to accurately reflect the customary rules of international law concerning maritime navigation and overflight freedoms. (U)

General U.S. policy on the Law of the Sea is contained in NSDD-83 (U.S. Oceans Policy, Law of the Sea, and Exclusive Economic Zone) and the President's Oceans Policy statement of March 10, 1983. (C)

This policy provides that the United States will respect those maritime claims that are consistent with the navigational

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Partially Declassified/Released on 11-22-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Taten, Director, Security Council

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2

provisions of the LOS Convention. Additionally, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights on a worldwide basis in a manner consistent with the LOS Convention. The United States will not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other traditional uses of the high seas. (U)

The Freedom of Navigation Program combines diplomatic action and operational assertions of our navigation and overflight rights to encourage modification of, and to demonstrate nonacquiescence in, maritime claims that are inconsistent with the customary rules of international law pertaining to maritime navigation and overflight freedoms. (U)

Categories of Excessive Maritime Claims

U.S. interests are to be protected against the following categories of excessive maritime claims:

1. Historic bay/historic water claims not recognized by the United States. (U)
2. Territorial sea baseline claims not drawn in conformance with the customary international law reflected in the LOS Convention. (U)
3. Territorial sea claims not exceeding twelve nautical miles in breadth that:
  - a. overlap straits used for international navigation and do not permit transit passage in conformance with the customary international law reflected in the LOS Convention, including submerged transit of submarines, overflight of military aircraft, and surface transit of warships/naval auxiliaries, without prior notification or authorization, and including transit in a manner of deployment consistent with the security of the forces involved; or
  - b. contain requirements for advance notification or authorization for innocent passage of all vessels, including warships/naval auxiliaries, or apply discriminatory requirements to such vessels; or
  - c. apply special requirements, not recognized by international law, for innocent passage based on means of propulsion, armament, or cargo. (U)

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4. Territorial sea claims in excess of twelve nautical miles.  
(U)
5. Other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve nautical miles, such as security zones, that purport to restrict non-resource related high seas freedoms. (U)
6. Archipelagic claims that either:
  - a. do not permit archipelagic sea lanes passage in conformance with customary international law reflected in the LOS Convention, including submerged passage of submarines, overflight of military aircraft, and surface transit of warships/naval auxiliaries, without prior notification or authorization, and including transit in a manner of deployment consistent with the security of the forces involved; or
  - b. are otherwise not in conformance with customary international law reflected in the LOS Convention. (U)

Program Guidance

1. The Department of State shall act assertively to preserve U.S. navigation and overflight rights under international law. The Department of State shall use its facilities, here and abroad, to encourage each state with excessive maritime claims to conform its laws and/or conduct with customary international law concerning maritime navigation and overflight freedoms. The Department of State shall protest excessive maritime claims to avoid legal acquiescence. (C)
2. The Department of Defense will plan and administer the operational assertion portion of the FON Program under the following procedures:

a.



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Criteria for the selection of an excessive maritime claim for the annual list will include, but are not limited to, the following:

-- [REDACTED]

1.5  
(a) +  
(d)

b. Categories of excessive claims to be submitted for coordination include:

-- unrecognized historic bay/historic water claims (paragraph 1, above);

-- excessive straight baseline claims (paragraph 2, above);

-- territorial sea claims (of 12 nautical miles or less) that include: unlawful restrictions or requirements relating to innocent passage (paragraph 3b, above); or that apply unlawful discriminatory restrictions or requirements based on means of propulsion, armament, or cargo (paragraph 3c, above);

-- territorial sea claims in excess of twelve nautical miles (paragraph 4, above)

[REDACTED]

1.5  
(a)

-- other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve nautical miles, such as security zones, that purport to restrict non-resource related high seas freedoms (paragraph 5, above)

[REDACTED]

1.5  
(a)

3.

[REDACTED]

1.5  
(d)

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5

1.5(a) +  
(d)

4.

1.5(a)

5.

1.5  
(a) +  
(d)

6. Military ships and aircraft will use international straits (paragraph 3a, above) and archipelagic sea lanes (paragraph 6a, above) freely and frequently

1.5(a)  
+ (d)

7. Military ships and aircraft will routinely assert U.S. rights against territorial sea claims and other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve nautical miles that purport to restrict nonresource related high seas freedoms, and archipelagic claims not in conformance with the LOS Convention (paragraphs 4, 5, and 6b, above).

1.5(a)  
+ (d)

8.

1.5  
(d)

9.

1.5  
(a) + (d)

10.

1.5(d)

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6

[REDACTED] 1.5 (d)

11. The Department of Defense will provide to the Department of State and the National Security Advisor a semiannual list of operational assertions conducted under the FON Program. The Department of State shall, when appropriate, use the semiannual list of operational assertions in its diplomatic efforts to preserve United States navigation and overflight rights under international law. The Department of State will publish an annual unclassified summary of the diplomatic activities under the FON Program. (U)

12. On an annual basis, the Department of Defense will incorporate into an already existing report an unclassified listing of FON operational assertions conducted during the previous year. The listing will specify the country and excessive claim, but not the date or frequency of the assertion. Assertions specified in the annual list will become unclassified upon incorporation into the report. (U)

*Ag. T. B. Smith*

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WASHINGTON

21073

October 12, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Decisions on START and CFE Issues (U)

I remain committed to achieving START and CFE agreements that enhance U.S. national security and strengthen international stability. Consistent with that objective, completion of both treaties during the remainder of 1990 remains an important goal. I have made the following decisions to achieve these two objectives. (C)

START

1. **Backfire.** The United States has reached an agreement in principle with the Soviet Union on a politically binding commitment not to give Backfire the capability to operate at intercontinental ranges, through in-flight refueling or in any other manner. [REDACTED] (S) 1.5 (d)

2. **Missile and Re-Entry Vehicle Elimination.** [REDACTED] (S) 1.5 (d)

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Declassify on: OADR

Partially Declassified/Released on 11-23-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by U.S. State Dept. Security Council

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3. **Non-Circumvention.**

[REDACTED]

1.5  
(d)

4. **Ban on Third-Country Basing.**

[REDACTED]

1.5  
(d)

5. **Limits on Heavy ICBMs.** On the understanding that the United States will seek the ultimate elimination of heavy ICBMs in follow-on negotiations, and that the Backfire and non-circumvention issues are satisfactorily resolved, the U.S. may accept a package of constraints on heavy ICBMs consisting of the following:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

[REDACTED]

1.5  
(d)

6. **Throw-weight Limits.** The United States and Soviet Union have agreed to a requirement to reduce current Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight by "approximately 50 percent." The specific throw-weight reductions the United States will require to achieve this objective will depend in part on Soviet willingness to accept U.S. proposals in related areas. For example, in the context of the proposed U.S.-Soviet compromise on the limitation of the "potential throw-weight" of future types of ballistic

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missiles, [REDACTED]

1.5  
(d)

(S)

7. Related Issues.

1.5  
(d)

(S)

CFE

1. Aircraft Limits.

1.5  
(d)

(S)

1.5  
(d)

(S)

2. Sufficiency Rule.

1.5  
(d)

(S)

3. Zones.

1.5  
(d)

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1.5 (d)

4. **CSCE Summit.** It continues to be the policy of the United States that the CSCE Summit should only be held when the CFE agreement has been completed. Accordingly, my attendance at such a summit is contingent on the CFE agreement having been completed. (S)

Except as modified by the foregoing, NSD-40 remains in effect.  
(U)

*C. B. Bush*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1990

21071

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 51

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
CHAIRMAN, BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL  
BROADCASTING

SUBJECT: United States Government International  
Broadcasting (U)

This directive establishes national policy, guidelines, and implementing actions for United States Government international broadcasting. It is based on National Security Review 24, which I directed on March 28, 1990, to be done in light of dramatic political, economic and social changes in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. NSDD-77 is superseded. Pertinent parts of NSDD-45 shall remain active. (C)

In a period of historic change, a global U.S. Government broadcasting capability remains necessary. At the same time, we must increase efficiency in the light of U.S. budget constraints and reexamine priorities to ensure that our limited broadcasting resources are used to best effect. (U)

U.S. Government broadcasting will continue to have four missions:

- To present and explain to foreign audiences U.S. Government policies and actions.
- To describe and explain American society, thought, and institutions.

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by 12.10.01 T&S, National Security Council

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- To provide objective and reliable news, commentary and information about U.S. and international events.
- To provide surrogate programming where local governments curtail the free flow of information to their people and where surrogate programming is in the U.S. interest. (U)

U.S. Government international broadcasting activities should be carried out in accordance with the following guidance:

- Broadcasting should serve and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives through radio and television programming to foreign audiences. Broadcasting should be directly connected to the U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus and should remain under the authority of the Executive branch. (S)
- The U.S. Government should maintain a global radio and television capability, broadcasting to both elites and general populations in all geographic areas. Where possible, the U.S. should broadcast in the languages of the receiving countries, as well as in English. (U)
- The limited resources for broadcasting activities should be directed as necessary to reflect overall U.S. foreign policy priorities in the areas covered, the types of programming offered, and the languages used. (S)
- A chief priority for U.S. Government international broadcasting should be to further the process of democracy-building by describing democratic institutions and practices. (U)
- Broadcast capability to currently underserved regions, including the Islamic world and Africa, should be increased, and VOA should increase its surrogate function or targeted broadcasts. (S)
- U.S. Government international broadcasting should actively and directly support non-traditional U.S. foreign policy priorities, such as the war on drugs, the fight against terrorism, and efforts to improve the global environment. (U)
- To operate within constrained budget levels, U.S. Government broadcasting agencies should begin to consolidate broadcasting operations, eliminate redundancy and increase flexibility and coordination in managing assets, keeping in

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3

mind the different mandates of VOA and USIA/TV on the one hand, and RFE/RL on the other. (U)

- To be more effective and better utilize limited resources, the U.S. Government should, at some future point, have only one broadcast entity. (U)
- U.S. Government budgetary support for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should eventually be phased out as their mission is completed. The RFE/RL research service should be maintained; its role should be reviewed periodically. Innovative ways should be considered for continuing RFE in Eastern European countries without U.S. Government funding, possibly through commercialization or transferring the name and some assets to local broadcasters. (U)
- The currently approved streamlined modernization plan for VOA and RFE/RL, central to meeting these missions on a global basis, is reaffirmed (with adjustments to the Israel shortwave relay station to reflect changes in Eastern Europe). (U)
- With the emergence of a unified Europe, VOA Europe should increase the political and economic content of its service and seek to expand its audience. (U)
- To compete in an increasingly sophisticated global media environment, the U.S. Government must frequently reevaluate its broadcasting technology and programming on the basis of audience survey research to ensure the most effective technical means of delivery and mix of programming for reaching the greatest number of priority audiences. Greater emphasis should be placed on developing the potential of USIA/TV in consonance with opportunities to reach larger priority audiences. (U)
- U.S. Government broadcasting should not conflict with the growth of U.S. private sector telecommunications and broadcasting enterprises. Where possible, U.S. Government broadcasting activities should help private sector enterprises to become established in foreign markets. (U)

In order to coordinate U.S. Government international broadcasting activities more effectively, a Policy Coordinating Committee for International Broadcasting should be established, chaired by the Department of State and composed of relevant agencies. Its functions are outlined in NSR-24. The PCC will complete an initial strategic review of broadcasting priorities within five months. (C)

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4

The opening up of Eastern Europe, though incomplete, offers opportunities to begin consolidating some RFE and VOA technical resources now. The first task of consolidation should be to prepare to phase out USG-funded RFE programming to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland as conditions in those countries permit. The first step is to eliminate RFE repeat programming in these countries. (C)

The Policy Coordinating Committee for Europe should advise the PCC on International Broadcasting in assessing the appropriate time for phasing out and ending U.S. Government support for individual RFE surrogate broadcasting services, using as guidelines the criteria in NSR-24. (C)

U.S. Government international broadcasting will, in steps and over time, consolidate activities under a single U.S. Government entity. To determine the best organization for that entity, I will appoint an independent bipartisan task force to study the future of U.S. Government international broadcasting assets and activities (VOA with Radio and TV Marti, USIA/TV, RFE/RL, and Radio in the American Sector [RIAS] of Berlin). On the basis of policy established in this directive, the task force is to make recommendations to me within six months of its establishment on the following issues in the overall context of U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy:

- The most appropriate organization and structure under which all USG international broadcasting eventually would be combined into a single U.S. Government broadcasting entity; when and how such consolidation should take place. (U)
- New technologies in light of the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to remain effective and competitive. This should include strategies for the best use of new technologies. (U)
- The relationship between U.S. Government broadcasting activities and U.S. private sector broadcasting enterprises in the international arena. (U)



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21157

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 52

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: The FY 1991 Sculpin Nuclear Test Program (U)

I have approved the FY 1991 Sculpin Nuclear Test Program proposed by the Secretary of Energy. In implementing the Sculpin program, the following guidance will apply:

- All tests associated with Sculpin will be conducted in compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, with the National Environmental Policy Act and all other relevant environmental laws and regulations. (S)
- The Department of Energy shall review each test with design yields near 150 kilotons to reasonably ensure that the device yield does not exceed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit. (S)
- It is likely that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, along with its new verification protocol, will come into force during the period of implementation of the Sculpin program. Tests must be conducted in full compliance with the treaty and its protocols. Successful implementation of the treaty -- granting Soviet inspectors the access allowed by the treaty while protecting classified information and minimizing interference in the U.S. test program -- will require careful and close cooperation among U.S. agencies. (U)

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Partially Declassified/Released on 8-20-96  
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by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

F89-191


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2

The testing agency shall continue to coordinate public affairs activities related to the implementation of the Sculpin program, as appropriate, in advance of test events. (U)

The FY 1992 Nuclear Test Program should be provided for my approval by September 1, 1991. (U)



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
Attachment 1

## SCULPIN FY 1991 UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST SERIES (U)

### I. Department of Energy (DOE) Weapon Development Tests

#### A. Current/Near-term Stockpile

Nuclear tests in this category are designed to demonstrate the performance of production model warheads that have been certified for the stockpile. Tests are also included in this category that support the development and characterization of specific weapons for Department of Defense (DOD) systems.



*Atomic Energy  
Act  
1.5(a)*


Derivative Classifier:  
D. Garcia, Director, DP-25

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2

COSO will include two nuclear devices to be detonated nearly simultaneously in the same underground emplacement hole.



Atomic Energy  
Act  
1.5(g)

MONTELLLO will include two nuclear devices that will be detonated nearly simultaneously in the same underground emplacement hole.



Atomic Energy  
Act  
1.5(g)


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3

Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(g)



B.

Atomic  
Energy Act



Program

Test Name

Quarter

Laboratory

CARLIN  
LUBBOCK  
HOYA  
JUNCTION


Third  
Third  
Fourth  
FY 1992

LLNL  
LANL  
LLNL  
LANL

Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(a)

Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(a)

CARLIN will be a test with multiple objectives.



Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(g)

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4

Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5 (a) (g)

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*Atomic  
Energy Act*

C. Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons

Tests in this category are designed to explore the feasibility of nuclear explosive driven, directed energy weapon concepts. Exploring this technology may provide a basis for assessing a possible Soviet counter defensive capability or a capability against the U.S. retaliatory deterrent. This work may also lead to a nuclear option for U.S. strategic defense, if needed. There are no dedicated tests in this category planned for FY 1991.

*Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(a)(g)*

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6

*Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(a)(g)*

II. Department of Defense Tests

The following test is designed and sponsored by the DOD. It will be conducted at the Nevada Test Site and will utilize a nuclear device supplied by the DOE.

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*Atomic Energy Act*

<u>Program</u>	<u>Test Name</u>	<u>Design Yield (kt)</u>	<u>Quarter</u>	<u>Laboratory</u>
Effects and Vulnerability	DISTANT ZENITH	[REDACTED]	Fourth	LANL

DISTANT ZENITH will be the first in a series of planned horizontal line-of-sight effects tests to evaluate source region electromagnetic pulse phenomenology issues. There are significant uncertainties about the effects of prompt nuclear radiation on current and planned ground-based military systems and their electronic components. Requirements to quantify these uncertainties have increased as blast and thermal hardened mobile elements are included in tactical and strategic systems, such as the current Army tactical equipment inventory, the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Hardened Mobile Launcher, and ground-based elements of Strategic Defense Initiative systems. Systems hardened to blast will be exposed to significant combined radiation/electromagnetic effects on electronic components. Benchmark data will be obtained on these effects, subsequent electronics response, and applicable hardening techniques for use in military systems analysis and design.

### III. United Kingdom (U.K.) Tests

The government of the United Kingdom has requested the assistance of the United States in conducting the nuclear tests described below under the terms of the 1958 U.S./U.K. Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. United States approval for the HOUSTON test was granted in response to a request with last year's program plan.

*Atomic Energy Act  
1.5 (b)*

<u>Program</u>	<u>Test Name</u>	<u>Design Yield (kt)</u>	<u>Quarter</u>	<u>Laboratory</u>
Development	HOUSTON	[REDACTED]	First	LANL
Development	BRISTOL	[REDACTED]	FY 1992	LLNL

*Atomic Energy Act  
1.5 (a) (g)*





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8

Atomic  
Energy Act  
1.5(a)(g)



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Attachment 2

FIVE-YEAR NUCLEAR TEST PLAN (U)

	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992*</u>	<u>1993*</u>	<u>1994*</u>	<u>1995*</u>
I. Department of Energy (DOE)					
A. Current/Near-term Stockpile	4	4	5	6	6
B. Advanced Development	3	3	3	4	4
C. Nuclear Directed Energy	0	2	2	2	2
D. Predictive Capability	1	3	5	5	6
(DOE Subtotal)	(8)	(12)	(15)	(17)	(18)
II. Department of Defense (DOD)	1	2	2	1	1
III. United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1
Total	10	15	18	19	20

\*The levels of DOE and DOD tests forecast in these years are based on currently perceived program needs but are not expected to be achievable under current funding projections.

Derivative Classifier:  
D. Garcia, Director, DP-25

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This document contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.

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21296

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 10, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 53

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Interagency Review and Disposition of Export  
Control Licenses Issued by the Department of  
Commerce (C)

American exporters are entitled to prompt review of export license applications submitted to the United States Government. It is United States policy that there is a presumption of approval of such applications based on our commitment to an open international trading system and the need to ensure American competitiveness. Therefore, any U.S. agency that opposes an export license on national security grounds shall bear the burden to overcome this presumption of approval. At the same time, I want to emphasize that none of the changes set forth in this directive are intended in any way to signal a lessening of our determination to weigh cautiously license applications raising potential nonproliferation or broader national security concerns.

To implement this policy, this directive establishes uniform procedures, consistent with applicable law (including, without limitation, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Atomic

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Declassified/Released on: 8-20-96  
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by: [illegible]  
F89-191

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Energy Act, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act) by which the Department of Commerce (the "Department") will process all export license applications submitted pursuant to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Sections 770-799. (C)

1. In accordance with Executive Order No. 12002, as amended, the Secretary of Commerce chairs the Export Administration Review Board (EARB), which addresses interagency differences arising out of export license applications reviewed by the Department. (C)

2. The Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC) shall continue to discharge its responsibilities as required by law. In order to facilitate the interagency evaluation of other nonproliferation cases, by January 1, 1991, the Department of State shall charter working groups for chemical and biological weapons and missile technology. At a minimum, these working groups shall include representatives of all departments and agencies represented on the EARB. The Operating Committee (OC), chaired by the Department of Commerce, shall continue to provide the first level of interagency review for all dual-use cases not related to the possible proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or missile technology. Each working group, including the OC and SNEC, shall be responsible for formulating all analyses related to the cases under its purview that are the subject of this directive. (C)

3. At any time in the processing of a license application, the Assistant Secretary, or an official of comparable rank, of an interested department or agency may obtain review by the National Security Council (NSC) of foreign or national security policy issues (including nonproliferation policy) related to the application by submitting a written request to the appropriate chair of a Policy Coordinating Committee. A copy of such request shall be provided simultaneously to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration. Upon receipt of such a request, the Department shall delay any further action on the license application for a period of 30 days while the policy issue is addressed in the NSC process. The NSC process shall be completed, and a written response to the Department shall be issued on the policy issue within the 30-day period. The issuance of the NSC response or expiration of the 30-day period, whichever occurs first, will end the suspension of any action on the license application. (C)

4. The Department shall continue to refer all license applications requiring interagency review to all appropriate agencies and departments according to agreed procedures. The executive secretary of each working group shall circulate agendas for all meetings of that group to all members of the EARB. Within 90 days of the date of receipt by the Department of an application, the cognizant working group shall recommend that the license be issued or denied, as appropriate, or shall forward the agency positions and all supporting documentation to the OC. The Chair of the OC shall circulate at least once every 30 days to

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each agency a list of all license applications pending for 60 days or more from the date of application. (C)

5. The Chair of the OC, as Executive Secretary of the ACEP, shall ensure that the analyses of disputes escalated by the working groups identify the unresolved issues related to the license application and represent the views of the agencies. (C)

6. In the event that no decision to approve or deny a license application is reached within 100 days of submission of the export license application to the Department of Commerce, the Chair of the ACEP will convene a meeting of the ACEP to resolve any differences on the disposition of the export license application. Approval of the license by the ACEP shall require a majority vote. Within five days of the ACEP meeting, the ACEP Chair shall notify the participants of the majority recommended decision. Within ten days of the date of that letter, the head or deputy head of any participating department or agency may request in writing that the Secretary of Commerce convene the EARB to review the ACEP decision. This request shall be binding on the Secretary of Commerce, who may also convene the EARB on his or her own authority to review a decision of the ACEP. If no department or agency seeks review of the recommended decision within such ten-day period, the recommended decision of the ACEP shall become final, and the license granted or denied accordingly. (C)

7. Within 35 days of the ACEP meeting, the EARB shall meet, as necessary, to review the proposed export license application. Approval of the license by the EARB shall require a majority vote. Within five days of the EARB meeting, the Secretary shall notify the participating departments and agencies of the recommended decision pursuant to the EARB meeting. Within ten days of the date of such letter, the head or deputy head of a department or agency participating in the EARB may request that the Secretary of Commerce forward the application to the President for decision or the Secretary of Commerce on his or her own authority may take such action. In either of these cases, the Secretary shall forward the license application and the views of the departments and agencies to the President within 35 days of the EARB meeting. If no department or agency seeks review of the recommended decision within such ten-day period, the recommended decision of the EARB shall become final, and the license granted or denied accordingly. (C)

8. In the event that a dissenting department or agency fails to meet any of the foregoing deadlines for appeal of an ACEP or EARB recommended decision, such agency or department will have waived its objection to the recommended decision. In the event that any deadlines or extensions specified in this NSD for acting upon license applications are not met, for reasons other than pending third party actions on a license application unrelated to the Government's deliberation on that case, the Secretary of Commerce shall inform me in writing of the delay, the reasons for missing

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the original or extended deadline, and the date by which disposition of the license is expected. (C)

9. Within 60 days of the date of this directive, the Secretaries of State and Energy, in consultation with relevant departments and agencies, shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to bring the procedures of the SNEC into conformity with the procedures outlined in this directive. (C)

10. The resolution of export license application issues at intermediate levels, e.g., at the Deputy Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary level, is encouraged, but shall not result in extending the time frames specified in this directive. (C)

11. Nothing in this directive shall derogate from the Department's authority to extend deadlines as necessary pursuant to law and regulations. (U)

12. All currently pending license applications shall be brought into conformity with this directive by March 31, 1991. (U)

13. All references to the Secretary of Commerce in this directive shall include the Deputy Secretary of Commerce. (U)

14. I direct that, within six months, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council shall review and report on the operation of these procedures to the NSC. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 54

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf (U)

1. Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. Consistent with NSD 26 of October 2, 1989, and NSD 45 of August 20, 1990, and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States remains committed to defending its vital interests in the region, if necessary through the use of military force, against any power with interests inimical to our own. Iraq, by virtue of its unprovoked invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and its subsequent brutal occupation, is clearly a power with interests inimical to our own. Economic sanctions mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 661 have had a measurable impact upon Iraq's economy but have not accomplished the intended objective of ending Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. There is no persuasive evidence that they will do so in a timely manner. Moreover, prolonging the current situation would be detrimental to the United States in that it would increase the costs of eventual military action, threaten the political cohesion of the coalition of countries arrayed against Iraq, allow for continued brutalization of the Kuwaiti people and destruction of their country, and cause added damage to the U.S. and world economies. This directive sets forth guidelines for the defense of vital U.S. interests in the face of unacceptable Iraqi aggression and its consequences. (S)

2. Pursuant to my responsibilities and authority under the Constitution as President and Commander in Chief, and under the laws and treaties of the United States, and pursuant to H. J. Res. 77 (1991), and in accordance with the rights and obligations of the United States under international law, including UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667,

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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669, 670, 674, 677, and 678, and consistent with the inherent right of collective self-defense affirmed in Article 51 of the of the United Nations Charter, I hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. These actions are to be conducted against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait by U.S. air, sea and land conventional military forces, in coordination with the forces of our coalition partners, at a date and time I shall determine and communicate through National Command Authority channels. This authorization is for the following purposes:

- a. to effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- b. to restore Kuwait's legitimate government;
- c. to protect the lives of American citizens abroad; and
- d. to promote the security and the stability of the Persian Gulf. (TS)

3. To achieve the above purposes, U.S. and coalition forces should seek to:

- a. defend Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states against attack;
- b. preclude Iraqi launch of ballistic missiles against neighboring states and friendly forces;
- c. destroy Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities;
- d. destroy Iraq's command, control, and communications capabilities;
- e. eliminate the Republican Guards as an effective fighting force; and
- f. conduct operations designed to drive Iraq's forces from Kuwait, break the will of Iraqi forces, discourage Iraqi use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, encourage defection of Iraqi forces, and weaken Iraqi popular support for the current government. (TS)

4. While acting to achieve the purposes in paragraph 2 above and carry out the missions in paragraph 3 above, every reasonable effort should be taken to:

- a. minimize U.S. and coalition casualties and

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- b. reduce collateral damage incident to military attacks, taking special precautions to minimize civilian casualties and damage to non-military economic infrastructure, energy-related facilities, and religious sites. (TS)
5. The United States shall seek the maximum participation of its coalition partners in all aspects of operations conducted in either Kuwait or Iraq. (S)
6. The United States will encourage Iraq's neighbors Syria and Turkey to increase their forces along their borders with Iraq so as to draw off Iraqi forces from, and resources devoted to, the Kuwait theatre of operations. (S)
7. The United States will discourage the government of Israel from participating in any military action. In particular, we will seek to discourage any preemptive actions by Israel. Should Israel be threatened with imminent attack or be attacked by Iraq, the United States will respond with force against Iraq and will discourage Israeli participation in hostilities. (TS)
8. The United States will discourage any participation in hostilities by Jordan. Similarly, the United States will discourage any Jordanian facilitation of, or support for, Iraqi military efforts. The United States will also discourage violation of Jordanian territory or airspace. (TS)
9. The United States recognizes the territorial integrity of Iraq and will not support efforts to change current boundaries. (S)
10. Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorist acts against U.S. or coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait's oil fields, it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq. I also want to preserve the option of authorizing additional punitive actions against Iraq. (TS)
11. All appropriate U.S. government departments and agencies are to prepare and present to me for decision those measures necessary for stabilizing to the extent possible energy supplies and prices during hostilities. (C)
12. Military operations will come to an end only when I have determined that the objectives set forth in paragraph 2 above have been met. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 55

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Change 1 to NSD-48 -- Nuclear Weapons Deployment  
Authorization for FY 1990 and FY 1991 (C)

The Secretary of Defense is authorized to reduce the Nuclear  
Weapons Deployment Authorization level of W-79 projectiles  
Completion of this reduction is authorized to  
occur in FY 1991 or FY 1992. (SRD)

*Ag Bush*

PARTIALLY declassified/released on 8-20-96  
under provisions of E.O. 13526  
by [redacted] National Security Council  
F89-191

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 56

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
POLICY  
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
AGENCY  
MANAGER, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

SUBJECT: National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP)  
Telecommunications Funding

This directive provides guidance for the funding of NSEP telecommunications and supersedes National Security Decision Directive 201.

Policy

Implementation and recurring costs for national level NSEP telecommunications programs shall be shared by Defense and FEMA. Defense, as the Executive Agent for the National Communications System (NCS), shall fund all pre-implementation costs for national level NSEP telecommunications programs. Participation by federal agencies in the National Communications System will continue to be in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12472.

Implementation

Beginning in FY 93, implementation and recurring costs for NSEP telecommunications will be funded by Defense (70 percent), and FEMA (30 percent).

On an annual basis, the Manager, NCS, shall ensure that a proposed national level NSEP telecommunications program is submitted for consideration by the NCS Committee of Principals and the Executive Agent. The recommendations of each regarding those initiatives that should be implemented will then be

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by the National Security Council  
F89-101

(56)

provided to the PCC for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems by June 1 and will include the required funding levels for the next two fiscal years. The PCC will provide recommendations to OMB and the agencies for use in preparation of the President's budget.

The PCC will invite participation by FEMA for review of NLP issues.

*Cy Bunk*

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WASHINGTON

20268

May 7, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Port Security Program (U)

POLICY

National security interests require that measures be taken to control the access of foreign flag vessels to U.S. ports and internal waters. The objectives of this control are as follows:

1. Protect U.S. vessels, ports, harbors, and waterfront facilities from sabotage or other activities intended to hazard their safety. (S)
2. Protect sensitive operations and U.S. defense facilities in waterfront areas from espionage and intelligence collection. (C)
3. Protect U.S. national interests defined in terms of foreign policy considerations: Examples would include limiting port access for countries that sponsor international terrorism or as a reciprocal response to limitations on access for U.S. vessels. (C)

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by U.S. Naval National Security Council  
F89-191 (5)



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4. Protect the exercise of U.S. maritime rights and high seas freedoms from intentional interference by specific vessels. (U)

#### RESPONSIBILITIES

1. To meet the objectives listed above, the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall promulgate and implement a port security program in coordination with the Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, Justice, and the Intelligence Community. (U)
2. A Port Security Committee comprised of a chairman, appointed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and representatives of the above departments and agencies will advise the Commandant of the Coast Guard in the administration of the port security program. (U)
3. For objectives 1, 2, and 3, the Defense Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) will be responsible for oversight of the program and resolution of differences that cannot be reconciled by the Port Security Committee. For objective 4, the International Oceans, Environment, and Science Affairs PCC will have that responsibility. (U)

#### APPLICABILITY

This program is applicable to all foreign flag vessels, except sovereign-immune vessels and vessels under force majeure or distress. (U)

#### PORT ACCESS

1. Unless denied or restricted under this program, access to U.S. ports open to commercial trade shall be on the basis of 24 hours' notice to the appropriate Coast Guard authority. (U)
2. Denial of access to all U.S. ports of all vessels flying the flag or under the effective control of a specific country requires a determination that such vessels are a threat to the national security interests outlined above. Such denial shall occur, normally, only as an element of a broader national security program of sanctions against the country. Countries so designated are listed in Annex A. For the purpose of this determination, effective control refers to vessels owned, operated, or chartered by the country in question. (U)

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3. Denial or restriction of access to U.S. ports of an individual vessel which intentionally interferes with the exercise of U.S. maritime rights and high sea freedoms requires a determination by the PCC for International Oceans, Environment, and Science Affairs, and approval by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (S)

4. Restrictions on access to U.S. ports of vessels or classes of vessels flying the flag or under the effective control of a specified country shall result from a determination that restriction is necessary to meet the objectives of the program. Restrictions shall be the minimum necessary, commensurate with the threat involved, and conducive to the efficient administration of the program. Countries and ports so designated are listed in Annex B. For the purpose of this determination, effective control refers to the composition of the crew, in particular, the nationality of the captain (master) and chief mate. Determinations shall be made in accordance with the following considerations:

- the ability of the vessels or classes of vessels to exploit U.S. national security vulnerabilities;
- the ability of the U.S. to compensate for those vulnerabilities through reasonable measures;
- the effect on the U.S. military's operational capability and defensive posture;
- the ability of the foreign government to defeat the objectives of this program through other means;
- the impact of the restriction on U.S. foreign, economic, and trade policy objectives. (C)

#### SECURITY MEASURES

Appropriate defensive security measures shall be applied to specified vessels of countries designated in Annex B, including boarding and search by the U.S. Coast Guard at intervals considered appropriate by the Commandant. (C)

#### UPDATING

The categories specified in Annexes A and B and the ports listed in Annex B may be updated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the recommendation of the Defense Policy Coordinating Committee. (U)

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RESCISSION

This statement of policy on U.S. port security supersedes National Security Decision Directive No. 200 dated December 4, 1985. (C)

*G. Bush*

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ANNEX A

COUNTRIES WHOSE VESSELS ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO  
ENTER U.S. PORTS

Cambodia

Cuba

Iran

Iraq

Libya

North Korea

Syria

Vietnam

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ANNEX B

COUNTRIES WHOSE VESSELS ARE ELIGIBLE  
FOR ACCESS TO U.S. PORTS EXCEPT THOSE NOT  
AVAILABLE FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

POLAND	ALBANIA	
HUNGARY	BULGARIA	Note 1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	ROMANIA	
USSR		Note 2

Note 1: The following are controlled ports: Portsmouth, New Hampshire; New London and Groton, Connecticut; Hampton Roads, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; Kings Bay, Georgia; Port Canaveral, Panama City, Pensacola, and Port St. Joe, Florida; San Diego and Port Hueneme, California; and Honolulu, Hawaii. Vessels capable of intelligence collection, e.g., research vessels, would normally be considered public vessels. Access of vessels capable of intelligence collection to the controlled ports will be considered on a case-by-case basis through government to government channels. Vessels not considered to be intelligence collection platforms, such as commercial cargo and passenger vessels, may enter all U.S. ports, upon 24 hours' notice.

Note 2: The controlled ports are unavailable to vessels from the USSR. Access to all other U.S. ports will be governed by the 1990 US-USSR Maritime Transport Agreement. These provisions shall apply also to fishing and fishing support vessels, subject to reciprocal treatment of U.S. fishing and fishing support vessels.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 58

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention Initiative (U)

The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf brought into play once again the threat of chemical weapons (CW). It demonstrated in the most graphic terms that unscrupulous regimes can and will threaten entire populations with these weapons of terror as long as we permit them to exist. The circumstances of that conflict renew and reinforce my conviction, shared by responsible leaders around the world, that chemical weapons must be banned. Our best hope for getting us firmly on the path to that goal is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) under negotiation in Geneva.

(5)

The United States is the only country that can provide the leadership necessary to achieve an early conclusion to a CWC that serves our interests. Accordingly, I have decided that the U.S. will take new initiatives to accelerate the negotiations in Geneva, and to provide stronger incentives to states to follow the American lead by committing themselves to becoming parties to an effective Convention and to carrying out its requirements strictly. (C)

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I therefore direct that the following actions be taken:

- The United States will call for the resolution of all major outstanding issues by the end of 1991 and the completion of the CWC within twelve months. (C)
- To help reach these goals and to demonstrate our determination to do everything possible to bring the CWC talks to a successful conclusion soon, the United States will propose that the CW ad hoc committee of the CD stay in continuous session in Geneva at the ambassadorial level, with delegations reinforced as necessary. (C)
- In support of these goals, the United States will propose that the CD Foreign Ministers meet at an appropriate time to conclude any remaining issues that cannot otherwise be resolved. (C)
- The U.S. will publicly reaffirm that it intends to become an original party to the CWC. In addition, the U.S. will fore swear the right of retaliation with CW for any reason against any state, effective when the CWC enters into force. At the CD negotiations, the United States delegation will propose a provision in the CWC prohibiting the use of CW for any reason. The U.S. will also call upon all states publicly to commit to becoming original parties, to declare their CW stocks, and to fore swear the use of CW for any reason when the CWC enters into force. (S)
- The United States will commit itself to the unconditional destruction of all CW stocks and former production facilities within ten years of entry into force of the CWC, and will publicly announce this new position. We will call upon all states to follow our lead and to begin the destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as possible. We will propose provisions for the CWC that require all parties to begin the unconditional destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as the CWC enters into force, and to complete their elimination within ten years of that date. (S)
- The U.S. will offer to provide practical destruction assistance to parties to the CWC that have CW located on their territory. The U.S. will:
  - o Make available technical advice and assistance (e.g., blueprints, technical advice, visits to U.S. destruction facilities). (C)
  - o Create a Task Force comprised of U.S. government agency and private industry representatives to develop proposals on how the U.S. can advise and assist states in CW destruction. (C)

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- o Propose the creation of a CD Working Group on CW destruction and offer to provide U.S. experts to it. (C)
- The U.S. will reiterate U.S. unilateral policy on export controls on appropriate chemicals and related technology and call on all states to enact similar controls. (C)
- There must be a wide-spread recognition that, aside from the significant intrinsic benefits that will flow to all parties from a total ban on CW, there will be tangible benefits for those states that join the Convention and enhance its strength, and specific penalties for those states that fail to support it in the most fundamental and important way by not joining it. To make that difference meaningful, the United States will propose provisions for the CWC that require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with states that do not become parties within a reasonable time after entry into force. (S)
- The United States will reaffirm our current position that there should be sanctions against those states that violate the CWC and especially severe sanctions against any state that initiates the use of CW. (C)
- The United States will reaffirm our commitment to a strong and forthright verification regime. We will offer additional concrete proposals to address the central issue of inspecting suspect sites, and we will call on the CD to adopt our approach. (C)
- By May 14, 1991, the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee will develop instructions to our representatives to the CD that are based on this NSD. (C)

This National Security Directive supersedes NSD-24. (C)

*Cy Bunk*

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~~with TOP SECRET attachments~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

21236

May 14, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 59

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Disposition of Reagan Administration Policy  
Papers

After an interagency review of the National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) from the Reagan Administration, I direct that the following disposition be made:

1. Those NSDDs listed at Tab 1 are no longer in force and have been superseded by more recent policy directives.
2. Those NSDDs listed at Tab 2 have been completed and are no longer in force.

This directive supplements NSDD 321.



Brent Scowcroft

Attachments

Tab 1 List of Superseded NSDDs  
Tab 2 List of Completed NSDDs

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with TOP SECRET attachments

Partially Declassified/Released on 10-18-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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1

NSDD'S NO LONGER IN FORCE AND SUPERSEDED BY OTHER POLICY DIRECTIVES

NSDD	3	14 Dec 81	Crisis Management (U) Superseded by NSD 1
NSDD	7	6 Aug 81	Enhanced Radiation Weapons (U) Superseded by NSD 43
NSDD	26	25 Feb 82	Civil Defense (S) Superseded by NSDD 259
NSDD	30	10 Apr 82	Managing Terrorism Incidents (U) Superseded by NSDD 207
NSDD	55	14 Sep 82	Enduring National Leadership (TS) Superseded by NSD 37
NSDD	58	30 Sep 82	United States Oceans Policy & Law of the Sea (U) Superseded by NSDD 83
NSDD	61	15 Oct 82	<div data-bbox="639 1360 1560 1486" style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 60px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div data-bbox="969 1444 1304 1507" style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">(TS) 1.5 (g)</div> Superseded by NSD 37
NSDD	75	17 Jan 83	U.S. Relations with USSR (S) Superseded by NSD 23

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NSDD 79	1 Feb 83	U.S. Chemical Weapons Arms Control Policy (C) Superseded by NSDD 136
NSDD 85	25 Mar 83	Eliminating the Threat from Ballistic Missiles (U) Superseded by NSD 14
NSDD 99	12 Jul 83	United States Security Strategy for Near East & South Asia (S) Superseded by NSD 16, NSD 20, NSD 26
NSDD 114	26 Nov 83	U.S. Policy towards Iran - Iraq War (S) Superseded by NSD 26
NSDD 133	14 Mar 84	United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia (S) Superseded by NSC Memorandum dated August 10, 1989, entitled "Comprehensive Review of U.S. - Yugoslav Relations (S)"
NSDD 145	17 Sep 84	Natl Policy on Telecommunications & Automated Information Systems Security (U) Superseded by NSD 42
NSDD 147	11 Oct 84	U.S. Policy Towards India & Pakistan (S) Superseded by NSD 20
NSDD 166	27 Mar 85	U.S. Policy, Programs, & Strategy in Afghanistan (TS) Superseded by NSD 3
NSDD 179	17 Jul 85	Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (U) Superseded by NSDD 207

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NSDD 200	5 Dec 85	U.S. Port Security (U)
		Superseded by NSD 57
NSDD 201	17 Dec 85	Natl Security Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Funding - NSEP (U)
		Superseded by NSD 56
NSDD 217	10 Mar 86	<div style="background-color: black; width: 200px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div> (TS) 1.5 (g)
		Superseded by NSD 37
NSDD 231	14 Jul 86	Crisis Management Policies & Procedures (TS)
		Superseded by NSD 37
NSDD 237	2 Sep 86	Director, Presidential Contingency Programs (C)
		Superseded by NSD 37
NSDD 265	16 Mar 87	Freedom of Navigation Program (C)
		Superseded by NSD 49
NSDD 270	1 May 87	Afghanistan (C)
		Superseded by NSD 3
NSDD 283	7 Oct 87	1988 Touchstone Nuclear Test Program (U)
		Superseded by NSDD 316
NSDD 303	15 Apr 88	Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1988 & FY 1989 (U)
		Superseded by NSD 38

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NSDD 306	23 May 88	National Coordination of Emergency Relocation Sites (S) Superseded by NSD 37
NSDD 311	28 Jul 88	US - Soviet Defense & Military Relations (U) Superseded by NSD 23
NSDD 316	11 Oct 88	FY 1989 Cornerstone Nuclear Test Program (U) Superseded by NSD 29
NSDD 317	20 Oct 88	Amendment to Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1988 & FY 1989 (U) Superseded by NSD 38
NSDD 325	19 Jan 89	FY 1989 - 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (U) Superseded by NSD 43

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NSDD'S COMPLETED AND NO LONGER IN FORCE

NSDD 51	10 Aug 82	U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy (U)
NSDD 54	2 Sep 82	U.S. Policy Twds Eastern Europe ( <del>S</del> )
NSDD 57	17 Sep 82	U.S. Policy Towards Horn of Africa ( <del>S</del> )
NSDD 59	5 Oct 82	Cuba & Central America ( <del>TS</del> )
NSDD 71	30 Nov 82	US Policy Twds Latin America in Wake of Falklands Crisis ( <del>S</del> )
NSDD 82	24 Feb 83	U.S. Policy Initiatives to Improve Prospects for Victory in El Salvador ( <del>TS</del> )
NSDD 88	30 Mar 83	Base Negotiations Policy (U)
NSDD 100	28 Jul 83	Enhanced U.S. Military Activity & Assistance In Central American Region ( <del>TS</del> )
NSDD 101	2 Sep 83	United States Strategy Towards Liberia ( <del>S</del> )
NSDD 105	4 Oct 83	Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Policy ( <del>S</del> )
NSDD 124	7 Feb 84	Central America: Promoting Democracy, Economic Improvement & Peace ( <del>S</del> )
NSDD 126	20 Feb 84	Mutual & Balanced Force Reductions - MBFR (U)
NSDD 132	13 Mar 84	Disposition of Presidential Directives (U)

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NSDD 136	2 Apr 84	U.S. Initiative to Ban Chemical Weapons (U)
NSDD 160	24 Jan 85	Preparing for Negotiations with Soviet Union <del>(S)</del>
NSDD 182	8 Aug 85	<div style="background-color: black; width: 300px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div> (S) 1.5 (d)
NSDD 196	1 Nov 85	Counterintelligence / Countermeasure Implementation Task Force (U)
NSDD 203	23 Dec 85	Nuclear Testing Limitation - Responding to Soviet Proposals of December 5 (U)
NSDD 209	4 Feb 86	Implementing Decisions of Geneva Summit <del>(C)</del>
NSDD 210	4 Feb 86	Allied Consultations on US Response to General Secretary Gorbachev 14 Jan Arms Control Proposal (U)
NSDD 219	1 Apr 86	Implementation of Recommendations of Presidential Commission on Defense Management (U)
NSDD 223	23 Apr 86	Implementing the Geneva Exchanges Initiative (U)
NSDD 225	20 May 86	Central America - U.S. Policy on Search for a Negotiated Solution <del>(S)</del>
NSDD 248	22 Oct 86	Central America (U)
NSDD 253	24 Dec 86	Suriname <del>(S)</del>
NSDD 258	6 Feb 87	Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Program (U)

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NSDD 284	15 Oct 87	U.S. Military Capabilities in Support of NATO (U)
NSDD 291	16 Dec 87	U.S. Policy Towards Mexico (U)
NSDD 295	14 Jan 88	Instructions for Ninth NST Negotiation Round (C)
NSDD 297	20 Jan 88	Preparations for the 1988 Economic Summit (U)
NSDD 310	18 Jul 88	Instructions for Tenth NST Negotiating Round (C)
NSDD 312	8 Aug 88	Instructions for the Third Five-Year Review of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (S)
NSDD 313	15 Aug 88	ABM Treaty Review - U.S. Delegation Instructions (U)
NSDD 320	20 Nov 88	National Policy on Strategic Trade Controls (C)
NSDD 321	2 Dec 88	Disposition of National Security Decision Directives (U)
NSDD 323	9 Jan 89	Disposition of Pre-Reagan Policy Papers (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

20336

May 30, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 60

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
POLICY

SUBJECT: The FY 1992 Nuclear Test Program: Julin (U)

I have approved the FY 1992 Nuclear Test Program, "Julin" proposed by the Secretary of Energy. In implementing the Julin program, the following guidance will apply:

- All tests associated with Julin will be conducted in compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the National Environmental Policy Act and all other relevant environmental laws and regulations. (S)
- The Department of Energy shall review each test with design yields near 150 kilotons to ensure reasonably that the device yield does not exceed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit. (S)

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Declassified/Released on 8-30-96  
Under provisions of E.O. 13526  
by the Exec. National Security Council

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The testing agency shall continue to coordinate with the NSC staff public affairs activities related to the implementation of the Julin program, as appropriate, in advance of test events.  
(U)

The FY 1993 Nuclear Test Program should be provided for my approval by April 15, 1992. (U)

*G. Bush*

C

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 2, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: FY 1991-1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (U)

I approve the attached Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for the fiscal year 1991 through 1996. The levels depicted for FY 1992 and beyond may require adjustment based on developments in arms control, changes in the international political environment, and the capability of the nuclear weapons production complex. (S)

The stockpile levels in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan represent ceilings not to be exceeded except as provided below or otherwise approved by me. (S)

For the period FY 1991-1996, the following are authorized:

1. Consistent with environmental, safety and health standards, the Department of Energy (DOE) shall produce and retire those quantities of nuclear warheads and nuclear warhead parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpile, and shall produce additional nuclear weapons parts as necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Agreement of Cooperation. (S/FRD)

2. DOE may produce and transfer to the Department of Defense (DOD) parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear materials, as may be agreed to by DOE and DOD. These parts may be used in nuclear weapons training programs, research and development, and production. Additionally, DOE may

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Partially Declassified/Released on 12/15/99  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

F89-191

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temporarily transfer parts or test units containing fissile materials or plutonium power supplies for development and flight test programs. (U)

3. DOE, in coordination with DOD, shall make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads during FY 1991-1996 as may be necessary to accommodate changes in DOE materials availability, production and retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements; or to accommodate changes required by DOD because of adjustments in force structure requirements. These changes may not exceed plus or minus 10 percent of the totals each year in each of the categories of the active stockpile. In addition, any changes which indicate a significant shift in defense requirements or DOE production capabilities, will be submitted to me for approval. (S/FRD)

4. DOD, if requested by DOE, may retain custody of nuclear warheads that are designated as retired for a period of up to 24 months from the designation date to reduce DOE requirements for weapon storage. The DOE will take custody of warheads that DOD has designated as retired as rapidly as possible consistent with DOE transportation and storage capabilities. (C)

5. The safety of nuclear weapon systems remains of paramount important to the security of the United States. Nuclear warhead modernization programs will incorporate insensitive high explosive, as technically and operationally feasible, to minimize the potential for nuclear material scattering in an accident or sabotage situation. Older weapons lacking modern safety and security features, which are planned for extended retention, will be reviewed annually by DOD and DOE to determine if they should be included in the Stockpile Improvement Plan. (U)

6. National security considerations shall be the determining factor in the national nuclear material production goals. DOE shall provide the capacity and capability for nuclear materials and weapons production throughout the full planning and projection periods covered by the stockpile plan to include provisions for reasonable future contingencies. DOE shall establish and maintain a reserve of weapon-grade plutonium metal and highly enriched uranium metal to support the equivalent of approximately one year of weapons production. (U)

7. 

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
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The FY 1997-2001 Stockpile Projection, which was submitted with the Stockpile Plan, has been noted for planning purposes. (U)

The FY 1992-1997 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan should be submitted by January 31, 1992. The FY 1998-2002 Stockpile Projection should also be included as part of the same submission. (U)

This directive supersedes National Security Directive Number 43 (July 12, 1990). (U)

Attachment (S/FRD)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a stylized "B" and "ush".

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ENCLOSURE 1  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM	YIELD (KT)	FIVE YEAR PROGRAM						STOCKPILE PROJECTION **				
		FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01
A. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE												
MINUTEMAN II	W56											
MINUTEMAN III	W62											
MINUTEMAN III	W78											
PEACEKEEPER	W87											
SUBTOTAL (LAND-BASED MSL)												
POSEIDON	W68											
TRIDENT	W76											
TRIDENT	W88											
SUBTOTAL (SEA-BASED MSL)												
B2BY1												
B53												
B61-7												
B83												
B83 (904)	0											
SUBTOTAL (BOMBS)												
SRAM A	W69											
SRAM II	W89											
ALCM/ACM	W80-1											
ALCM/ACM	W80-1(908)											
EPW	W61											
SUBTOTAL (AIR-SURF MSL)												
TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE												
B. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE												
NONE												
TOTAL STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE												
C. TACTICAL												
B43Y2												
B57												
B61-0												
B61-2												
B61-3												
B61-4												
B61-5												
B61-6												
B61-8												
B61-9												
B61-10												
W91	SRAM T											
SUBTOTAL (BOMBS/ASM)												
TOMAHAWK	W80-0											
GLCM	W84											
SUBTOTAL (CRUISE MSLS)												

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for USC 2162  
of Atomic Energy  
Act

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ENCLOSURE 1  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM	YIELD (KT)	FIVE YEAR PROGRAM					STOCKPILE PROJECTION **				
		FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00

PERSHING Ia W50Y1  
 PERSHING Ia W50Y2  
 PERSHING Ia W50Y3  
 PERSHING II W85  
 LANCE W70-1,2  
 LANCE (ER) W70-3

## SUBTOTAL (SURF-SURF MSL)

8-INCH W33Y1,3,4  
 8-INCH W33Y2  
 8-INCH W79-0  
 8-INCH W79-1  
 8-INCH W79-1(910) (g)  
 155MM W48

## SUBTOTAL (ARTILLERY) 0

## SUBTOTAL (ADM)

## SUBTOTAL (AIR DEFENSE)

## TOTAL TACTICAL

## D. FLEET

DEPTH BOMB B57

## TOTAL FLEET

## A. TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

## B. TOTAL STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

## C. TOTAL TACTICAL

## D. TOTAL FLEET

## -- GRAND TOTAL ACTIVE --

42 USC 9162 of  
 Atomic Energy Act

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**UNCLASSIFIED**ENCLOSURE 1  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM	YIELD (KT)	FIVE YEAR PROGRAM						STOCKPILE PROJECTION **				
		FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01
<b>A. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE</b>												
MINUTEMAN II	W56											
MINUTEMAN III	W62											
MINUTEMAN III	W78											
PEACEKEEPER	W87											
SUBTOTAL (LAND-BASED MSL)												
POSEIDON	W68											
TRIDENT	W76	[a]										
TRIDENT	W88	[a]										
SUBTOTAL (SEA-BASED MSL)												
B28Y1												
B53		[b]										
B61-7												
B83												
B83 (904)		[c]										
SUBTOTAL (BOMBS)												
SRAM A	W69	[d]										
SRAM II	W89											
ALCM/ACM	W80-1											
ALCM/ACM	W80-1(908)	[e]										
EPW	W61											
SUBTOTAL (AIR-SURF MSL)												
TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE												
<b>B. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE</b>												
		NONE										
TOTAL STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE												
<b>C. TACTICAL</b>												
B43Y2												
B57												
B61-0												
B61-2												
B61-3		[f]										
B61-4		[f]										
B61-5												
B61-6												
B61-8												
B61-9												
B61-10												
W91	SRAM T	[f]										
SUBTOTAL (BOMBS/ASM)												
TOMAHAWK	W80-0											
GLCM	W84											
SUBTOTAL (CRUISE MSLS)												

**UNCLASSIFIED**42 USC 2162  
of Atomic Energy  
Act



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ENCLOSURE  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM	YIELD (KT)	FY91	FIVE YEAR PROGRAM					STOCKPILE PROJECTION **				
			FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01
E. INACTIVE RESERVE												
MINUTEMAN III	W62 (903)	[g]										
GLCM	W84	[h]										
SPARTAN	W71											
PERSHING II	W85											
TOTAL INACTIVE RESERVE												
--TOTAL STOCKPILE--												

## FOOTNOTES:

- \*
- \*\* FY 1997 - FY 2001 projections are beyond the SYDP and may not reflect firm DoD system decisions.

[a]  
[b]  
[c]  
[d]  
[e]  
[f]  
[g]  
[h]

*42 USC 2165  
of Atomic  
Energy Act*

## ABBREVIATIONS:

ACM - Advanced Cruise Missile  
 ASM - Air-to-Surface Missile  
 ALCM - Air Launched Cruise Missile  
 EPW - Earth Penetrator Weapon  
 ER - Enhanced Radiation  
 SYDP - Six Year Defense Plan  
 GLCM - Ground Launched Cruise Missile  
 SRAM - Short Range Attack Missile  
 SRAM T - Short Range Attack Missile---Tactical

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20298

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 62

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Significant Military Operations and Exercises (U)

This directive provides policy and procedures for review and approval of significant military operations and exercises and supersedes NSAM No. 316 dated November 12, 1964. (U)

Policy

The President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, must be informed in advance of significant military operations and exercises. (C)

The Department of Defense will take special care in scheduling and conducting military operations in geographic areas that are considered to be politically sensitive and in scheduling of exercises whose character or location make them politically sensitive, and will cooperate closely with the Department of State in carrying out this policy. (C)

Politically Sensitive Areas (PSA)

The Department of State will designate geographical land and maritime areas considered to be sufficiently politically sensitive with regard to U.S. foreign relations so as to require that the President be informed of upcoming military operations and exercises planned in those areas. (C)

In prescribing the breadth of maritime PSAs, the territorial sea baseline claimed by the country involved, and the baseline acceptable to the United States, shall be taken into account.

(C)

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Declassify on: OADR

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Declassified/Released on 12/15/99  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Souther, National Security Council  
F89-191

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In designating areas as politically sensitive, the Department of State will provide the reasons why an area is considered politically sensitive. The Departments of State and Defense will jointly review the list of areas considered to be sensitive at least every six months and may add or delete areas from the list. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the National Security Advisor) will resolve any disagreement on whether an area should be on the list. (C)

In a case of imminent distress to persons, aircraft or vessels within a PSA, assistance should be provided in accordance with international law and notification made to the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State. (C)

#### Significant Military Operations

The President shall be informed in advance of any military operations deemed significant because they are to be conducted either in or over an area designated as politically sensitive, or because they are to occur near a politically sensitive area when such operations constitute a change of significant nature in the type, size, frequency, or location of U.S. military presence. Military operations of interest involve the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, or training mission. (C)

The Department of Defense will provide the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State a detailed exposition of each proposed significant military operation at least seven (7) days (except in unusual circumstances) prior to the conduct of the operation. Procedures for notifiable Freedom of Navigation operations will be in accordance with NSD-49. Nothing in this directive relieves the Department of Defense from reporting and coordination requirements for sensitive operations which may be governed by other applicable policy guidance. (C)

#### Significant Military Exercises

The President shall be informed in advance of exercises deemed significant because they fall into any one of the following categories:

- Those involving comparatively large-scale participation of U.S. or foreign forces or commands. (C)
- Those requiring the granting of rights or approval by another nation or representative thereof, except where such approval is sought by NATO authorities. (C)
- Those that have particular political significance or implications, including those exercises that are planned to occur in politically sensitive areas. (C)
- Any exercise that is otherwise of such a nature as to receive prominent attention by the press. (C)

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UNCLASSIFIED


- Other exercises with which the Secretary of Defense believes the President should be familiar. (U)

After coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense will provide the National Security Advisor a detailed exposition of each proposed significant military exercise at least seven (7) days (except in unusual circumstances) in advance of the critical cancellation date. (C)

#### Advance Planning Information

For military operations and exercises in the above categories, available advance planning information should be forwarded on a quarterly basis covering the following twelve months to the Secretary of State and to the National Security Advisor. This information should include the name of the operation, exercise, sponsor, location, date, brief description, purpose and forces. Significant amendments to this information should be provided as they become available. In every case, this information should be provided prior to any commitment to foreign governments. (C)

Nothing in this document affects the chain of command over the armed forces established by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (U)



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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 21, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE

SUBJECT: Single Scope Background Investigations

To eliminate redundant and costly investigative practices currently employed throughout the Executive branch, I direct that the following minimum investigative scope and standards be adopted by all agencies and departments for access for Collateral Top Secret/National Security Information and Sensitive Compartmented Information:

Scope

Past ten (10) years or to age 18, whichever is less.

Expansion of Investigation

The investigation may be expanded as necessary, to resolve issues and/or address employment standards unique to individual agencies.

National Agency Check

Checks on subject and spouse/cohabitant of investigative and criminal history files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint records on the subject, and such other national agencies (DCII, INS, OPM, CIA, etc.) as appropriate to the individual's background.

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and provided to the  
by the National Security Council  
F89-191

63

### Subject Interview

Required in all cases and shall be conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel to ensure full investigative coverage.

An additional personal interview shall be conducted when necessary to resolve any significant information and/or inconsistencies developed during the investigation. In departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the personal interview may include a polygraph examination, conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.

### Birth

Independent certification of date and place of birth received directly from appropriate registration authority.

### Citizenship

Subject must be a U.S. citizen. Independent verification of citizenship received directly from appropriate registration authority. For foreign-born immediate family members, verification of citizenship or legal status is also required.

### Education

Independent verification of most recent or most significant claimed attendance and/or degree/diploma within the scope of investigation via sealed transcript received directly from the institution. If all education is outside of the investigative scope, the last education above high school level will be verified.

### Employment

Direct verification through records of all periods of employment within scope but in any event the most recent two (2) years. Personal interviews of two sources (supervisor/coworkers) for each employment of six months or more shall be attempted. In the event that no employment exceeds six months, interviews of supervisor/coworkers shall be attempted. All periods of unemployment in excess of sixty (60) days shall be verified through records and/or sources. All prior federal/military service and type of discharge(s) shall be verified.

### References

Four required (at least three of which are developed). To the extent practical, all should have social knowledge of subject and collectively span the entire scope of the investigation.

As appropriate, additional interviews may include cohabitant(s), ex-spouses, and relative(s). Interviews with psychological/medical personnel are to be accomplished as required to resolve issues.

### Neighborhood

Interviews with neighbors for last five years if residence exceeds six months. Confirmation of current residence shall be accomplished regardless of length to include review of rental records if necessary. In the event no residence exceeds six months, interview of neighbors should be undertaken.

### Credit

Verification of the subject's financial status and credit habits of all locations where subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six months or more for the last seven (7) years.

### Local Agency Checks

A check of appropriate Police records covering all locations where subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six months or more during the scope of investigation, to include current residence regardless of duration. In the event that no residence, employment, or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed.

### Public Records

Verification of divorce(s), bankruptcy, etc., and any other court (civil or criminal) actions to which subject has been or is a party within the scope of investigation, when known or developed.

### Transferability

Investigations satisfying the scope and standards specified above are transferable between agencies and shall be deemed to meet the investigative standards for access to Collateral Top Secret/

National Security Information and Sensitive Compartmented Information. No further investigation or reinvestigation prior to revalidation every five years will be undertaken unless the agency has substantial information indicating that the transferring individual may not satisfy eligibility standards for clearance or the agency head determines in writing that to accept the investigation would not be in the national security interest of the United States.

Notes

Immediate family -- spouse, parents, brothers, sisters, children, and cohabitant of the individual requiring access.

G. B. Burch



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organizing to Manage On-site Inspections Under  
the CFE Treaty (U)

This directive defines organizational structures and responsibilities to implement the on-site inspection provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the policy structure for providing guidance on matters involving on-site inspections. This directive complements National Security Directive 41, which expanded the mission of the On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA). (S)

Planning to implement this directive should begin immediately so that the United States is fully prepared to conduct appropriate monitoring of the CFE activities of successor states to the former Soviet Union and East European CFE participants as soon as the Treaty enters into force. (S)

Background (U)

On-site inspections carried out under the CFE Treaty will make an important contribution to U.S. verification. Unlike existing bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union, however, the CFE Treaty will involve inspections by our NATO Allies which, collectively, will greatly exceed the number conducted by the United States alone. It is imperative, therefore, that we organize not only to take maximum advantage of U.S. inspection rights but also to ensure, to the

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degree possible, that CFE inspections conducted by other NATO nations contribute to effective verification. One of our objectives is to use CFE implementation to help achieve our goal of expanding the political function of NATO. (C)

#### Policy Guidance (U)

The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) will provide overall policy guidance on matters involving on-site inspections. The PCC will also provide guidance to U.S. inspection teams and U.S. representatives to NATO verification coordinating mechanisms. Any disputes with other CFE Treaty Parties about matters involving on-site inspections will be promptly reported to Washington for attention by the PCC. The PCC will develop U.S. public affairs guidance on matters involving on-site inspections. (U)

U.S. policy is to exercise the full spectrum of monitoring and inspection rights under the CFE Treaty. U.S. inspection teams will exercise these rights consistent with general and specific policy guidance. We will encourage NATO Allies to do the same. Proposed exceptions to this policy will be resolved by the PCC. (C)

#### DoD Responsibilities (U)

The Department of Defense will be responsible for developing and implementing plans and procedures consistent with the CFE Treaty and PCC guidance (1) for the receipt of inspection teams, host nation and U.S. escort teams at U.S. forces installations, facilities, exercise activities or equipment locations and (2) for the conduct of inspections of U.S. forces at those locations. (U)

OSIA will develop detailed inspection procedures for the conduct of inspections consistent with overall policy guidance developed by the Arms Control PCC. OSIA will be responsible for overall leadership, management and support of U.S. CFE inspection teams and escort activities, including transportation, linguists, communications, training and counterintelligence. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for the makeup of all inspection and escort teams. A Team Leader, appointed by OSIA, shall lead each team of U.S. inspectors and shall have final authority over the team and in all dealings with counterparts from other Treaty countries. The Team Leader shall ensure that proper security procedures are followed to minimize the risk of unauthorized foreign access to information of intelligence or counterintelligence value. OSIA may augment the U.S. team of inspectors with personnel from other agencies as appropriate. In the case of U.S. participation in multi-national inspections under NATO auspices, OSIA will designate the U.S. team leaders and/or members, and will work with the Department of State to arrange such U.S. participation, including coordination with U.S.

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representatives to the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee.  
(S)

OSIA will be responsible for all escort activities related to non-U.S. inspections of U.S. facilities under the CFE Treaty, with support from U.S. military and diplomatic organizations in Europe. OSIA will designate the senior U.S. representative responsible for the U.S. escorts, for all dealings with non-U.S. inspection teams, and with escorts from the European countries where U.S. CFE-related facilities are located. The OSIA escort team leader will be informed of all security and counter-intelligence information which affects the escort mission. (S)

#### DCI Responsibilities (S)

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), through his Treaty Monitoring Center, will develop for PCC approval a comprehensive monitoring strategy and plan designed to accomplish CFE verification objectives. The DCI will be responsible for preparing all-source monitoring reports and integrating the results of on-site inspections with all-source intelligence and the information provided by other Treaty signatories. For this purpose, the DCI will receive guidance from the Arms Control PCC to formulate tasking for collection and analysis by the Intelligence Community. The DCI will coordinate the targeting requirements for all-source collection to monitor the CFE Treaty

[REDACTED] (S)

The DCI shall be responsible for recommending U.S. inspection

[REDACTED]

In this connection, an annual inspection plan will be developed and approved by the Arms Control PCC. Appropriate elements of this plan will be coordinated with allies through the Department of State. However, on-site inspections will not be the only source of information essential for verification of the CFE Treaty. Data from on-site inspections should be integrated with information from other sources to ensure complete and accurate monitoring reports. Such data and integrated reports will provide a basis for policy decisions on compliance by Treaty parties with the CFE Treaty provisions. (S)

[REDACTED] 1.5 (c)

The ultimate customer for the on-site inspection data and for other all-source intelligence and analysis is the Arms Control PCC. The DCI will ensure that, consistent with his responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, on-site inspection data and other all-source intelligence and information are analyzed and integrated, and that both data and analysis are disseminated promptly to all PCC members. (S)

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The United States will conduct only a portion of the inspections allotted to NATO under the CFE Treaty. In order to enhance the overall effectiveness of the NATO inspection effort the DCI will seek to provide appropriate U.S. intelligence support to the on-site inspection activities of our NATO Allies and arrange for the exchange of intelligence information acquired during U.S. and Allied inspections. (S)

A U.S. goal is to expand our participation in CFE inspections through the shared use of the limited number of inspections available to NATO. The DCI and the Department of State will arrange and coordinate as appropriate with OSIA any bilateral exchanges of CFE inspectors with other nations. (S)

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WASHINGTON

20284

March 16, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
AGENCY  
MANAGER, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

SUBJECT: Civil Defense (U)

POLICY

The United States will have a civil defense capability as an element of our overall national security posture. The objective of the civil defense program is to develop the required capabilities common to all catastrophic emergencies and those unique to attack emergencies in order to protect the population and vital infrastructure. Civil defense can contribute to deterrence by denying an enemy any confidence that he could prevent a concerted national response to attack. (U)

The civil defense program will support all-hazard integrated emergency management at State and local levels. In so doing, the civil defense program will: (U)

*PREVIOUSLY*

Declassified/Released on: 4-27-94  
under provisions of E.O. 12358  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

(F94-796)

(6)

- (1) Recognize and respect the primary responsibility of State and local governments to provide for the safety and well-being of their citizens in emergencies other than national security emergencies. (U)
- (2) Provide a focal point within Federal government to work with State and local governments on integrated multi-hazard response planning and operations to deal with the consequences of catastrophic emergencies. (U)
- (3) Continue to implement a policy of dual use of civil defense resources through the development and use of capabilities at Federal, State and local levels to perform emergency functions to respond to emergencies of all kinds including attack. (U)
- (4) Focus on the development, jointly with State and local governments, of the required capabilities common to all catastrophic emergencies and those unique to attack emergencies, thus ensuring that the use of civil defense funds is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from attack preparedness. (U)
- (5) Provide for the development of a civil defense infrastructure capable of expansion in a national security emergency involving the threat of all forms of attack on the United States which provide advanced warning. (U)
- (6) Utilize to the maximum extent the existing capabilities, facilities and resources of all appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, in accordance with Executive Order 12656 and, with their consent, those of the States and political subdivisions thereof, and of private sector organizations and agencies. (U)

Disaster-specific programs such as hurricane or flood relief programs which may be incorporated into the civil defense program and which are currently funded within domestic discretionary accounts, will continue to be budgeted in this manner. In addition, any equipment or programs not needed for the consequence management of national security emergencies will be funded within the domestic discretionary accounts. (U)

#### IMPLEMENTATION

The program under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with the support of heads of the Federal Departments and agencies, and under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council, will include: (U)

- (1) Population protection capabilities, with the Federal Government providing guidance and assistance to enable State and local governments to effectively support the population in all catastrophic emergencies. (U)
- (2) State and local government crisis management capabilities to effectively support the population in all catastrophic emergencies. (U)
- (3) Information to promote a clear understanding by the public of the civil defense program, all threats which may affect their localities and actions they should take to minimize their effects. (U)
- (4) Information to assist U.S. business and industry in taking measures to protect their work forces and physical assets in all catastrophic emergencies and encouragement of the private sector to make maximum use of private sector capabilities. (U)
- (5) Voluntary participation by citizens and institutions in community civil defense activities and emphasis on citizen protective actions. (U)
- (6) Plans for sustaining survivors, for restoration of critical life support capabilities, and to establish a basis for recovery. (U)
- (7) Definition of and an assessment of the base capability necessary to respond to emergencies that do not provide warning, and the development of those base capabilities which are common to all catastrophic emergencies and unique to attack. (U)
- (8) Plans for a civil defense surge from the base capability to the total required capability in a national security crisis involving the threat of attack. These plans should assume advanced warning, adequate time to conduct the surge, and the required base capability from which to surge. Total required capability is that operational capability necessary to protect the population and vital infrastructure through preparedness measures common to all catastrophic emergencies and unique to attack emergencies. (U)

The Department of Defense will support civil authorities in civil defense, to include facilitating the use of the National Guard in each state for response in both peacetime disasters and national security emergencies. Subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, readiness of the armed forces for military contingencies will have precedence and civil authorities should not rely exclusively on military support. Federal

military resources will be employed in civil defense missions only if State and Federal civil resources are not sufficient. Nothing in this directive alters or otherwise affects the chain of command for the armed forces established by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (U)

Nothing in this directive provides for any new Federal responsibilities which are now the responsibility of State and local governments. (U)

**RESCISSION**

National Security Decision Directive 259, dated February 4, 1987, is rescinded. (U)

*Ag Bush*



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20243

March 30, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 67

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005 (U)

The NSR-29 assessment of intelligence requirements and capabilities through 2005 is complete. Policy requirements for intelligence support have changed markedly in the past year and more change is inevitable. The priorities reflect a general consensus among policy departments and agencies. A summary of the 1992-2005 requirements is attached. (U)

I approve the NSR-29 requirements as a basis for resource management and production priorities. They should be reviewed periodically to ensure continuing relevance to the dynamic world situation and consonance with policy objectives. (U)

The DCI's recommendation to reallocate resources in FY 1993 and beyond is also approved. I expect additional changes will be recommended in the future, and I encourage a continued strong correlation of resource allocation and policy requirements for intelligence. (U)

I endorse the DCI's changes in the intelligence process and initiatives for improving both human intelligence collection and analysis at CIA. I also approve the DCI's recommendations for comprehensive restructuring of the Intelligence Community, including:

- Abolition of the Intelligence Community Staff, establishment of a DCI Community Management Staff headed by an Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs, and measures to strengthen community management of resources and requirements.

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CODENWORD

PARTIALLY  
Declassified/Released on 10/15/99  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Souters, National Security Council  
1-89-191

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- Strengthening the National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officers.
- Improved coordination and management of the four major collection disciplines and the reorganization of the NRO along functional lines.
- Initiatives to enhance support to the military, including establishment of an ADDO/Military Affairs in CIA and an Office of Military Affairs in CIA, and reprogramming measures to enhance Intelligence Community support to military contingencies. (S/TK)

These measures, together, represent the most dramatic reconfiguration of the Intelligence Community in decades, affecting structure, process, programs, and management. The program and organization changes must be implemented without delay. (U)

These changes in requirements and capabilities are an important beginning. Policy agencies must remain engaged, demanding customers, if they are to get timely, top-quality support. (U)

Attachment  
Summary of 1992-2005 Requirements

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

SUBJECT: The Nuclear Test Program for FY 1993 and the First  
Quarter of FY 1994: Klaxon (U)

I have approved the Nuclear Test Program for FY 1993 and the first quarter of FY 1994, "Klaxon," proposed by the Secretary of Energy. In implementing the Klaxon program, the following guidance will apply:

- All tests associated with Klaxon will be conducted in compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the National Environmental Policy Act, and all other relevant environmental laws and regulations. (S)
- The Department of Energy shall review each test with design yields near 150 kilotons to ensure reasonably that the device yield does not exceed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit. (S)

The testing agency shall continue to coordinate with the National Security Council staff public affairs activities related to the implementation of the Klaxon program, as appropriate, in advance of test events. (U)

The Nuclear Test Program for FY 1994 and the first quarter of FY 1995 should be provided for my approval by April 15, 1993. (U)

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by R. Soubers, National Security Council  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 70

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND  
TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
AGENCY  
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND  
SPACE ADMINISTRATION  
CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: United States Nonproliferation Policy (U)

The spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a continuing threat to U.S. national security interests. We must seek to minimize and reverse the spread of these capabilities and to prevent the use of such weapons. (U)

**Background**

Much has been done in recent years to reduce the dangers of proliferation. The accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of China, South Africa and several other African states, and the Baltic states, soon to be joined by France and (as non-nuclear weapon states) Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, will represent a signal accomplishment. Argentina and Brazil adopted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and are moving toward bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. Membership in multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile

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Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Australia Group, has broadened. Export control lists in these regimes have been updated and strengthened. Countries such as Argentina, Israel, and Russia now seek to join the MTCR, while China has agreed to observe its guidelines and parameters. After years of intransigence following its 1985 accession to the NPT, North Korea in December agreed with South Korea to declare the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons and related facilities, in April ratified an IAEA safeguards agreement, and in May accepted its first IAEA safeguards inspection. (C)

The United States has played a leading role in these and other developments. Under the December 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the United States substantially strengthened its own nonproliferation export controls, including penalties for U.S. citizens who knowingly contribute to proliferation-related activities abroad. The NSG, MTCR, and Australia Group, along with several key supplier nations, have followed the United States' lead in adopting significantly tougher nonproliferation export controls. Under the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative, the United States launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers -- the United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union (later replaced in the process by Russia), and China -- to establish guidelines of restraint for transfers to that troubled region. The special regime created to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is unprecedented. (U)

#### **Dangers Ahead**

Yet dangers remain. On the demand side, in key areas such as Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf, countries still seek possession of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. Clearly, the underlying motivations to acquire these weapons persist, with many governments still seeing them as an avenue to power, prestige and influence. Strong advocates of nuclear weapons exist in several countries. (C)

On the supply side, export controls have not -- and cannot -- completely shut off sales of goods or technology intended for development of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, countries of longstanding concern as developers of these weapons are now beginning to emerge as suppliers of related technologies. North Korea is the leading example, but there are several sources of concern on the supply side of proliferation. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Eastern European states may increase the possible sources of supply of these weapons or related technology, especially if the democratic and economic reforms in these countries should falter. (C)

These dangers require further broadening and strengthening of existing mechanisms, including multilateral export controls and other measures under the IAEA, NSG, Australia Group, and MTCR. They also require efforts to ensure that changes within the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) do not undermine our collective nonproliferation objectives.

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Indeed, our COCOM partners have accepted the recent United States proposal to establish a COCOM Cooperation Forum, reflecting our willingness to move from an adversarial to a cooperative basis for relations, while providing a forum to address new strategic threats, including proliferation. (C)

Global nonproliferation norms have played a vital role in discouraging the spread of weapons of mass destruction. They underpin -- and legitimize -- our regional and bilateral nonproliferation efforts. At the same time, preventing the spread of these weapons is a vital element of our overall national security and must be viewed in that context. We therefore will rely on global norms where possible and tailored approaches where necessary. (C)

### **United States Policy**

It is United States policy to discourage the spread of the capabilities to develop weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them, through diplomatic, political, economic, and other necessary means. It is also United States policy to prevent the use of these weapons. In pursuing its nonproliferation objectives, it is United States policy to work with other nations through bilateral and multilateral security relationships, alliances, organizations, and export control regimes, and to broaden and strengthen these mechanisms as appropriate. (U)

United States nonproliferation policy will be guided by the following principles:

First, the United States will build on existing norms and institutions against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them. To be truly effective, nonproliferation export controls need maximum multilateral support, including through the establishment of common standards of enforcement by licensing and customs authorities. These standards should seek to ensure that items licensed to one destination are not retransferred to another to assist in developing weapons of mass destruction or the missiles that deliver them. Common standards of enforcement will not only enhance our nonproliferation efforts, but also support the competitiveness of U.S. industry. (C)

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula. Also, as potential suppliers, the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states present new and potentially serious proliferation risks. In all of these areas, the problems are too difficult to be solved by generalized global norms alone. Therefore, those norms have begun to be supplemented by tailor-made approaches: the special inspection regime for Iraq, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, confidence-building measures such as those proposed for India and Pakistan, the bilateral

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Argentine-Brazilian safeguards regime and the trilateral full-scope safeguards arrangements those two countries agreed with the IAEA, and the proposed bilateral inspection regime between the Koreans. The United States should also rely on its alliances to discourage development of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. (C)

Third, United States nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support. Since the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an international problem, its treatment requires international cooperation. That means America must remain engaged in the world, supporting its friends and allies, opposing those who threaten its interests. We must be prepared as members of the international community to step in when crises arise, e.g., by seeking inspections by a body like the UN Special Commission or sanctions by the UN Security Council. That does not mean that the United States will never take unilateral actions. Indeed, the record shows that United States leadership has at times provided a beachhead from which to build multilateral consensus, as in the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (C)

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue in its totality, taking into account the underlying motivations and security rationales leading to acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, the supply of and demand for related materials and technology, and the entire range of military, political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, security assistance, and other options available to advance United States goals. This broad-gauged approach has already shown positive results, and will reinforce the first three principles. (C)

In pursuit of the foregoing principles, existing U.S. nonproliferation efforts will be supplemented by the measures described below. (U)

### **Global Norms and Institutions**

Chemical Weapons Convention. The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention this year remains a major objective, and the United States intends to take the necessary steps to meet that objective. The United States seeks universal adherence to the Convention, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories. (U)

NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993. (C)

International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with its allies and others to strengthen the IAEA. In order to support strengthened IAEA inspection procedures and to meet the increased burdens on the IAEA safeguards budget occasioned by the new safeguards requirements for Argentina, Brazil, North Korea,

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South Africa, states of the former Soviet Union, and others, the United States will support needed increases in the safeguards budget. (C)

Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by seeking universal adherence and increased support of the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review Conference. (U)

### **Regional Efforts**

Targeted approaches. The United States will work with the countries in sensitive regions as well as other states as appropriate to develop approaches tailored to the requirements of the particular region, as in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. These regional efforts should take economic, security, and political factors into account in seeking comprehensive measures to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. In addition to relying on existing security relationships, options to be considered include confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and "free zones" for or freezes on particular capabilities, materials, or weapon systems. (C)

Strategy for Former Soviet Union (FSU). To minimize the risk of the spread of militarily-useful technologies from the former Soviet Union, United States policy will contain the following elements. (C)

- Encourage implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention. (U)
- Assist FSU authorities in developing procedures for internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of materials and equipment related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the missiles that deliver them. (C)
- Assist FSU authorities in establishing and implementing effective export controls -- including appropriate laws, regulations, and multilateral standards -- as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials. (C)
- Work to ensure that nuclear-weapon material extracted from dismantled warheads remains under effective controls, and is dealt with in a safe and secure manner. (C)
- Create opportunities for scientists and engineers to redirect their talents from military to peaceful endeavors. (U)

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- Consider requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or conversion of these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products. Such assistance could include technical expertise, credit guarantees, or limited direct assistance, and could involve U.S. companies establishing joint ventures in former biological weapon facilities in Russia. Any such assistance would be conditioned on satisfactory declaration by the Russian Federation of all its biological weapon activities and ceasing all such activities as is required by the Biological Weapons Convention. (S)

### **Multilateral Actions**

Compliance with international nonproliferation norms. The United States should make clear to potential proliferators and suppliers that their relationship with the United States across the board, including such areas as technology transfer, will be affected by their performance on nonproliferation issues and conformity to key international nonproliferation norms. The United States will consult with its friends and allies to urge a similar approach.

(C)

Enforcement of international nonproliferation norms. The United States will propose that serious violations of international nonproliferation norms -- such as the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction, detonation of a nuclear device, confirmed use of chemical or biological weapons, or transfer of critical facilities for weapons of mass destruction -- be subject to appropriate international response. To implement this proposal, the United States will consult in the first instance with its friends and allies on steps including agreements on extradition, immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation, assistance to victims of attack by such weapons, inspections, United Nations Security Council embargoes and/or other sanctions. (C)

Support for special inspections and weapon destruction efforts. The United States will examine, in consultation with its friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to ensure adequate support for special inspection regimes for countries engaged in proliferation-related activities and to help states destroy existing stocks of chemical or biological weapons and the missiles that deliver them. (C)

Enhancement of export control regimes. The United States will propose that all members of nonproliferation export control regimes adopt common standards of licensing and enforcement, including universal agreement that no exporting country will approve a proposed export that another has denied on nonproliferation grounds without first consulting with that other country. This "no undercut" rule already applies in the MTCR and NSG. The rule should be applied within all nonproliferation export control regimes, and should extend across regimes (i.e. if one government denies an export on nuclear grounds another should

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not approve it for missile-related purposes without consulting with the first government). In addition, the United States will seek universal adoption of domestic laws and regulations analogous to the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (e.g., proscriptions against citizens assisting projects related to weapons of mass destruction, "safety-net" controls for nonlisted items). The United States will also promote exchange of licensing information on a real-time basis, to promote uniform implementation of agreed export control obligations. (C)

### **Nuclear Materials**

Cessation of nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in the Middle East and other regions of tension to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation. (C)

### **Intelligence**

Enhanced liaison activities. The Intelligence Community, in consultation with other United States agencies, shall enhance its nonproliferation-related liaison activities with Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Security Services around the world.

(S)

Strengthen support for multilateral institutions. The Intelligence Community, in consultation with other United States agencies, will strengthen its intelligence and analytical support to international nonproliferation regimes and institutions, such as the IAEA. (C)

Openness. The Intelligence Community shall undertake to ensure, with due attention to protection of intelligence sources and methods, that necessary information is made available for support of United States diplomatic initiatives and for public release.

(S)

Collection review. The Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake a zero-based review of Intelligence Community technical and other collection capabilities against proliferation targets and undertake necessary improvements. (S)

Training initiative. The Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake a major training initiative across all agencies of the Intelligence Community to enhance expertise and enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained officers available for the nonproliferation mission. (S)

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### Implementation

The Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agency and department heads, shall report by September 1, 1992, on the steps taken to implement this Directive, with special emphasis on regional efforts, multilateral actions, and nuclear materials.

(C)

The Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agency and department heads, shall report by December 1, 1992, on further steps that should be taken to advance our nonproliferation objectives. This review should include consideration of additional measures against ballistic missile proliferation (such as a codified international norm), and possible modifications of current United States policy toward positive and negative security assurances. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: FY 1992-1997 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (U)

I approve the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for the fiscal year 1992 through 1993, as presented in the attached Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for FY 1992-FY 1997. The levels depicted for FY 1993 and beyond should be reviewed immediately, particularly in view of the further reductions in deployed strategic weapons agreed at my June 1992 meeting with President Yeltsin. Those levels may require adjustment, based on those recent arms control achievements, as well as on other changes in the international political environment, the U.S. and allied response to that evolving situation, and the capability of the nuclear weapons production complex. (S)

The stockpile levels in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan represent ceilings not to be exceeded except as provided below or otherwise approved by me. (S)

For the period FY 1992-1993, the following are authorized:

1. 

2. DOE may produce and transfer to the Department of Defense (DOD) parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special

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UNCLASSIFIED

Partially Declassified/Released on 6-17-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

(71)

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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nuclear materials, as may be agreed to by DOE and DOD. These parts may be used in nuclear weapons training programs, research and development, and production. Additionally, DOE may temporarily transfer parts or test units containing fissile materials or plutonium power supplies for development and flight test programs. (U)

3.



(S/FRD)

4.



(C)

5. The safety of nuclear weapon systems remains of paramount importance to the security of the United States. Nuclear warhead modernization programs will incorporate advanced safety features, as technically warranted and operationally feasible. Weapons lacking modern safety and security features, that are planned for extended retention, will be reviewed annually by DOD and DOE to determine if they should be included in the Stockpile Improvement Plan. (U)

6.

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(S/RD)

7.

(S/RD)

8. The Stockpile Plan for FY 1994-1997, and the FY 1998-2002 Stockpile Projection which was submitted with the Stockpile Plan, have been noted for planning purposes. The FY 1993-1998 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan should be submitted no later than September 30, 1992. The FY 1999-2003 Stockpile Projection should also be included as part of the same submission. (U)

This directive supersedes National Security Directive Number 61 (July 2, 1991). (C)

Attachment (S/FRD)

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM

YIELD  
(KT)

FIVE YEAR PROGRAM

FY92

FY93

FY94

FY95

FY96

FY97

STOCKPILE PROJECTION \*\*

FY98


FY99

FY00

FY01


FY02

A. STRATEGIC



TOTAL STRATEGIC

B. THEATER



CLASSIFIED BY: CG-W-5, January 1984

PAGE 1 30-Apr-92

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Unauthorized disclosure of this information is prohibited by law. This information is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, disseminated, and destroyed in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.



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ENCLOSURE 1  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM

YIELD  
(KT)

FIVE YEAR PROGRAM

STOCKPILE PROJECTION \*\*

FY92

FY93

FY94

FY95

FY96

FY97

FY98

FY99

FY00

FY01

FY02

TOTAL THEATER

A. TOTAL STRATEGIC

B. TOTAL THEATER

-- GRAND TOTAL ACTIVE --

C. INACTIVE RESERVE

TOTAL INACTIVE RESERVE

--TOTAL STOCKPILE--

C

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ENCLOSURE 1  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PLAN

ITEM

YIELD (KT) FIVE YEAR PROGRAM  
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97

STOCKPILE PROJECTION \*\*  
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02

FOOTNOTES:

ABBREVIATIONS:

ACM - Advanced Cruise Missile  
ALCM - Air Launched Cruise Missile  
ER - Enhanced Radiation  
FYDP - Future Year Defense Plan  
GLCM - Ground Launched Cruise Missile  
SRAM - Short Range Attack Missile  
WXX - Warhead, Undesignated

(OVERALL CONTENT TO INCLUDE FOOTNOTES CLASSIFIED SECRET FRD)

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WASHINGTON

August 3, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 72

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for  
FY 1992 and FY 1993 (U)

The Secretary of Defense is authorized to deploy nuclear weapons during FY 1992 and FY 1993 as indicated in Tables 1 and 2, subject to future policy and programming decisions. Deployment figures are end-fiscal-year levels and are to be achieved in an orderly manner consistent with operational requirements. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

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Partially Declassified/Released on 6-7-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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~~TOP SECRET/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA ATTACHMENT~~

2.

3. The following additional policies govern nuclear weapons deployments:

a. The support of non-U.S. forces will be in accordance with the levels listed in Table 4. (U)

b.

c. During retrograde operations from outside the continental United States, unexpected delays could occur in scheduled reductions to authorized deployment levels. In such instances, when reduced levels cannot be achieved by fiscal year end, weapons may be deployed up to the previous year's level as specified in Tables 1 and 2, and the planned fiscal year retrograde may be completed in the subsequent fiscal year. If this exception is invoked, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will be advised by the Secretary of Defense. (U)

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~~SECRET/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~  
~~TOP SECRET/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA ATTACHMENT~~

d. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. The proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1993 and FY 1994 should be submitted for my approval not later than June 1, 1993. (U)

Attachments

132

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~~TOP SECRET/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA ATTACHMENT~~

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APPENDIX A

- Table 1 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization by Location and Supported Force
- Table 2 Nuclear Weapon Deployment Authorization by Region and Category
- Table 3 Conditional Nuclear Weapon Deployment Authorizations
- Table 4 Authorized Program of Cooperation for Nuclear Support of Non-U.S. Forces (Includes Unconditional and Conditional Authorizations)

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TABLE 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION BY LOCATION AND SUPPORTED FORCE (U)

FY 1992 Authorizations		FY 1993 Authorizations	
US Forces	Support of Non-US Forces Total	US Forces	Support of Non-US Forces Total



Warhead Total  
Outside US

07/10/92

**TABLE 2**

NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION BY REGION AND CATEGORY (U)

	FY 1992 Authorizations	FY 1993 Authorizations
Strategic Tactical		
Offensive		
Offensive		
Total		

## CON

<b>Grand Total</b>	100%
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\* May not vary by more than plus or minus 10 percent (not to exceed plus or minus 60 weapons) without Presidential approval.

\*\* May not exceed plus 10% (not to exceed plus 60 weapons) without Presidential approval, no minimum level applies.


07/10/92



TABLE 3  
CONDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS (U)

Part 1: Support of US Forces in Peacetime

Country of Unit/Storage Type Weapon	COND #	AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT		CONDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION		TOTAL	Condition
		FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1992	FY 1993		




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TABLE 4. (U) AUTHORIZED PROGRAM OF COOPERATION FOR NUCLEAR SUPPORT OF NON-US FORCES  
(INCLUDES UNCONDITIONAL AND CONDITIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS)

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Country of Unit/Storage	Delivery System	Type Weapon	FY 1992			FY 1993		
			Authorized <sup>1/</sup>	Support Unit <sup>2/</sup>	Support Unit <sup>2/</sup>	Authorized <sup>1/</sup>	Support Unit <sup>2/</sup>	Support Unit <sup>2/</sup>
			Weapons	Units	Equipment	Weapons	Units	Equipment



1/ The second number in the authorized column reflects a conditional deployment from Table 3 and is indicated with "(c)."  
2/ Levels reflect authorized deployments during the fiscal year.  
3/ Maximum yield



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 24, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 73

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organizing to Manage Observations Under the  
Open Skies Treaty (U)

This directive defines organizational structures and responsibilities to implement the provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies and the policy structure for providing guidance on observations. (U)

All affected agencies should begin immediately to implement this directive so that the United States is fully prepared to fulfill its rights and obligations under the Open Skies Treaty as soon as it enters into force. Departments and agencies should include in their budget submissions to the Office of Management and Budget appropriate funding to implement these responsibilities. (U)

Background

I proposed the Open Skies regime in May 1992 to help reduce the likelihood of military confrontations between Eastern and Western states through greater openness and transparency. By allowing aerial observation of the territory of participating states, Open Skies is intended to enhance stability and build confidence in the peaceful intentions of the parties to the treaty. (U)

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Partially Declassified/Released on 6-17-99  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel for the Security Council

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(S)

Policy Guidance

The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) will provide overall policy guidance on the matters involving Open Skies observations. The PCC will also provide overall guidance to U.S. observation teams and U.S. representatives to NATO or other Open Skies coordinating mechanisms. Any disputes with other Open Skies Parties about matters involving Open Skies observations will be reported promptly to Washington for attention by the PCC. The PCC will develop U.S. public affairs guidance in matters involving Open Skies observations. (U)

(C)

DoD Responsibilities

(C)

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will be responsible for overall leadership, management, and support for U.S. Open Skies observation missions, including teams and escorts, transportation, linguists, and training. (U)

OSIA will also be responsible for the makeup of all U.S. observation and escort teams. A Team Leader, appointed by OSIA, shall lead each team of U.S. observers and shall have final authority over the mission, with the exception of flight safety, and in all dealings with counterparts from other treaty countries. OSIA may augment the U.S. team of observers with personnel from other agencies as appropriate. In the case of U.S. participation in multi-national observations, OSIA will designate the U.S. Team Leaders and/or members, and will, in coordination with the Department of State, be responsible for arranging such U.S. participation. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for all escort activities related to foreign observations of U.S. territory, with support, as required, from U.S. military and diplomatic organizations. OSIA will designate the escort team leader who will be the senior U.S. representative and responsible for the U.S. escorts and for all dealings with foreign observation teams. The Team Leader shall ensure that proper security procedures are followed to minimize the risk of unauthorized disclosures. (U)

#### DCI Responsibilities

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#### Department of State Responsibilities

It will be the responsibility of the Department of State, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), or through diplomatic channels, to disseminate all notification messages concerning Treaty overflights to all interested U.S. departments and agencies. Moreover, the Department of State, in conjunction with other departments and agencies as appropriate, will be responsible for U.S. representation in the Open Skies Consultative Commission established in Vienna, Austria, to oversee the Treaty's implementation. (U)

#### FAA Responsibilities

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for providing full air traffic control services to U.S. and foreign Open Skies mission aircraft for flights within its jurisdiction. (U)

#### Counterintelligence Responsibilities

[REDACTED]  
(C)

[REDACTED]  
(C)

OSIA will be responsible for prompt dissemination to concerned U.S. agencies of detailed flight plan information as soon as it is received from the observing Party. (U)

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(S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
November 24, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 74

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping and Emergency Humanitarian Relief  
Policy (U)

This directive provides guidance for U.S. support of United Nations peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief activities. (U)

**GENERAL POLICY**

1.

[REDACTED]

(C)

2.

[REDACTED]

(C)

3.

[REDACTED]

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Declassify on: OADR

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council  
F89-191  
94



4. Authority: The United States policy on the UN's mobilizing national forces is that they should be made available only after the request of the United Nations Security Council and with the approval of the states providing them. United Nations member states must retain the final decision on the use of their troops. (C)

#### **FORCES, EQUIPMENT, AND DIRECT SUPPORT**

5. Forces: The United States should urge nations to provide military units for possible peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. These forces should be available on short notice. U.S. forces will emphasize training of its combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. The United States will work with the United Nations on how best we could employ our lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping. (C)

In order that UN peacekeeping operations may be better planned and more rapidly assembled, the United States supports the proposal that member states advise the Secretary General of their available capabilities. The United States will provide the United Nations with information on what we believe are our potentially unique contributions (e.g., strategic lift, logistics support, communications, medical). (C)

6. Equipment: Effective multinational action requires interoperability of both equipment and communications. Member states traditionally equip their own units that are seconded to a UN peacekeeping force. Some states, however, might be willing to provide personnel but are unable to supply them with some of the equipment needed for interoperability. Toward the end of enlarging the pool of countries that can participate in UN peacekeeping forces, the United States should propose that member states provide the United Nations on a regularly updated basis with information about the equipment they would in principle be willing to provide to equip other nations' contingents, subject to case-by-case national review. The United States should state its willingness to provide such information and should prepare a submission. (C)

7. Humanitarian Relief: The United States should urge member states to designate stockpiles of resources necessary to meet humanitarian emergencies, including famines, floods, and civil disturbances. The United States should explore with the United Nations and member states the enhancement of the combined civilian and military emergency humanitarian relief capability of the United Nations. The United States should urge the United

[REDACTED]

(C)

8.

[REDACTED]

(C)

OPERATIONS, PLANNING, AND TRAINING

9.

[REDACTED]

(C)

10.

[REDACTED]

(C)

IMPLEMENTATION

11

[REDACTED]

(C)

12.

[REDACTED]

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(C)

13. An interagency report on implementation of this directive should be submitted by the Working Group to the Deputies Committee in 30 days and again in 60 days. (U)

*R. B. B.*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: American Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa in the  
1990s (U)

This Directive establishes a comprehensive United States policy on sub-Saharan Africa for the 1990s based on National Security Review 30. (U)

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic changes underway in post-Cold War Africa present unprecedented opportunities and challenges for U.S. policy. Africans, seeking economic progress and democracy, are beset by ethnic tensions, economic decline, environmental degradation, and new threats from AIDS and narcotics. Progress and stability will require a long-term effort both by the international community and by the Africans themselves. Perhaps more so than ever before, they look to the U.S. for support and a mature partnership, while taking more responsibility for solving their own conflicts and problems. (U)

Maintaining substantial involvement in Africa can yield important benefits. Therefore, bilaterally and with international organizations we will continue to promote peaceful change, political stability, conflict resolution, democracy, improved governance, more commerce, sustainable development, and solutions for transnational issues. To achieve these goals we will maintain an appropriate and active diplomatic presence in each country. (U)

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5/8/00  
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DATE 5/8/00 BY 1045

Africa's global political role is disproportionate to its economic and military strength. It accounts for one third of the UN's membership and fills three non-permanent Security Council seats. Maintaining our role in Africa will also be a welcome signal to others of our willingness to continue as a global leader. ~~SECRET~~

With a population of 795 million, 20 percent of the world's land area, and a wealth of natural resources Africa cannot be discounted or ignored. Because of its conflicts and poverty there is a long-term humanitarian imperative to help alleviate acute suffering as much as possible. Domestic cultural and political ties to Africa, especially strong among African-Americans, also argue for long-term involvement. (U)

#### POLICY OBJECTIVES

The U.S. shall pursue the following policy objectives:

**Conflict Resolution and Political Stability:** These two objectives are primary, since the degree of success in achieving them will significantly influence our ability to succeed in all other areas. We must maintain an active role in conflict resolution within the limits of our resources and in concert with like-minded states in the region and beyond. When appropriate, we will encourage the United Nations and regional organizations to take the lead. At times and as necessary we will also take independent, bilateral approaches. ~~SECRET~~

We will foster politically stable regimes that are committed to political and economic freedoms. In principle we will discourage border adjustments and the creation of new states, but we will not oppose them if they are peacefully achieved, agreed to by the parties concerned, and politically acceptable in the region. ~~SECRET~~

**Democracy and Good Governance:** We will seek greater African acceptance of human rights, worker rights, the rule of law, government accountability, and democratic political pluralism. We will promote smaller, defensive military force structures with missions and leaders responsive to civilian authority and democratic values. (U)

**Development and Commerce:** We will work for sustained development through market-based reforms that rely more on the private sector and in the long term reduce dependence on outside aid. We view equitable access to markets, investment opportunities, and resources as the best way to sustain growth and U.S. involvement. (U)

**Transnational Issues:** We must reduce terrorism and narcotics trafficking in Africa, counter the proliferation threat, and limit subversion by radical regimes (e.g. Iran, Iraq, and Libya) that consider Africa a priority target and that are inimical to our interests. Seeking bilateral and multilateral support, we shall confront environmental degradation, AIDS and other health

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UNCLASSIFIED

threats, and work to curb population growth, to ameliorate the refugee problem, and to improve the status of women. (U)

**Military Security:** The reduced strategic importance of Africa to the United States in the post-cold war world should be reflected by redirecting some U.S. military resources into peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. Yet, maintaining access to some air and naval facilities for military contingencies in the region and in nearby areas will be important. We will assist in insuring adequate resources and access for international peacekeeping operations. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#### POLICY PROGRAMS

##### Fostering Stable Democracies

Our commitment is to help sustain reforms now being demanded by Africans themselves. We will focus on supporting broadly democratic processes and institutions, not personalities or specific partisan outcomes. (U)

Human rights will have a significant role in our diplomacy and programs. Post-colonial, authoritarian regimes in Africa have been dismal failures. As they disappear, we have a historic opportunity to show Africans how stability and development can be achieved through participatory political life and responsible government. (U)

Strong U.S. programs to propagate democratic values are essential. We will support rule of law, improvements in human and civil rights, freedom of the press, free and fair elections, improved governance, improved status for women, and other pillars of a democratic society. By strengthening such institutions and values, we and other democracies can help make democratic experiments in Africa permanent realities. (U)

##### U.S. and International Engagement in Africa

African conflicts and resulting humanitarian emergencies, poor governance and bad economic policies lead to heavy drains on resources and lost economic opportunities. There is much to be gained through a selectively activist policy in Africa seeking to eliminate the causes of these phenomena. The U.S. role in resolving conflicts in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Ethiopia, and in humanitarian relief in Somalia, has earned us prestige, respect and influence in Africa and will help us build on these successes. However, we should engage militarily only under extraordinary, compelling circumstances. Instead, we must rely on well-informed and vigorous bilateral diplomacy, and multilateral engagement to preempt and mediate strife. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As a complement to U.S. bilateral efforts, we have good reason to look to collective engagement with G-7 and other partners in Africa: a dwindling U.S. resource base for assistance, legitimate European interests (notably French, British and Portuguese), the expanding role of the EC, Japan's growing involvement on the continent, African efforts to revitalize the

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OAU, and the already heavy participation of the UN and international financial institutions. The capacity of the UN, the OAU and other organizations to respond to conflicts must be improved. Collective engagement among Africans for peacekeeping and economic development should be both a goal of U.S. policy and a modality for pursuing our interests. ~~(S)~~

South Africa continues to require special attention. The end of apartheid and the creation of a new, multiracial South African society will continue to be a high U.S. priority and therefore warrant an especially activist policy. The high regard of the U.S. held by all elements in that country will be a great asset.  
~~(S)~~

#### Achieving U.S. Economic Objectives

Sustainable economic growth driven by the private sector is essential to the achievement of U.S. objectives in Africa. Our economic assistance and support must focus on countries committed to free-market economic policies. The democratization process is essential since tough economic reform measures need popular support to endure. The U.S. will seek and support economic and political reforms that provide a broader role for the private sector. To maximize the impact of U.S. assistance, coordination with other donors will continue to be essential. (U)

**U.S. Aid:** We will thoughtfully apply good governance and structural reform objectives in U.S. aid programs and seek them in programs of the international financial institutions. We will continue to employ the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) to promote free markets and sustainable economic development. Economic performance, need and progress towards democracy and good governance should be the primary considerations in allocating the DFA. Consistent with sound development policy, assistance must also support broad U.S. foreign policy objectives. (U)

The U.S. will continue to respond quickly and substantially to the suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters. We will seek equitable burdensharing among all international donors. (U)

**Demobilization and Military Spending:** Resolution of conflicts throughout Africa creates a critical need to convert former combatants into productive participants in ravaged economies. We will encourage African countries to reduce military spending and put freed resources into more productive sectors. (U)

**Trade and Investment:** We will promote continued growth in U.S. trade and investment in Africa by improving the climate for the private sector, ensuring non-discriminatory treatment for U.S. business and enhancing private sector support and services needed to sustain trade. The U.S. Government and its representatives in Africa shall seek aggressively equal access for American products, services and investors. Of equal importance, U.S. ambassadors and other official representatives shall assist U.S. business to realize trade and investment opportunities, energizing U.S. and African private sectors to expand our

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commercial relationships and presence in Africa. An open trade and investment regime is especially important for the future of South Africa. (U)

To enhance U.S. exports we will encourage governments to bring their trade regimes into conformity with GATT provisions and play an active and constructive role within GATT. African countries will be urged to institute modern intellectual property rights regimes, conform to non-discriminatory investment policies and support trade-in-services provisions of the Uruguay Round. Liberalization of trade, especially in agriculture and textiles, is in Africa's long-term interest as well as ours, and Africa must move in this direction. In addition, African countries must move towards internationally recognized workers' rights. The U.S. will support viable, GATT-consistent regional economic groupings as appropriate. (U)

Renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program beyond 1993 would underscore that growth through trade can lead to less reliance on assistance. The U.S. should liberalize products that benefit the world's least developed countries. (U)

**Debt:** External debt in sub-Saharan Africa is the highest per capita of any region and many countries face serious debt burdens. While there is statutory authority for debt reduction, there is no appropriation for additional debt forgiveness in current or proposed budgets. (U)

In light of debt servicing problems in many African countries, debt relief should continue to be provided through the Paris Club, as appropriate, for those countries undertaking reforms. The extent of the debt burdens on African countries, the effectiveness of current policies to address these problems, and the prospects for continuing debt forgiveness programs for newly reforming countries shall be kept under review. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Resources:** We must accomplish our economic, assistance and commercial objectives without, in the aggregate, additional resources. In fact, vigorous promotion of stable, democratic societies and free market principles will lower the costs the U.S. inevitably bears from civil conflict and humanitarian crises by reducing their likelihood and intensity and by sustaining economic development. Conflict resolution and promoting stability leading to democracy will be given heavy emphasis in allocating USG resources and assistance in Africa. Adequate resources will be made available to support the electoral process in newly democratizing countries. (U)

#### Achieving Our Transnational Objectives

Africa's regional and subregional organizations have potential utility for the achievement of U.S. objectives. Their effectiveness is often limited by lack of sufficient political will, management skills and resources. When appropriate, the U.S. will assist individual states to address the underlying weaknesses of these organizations through training and technical assistance. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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The OAU is Africa's most inclusive and important organization. The issue on which we have the greatest identity of interest with the OAU is regional conflict resolution. In cooperation with other donor nations, the U.S. will support OAU initiatives to enhance its capability to resolve conflict. Beyond the OAU, U.S. assistance should be given to those bodies which currently, or with assistance, have the best prospects for achieving U.S. objectives. ~~(C)~~

**Women:** Women play an essential role in the management of natural resources. The low status of women in Africa contributes directly to economic, social and health problems. U.S. policy in Africa will emphasize the key role women have in sustainable programs of development. Greater technical assistance and training should be provided for women and U.S. assistance should promote women as partners and equal beneficiaries of development. (U)

**AIDS:** The U.S. will support African leaders in implementing the OAU Council of Ministers' Action Plan on AIDS (June, 1992). U.S. assistance will focus on developing comprehensive HIV prevention programs in both civilian and military medical systems, transferring knowledge and technologies to prevent HIV infection and providing technical assistance to strengthen local capacity to provide cost-effective care for infected individuals. Prevention and control efforts should extend beyond the health sector and be addressed in programs for education, industry, agriculture, population, and private enterprise. Finally, U.S. development programs will identify strategies for mitigating the impact of AIDS. (U)

**Population Growth:** Slowing population growth is essential if Africa is to achieve sustainable development. The U.S. will continue to support comprehensive health care and family planning programs in Africa in order to help reduce the need for humanitarian assistance. (U)

**Environment:** U.S. development assistance efforts should continue to focus on assisting African countries to develop institutions and capacities to promote sustainable environmental practices, including improved management and conservation of tropical forests, biological diversity, fisheries, and coastal resources. (U)

U.S. assistance should also address urban environmental problems. Debt-for-nature swaps and other innovative financing should be considered. These activities should be coordinated with National Environmental Action Plans and with multilateral environmental programs. (U)

**Narcotics:** The U.S. will encourage non-signatories to support the 1988 UN Vienna Convention which criminalizes drug trafficking and encourages cooperation in drug law enforcement. We will engage in bilateral discussions with countries which tolerate traffickers and, if required, take other steps, including counternarcotics decertification and air carrier sanctions, to

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induce cooperation. In major drug transit countries we will fund purchase of drug control equipment and strengthened regional training programs for drug control officers. Finally, we will continue demand reduction programs in countries most affected by drug consumption. (U)

**Refugees:** Continuing tensions (especially ethnic ones), human rights abuses and the competition for resources coupled with the easy availability of modern weaponry can be expected to generate substantial numbers of additional refugees. Committing increased resources to conflict resolution is therefore a high priority. Coupled with adequate aid for those returning to their homes, such a commitment could make voluntary repatriation a reality for most of today's African refugees. (U)

**Terrorism:** As civil order breaks down in African states, the resulting turmoil provides opportunities to terrorists and their state sponsors. There are indications that Iran is seeking recruits within Islamic communities in Africa. Libyan subversion has long been a problem throughout the continent. In the case of Libya, the remedy lies in exerting pressure on that country's leadership. In the case of Iran and Sudan, greatly expanded U.S. intelligence briefings of African leaders and active American diplomacy will alert African governments to the threat and help them counter it. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#### Achieving Our Security Objectives

A vital element of successful U.S. diplomacy is an effective security policy and a program of military activities which directly supports conflict resolution and our other policy objectives in Africa. The United States has no vital (war fighting) interests in Africa, although protection of U.S. citizens could require the use of force. Shared values will be a key determinant in developing our military relationships with African states. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Access:** Secure lines of communication across and around Africa are needed for contingency operations in Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia. U.S. forces will continue to require access to selected airfields, airspace, ports, and sea lanes in order to respond effectively to crises. Current formal access agreements, such as the arrangement for special facilities in the Seychelles, will be adequate for the foreseeable future. Past investments in securing access to specific African countries have not proved to be reliable in the long-term. Our efforts should therefore be directed at expanding informal access where possible by cultivating cooperation with host country governments and militaries. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There is no requirement to station troops or construct bases in Africa; however, U.S. forces should occasionally train there for experience in the region. A requirement also exists for sites from which to stage emergency evacuations of embassy staff during political upheaval and conflict. Such instability at times requires military-assisted evacuations, on-site planning, and access. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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**Downsizing:** Reducing the size of militaries in impoverished African states and creating defensively-oriented, apolitical militaries is essential to democratization and economic progress. We need a coordinated program that works toward this goal. (U)

**Democracy:** Disciplined, apolitical militaries are key to political progress and economic development in Africa. Assisting the defense of countries making progress toward democracy, better governance, and improved human rights is a legitimate purpose of military aid, including support for previously provided military equipment. Civic action, health and humanitarian relief, and other nonlethal assistance programs can also effectively promote desired reforms and development goals. (U)

All military assistance (e.g., IMET, exercises) should be structured to promote the clear subordination of military to civil authority and military participation in development. (U)

**Conflict Resolution:** We shall support both ad hoc peacekeeping operations, such as ECOMOG in Liberia, and the development of African institutions for conflict resolution in organizations such as the OAU. Active U.S. diplomacy and the encouragement of African initiatives to resolve conflict are both necessary to achieve our objectives. (U)

**U.S. Military Activities:** Attaining our objectives requires a U.S. military engagement which will provide direct, personal contacts with African military leaders. Our policy should aim to build positive relationships with the military through maintaining an adequate presence and a pattern of activities. Such presence is particularly important for countries undertaking political and economic reforms. ~~(S)~~

On-site U.S. military training and exercises improve our capability to carry out contingency operations in Africa while signalling our interest in and commitment to the region. In addition, Africa provides a unique training environment from the point of view of terrain, climate, and local culture for U.S. forces, such as special operations and medical/public health units. ~~(S)~~

**Tools:** Where an American military presence is considered desirable, we shall employ specific tools including: an effective U.S. security assistance program, with emphasis on nonlethal development activities and international military education and training; participation by U.S. forces in combined exercises, deployments for training, senior officer visits, port visits, and humanitarian assistance; well-trained and well-equipped U.S. conventional and special operations forces available for regional contingencies; cooperative security efforts with key allies who have interests in Africa. ~~(S)~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 3, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 76


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Disposition of NSC Policy Documents

After an interagency review of active NSC Policy Documents, I direct that the following disposition be made:

1. NSC Policy Documents listed at Tab A are no longer in force and have been superseded by more recent policy directives.
2. NSC Policy Documents listed at Tab B have been completed and are no longer in force.

This directive supplements NSD 59.

  
Brent Scowcroft

Attachments

Tab A Listing of Superseded Policy Documents  
Tab B Listing of Completed NSC Policy Documents

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Partially Declassified/Released on 10-17-96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by O. Van Tassel, National Security Council

F89-191

NO LONGER IN FORCE AND SUPERSEDED/RESCINDED

<u>POLICY ID</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
NSDM 222	11 JUN 73	COCOM (S)
<u>COMMENT</u> Earlier policy guidelines have been superseded by more recent guidance and have been implemented.		
NSDD 11	22 SEP 81	Munitions/Technology Transfer to the People's Republic of China (S)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by Presidential directive after Tiananmen with total ban on such exports still in force.		
NSDD 138	03 APR 84	Combatting Terrorism (U)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by NSDD 207.		
NSD 15	22 JUN 89	Open Skies (U)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by NSD 73 and Open Skies Treaty.		
NSD 29	30 OCT 89	FY 90 Aqueduct Nuclear Test Program (U)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by NSD 68.		
NSD 31	14 NOV 89	Change to FY 1989 and FY 1990 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan (C)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by NSD 38.		
NSD 32	30 NOV 89	Economic Sanctions against Panama (C)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by Operation Just Cause and NSD-34.		
NSD 50	12 OCT 90	Decisions on START and CFE Issues (U)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by signed START and CFE treaties.		
NSD 52	22 OCT 90	FY 1991 Sculpin Nuclear Test Program (U)
<u>COMMENT</u> Superseded by NSD 68.		

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NSD 60      30 MAY 91      FY 1992 Nuclear Test Program - Julin (U)

~~COMMENT~~      Superseded by NSD 68.

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<u>POLICY ID</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
NSAM 299	12 MAY 64	Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad (C)
	<u>COMMENT</u>	Responsibilities delegated to Secretaries of State and Defense.
NSDM 262	29 JUN 74	Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression against South Korea (C)
NSDM 275	10 OCT 74	COCOM Position on Return of Depleted Uranium Tails from USSR (C)
	<u>COMMENT</u>	This is negotiating position for negotiations that are long concluded.
PD 9	30 MAR 77	Army Special Operations Field Office in Berlin (C)
	<u>COMMENT</u>	Operation shut down in August 1991; files sent to Fort Meade; personnel reassigned.
NSDD 50	06 AUG 82	Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy (C)
	<u>COMMENT</u>	National space policy and non-proliferation directives should guide this policy.
NSDD 52	20 AUG 82	Future Political Status of Micronesia Palau (S)
	<u>COMMENT</u>	Compact negotiations were concluded.
NSDD 158	09 JAN 85	United States Policy in Southeast Asia - The Kampuchea Problem (U)
	<u>COMMENT</u>	Largely completed by Cambodia settlement.
NSDD 173	10 JUN 85	Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint (S)

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NSDD 208 30 JAN 86

United States Policy towards the  
Southwest Indian Ocean (U)

COMMENT Largely irrelevant due to changed circumstances in the region although some aspects remain valid.

NSDD 238 2 SEP 86

Revised National Security Strategy (TS)

NSDD 247 10 OCT 86

Ratification of Existing Treaties Limiting Nuclear Testing (U)

COMMENT TTBT and PNET treaties signed, ratified and in force.

NSDD 251 24 DEC 86

Arms Control Discussions (U)

COMMENT START treaty negotiated, signed and is in force.

NSDD 273 07 MAY 87

United States Policy towards South Africa (C)

COMMENT Largely accomplished or rendered irrelevant by subsequent developments. However underlying policy remains valid but policy tactics and strategies must be updated.

NSDD 319 14 NOV 88

U.S. Policy towards Indochina (U)

COMMENT Largely completed by Cambodia settlement.

NSD 3 13 FEB 89

U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan (C)

COMMENT Afghan situation warrants fresh look given instability.

NSD 4 22 FEB 89

U.S. Policy towards May 7, 1989  
Elections in Panama (TS/CO)

NSD 5 18 MAR 89

Legislation to Authorize the Transfer of Funds to the Agency for International Development (AID) for Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (U)

COMMENT Legislation submitted.

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NSD 6 22 MAR 89 Security of U.S. Government Personnel  
in Panama (C)

COMMENT Specific to threat to US personnel at time of  
1989 Panamanian election.

NSD 8 01 MAY 89 U.S. Policy towards Nicaragua and the  
Nicaraguan Resistance (C)

COMMENT Objectives attained with the election and  
inauguration of democratic government in April 1990.

NSD 8 11 MAY 89 Sensitive Annex to NSD 8 re U.S. Policy  
ANNEX towards Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan  
Resistance (C)

NSD 9 08 MAY 89 Actions to Respond to the Polish  
Roundtable Agreement (U)

NSD 12 06 JUN 89 Lifting the No-Exceptions Policy (U)

COMMENT Final decision made by COCOM to eliminate  
the "no exception policy".

NSD 13 07 JUN 89 Covert Action Annex to NSD-13 on Cocaine  
ANNEX Trafficking (S)

NSD 17 22 JUL 89 U.S. Actions in Panama (C)

COMMENT OBE by Operation Just Cause.

NSD 21 01 SEP 89 U.S. Policy towards Panama under Noriega  
after 1 September 1989 (C)

COMMENT OBE by Operation Just Cause.

NSD 22 20 SEP 89 United States Policy on Nuclear Testing  
Arms Control (U)

COMMENT TTBT and PNET treaties signed, ratified and  
in force.

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NSD 23      22 SEP 89      United States Relations with the Soviet Union (C)

COMMENT      Replaced by policies toward each of the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union.

NSD 25      22 SEP 89      U.S. Policy towards the February 1990 Nicaraguan Election (S)

COMMENT      Specific to 1990 election.

NSD 25      22 SEP 89      [REDACTED] NSD-25 on U.S. Policy  
ANNEX      towards the February 1990 Nicaraguan Election (S)

1.5

NSD 33      24 JAN 90      U.S. Policy towards Panama - Post Noriega (U)

COMMENT      Most of the specific elements have been undertaken and completed.

NSD 34      24 JAN 90      Partnership with Panama - Action Plan to Foster Economic Recovery (U)

COMMENT      Most of the specific elements have been undertaken and completed.

NSD 35      24 JAN 90      U.S. - Soviet Economic Initiatives (C)

COMMENT      Completed, policies toward each of the Newly Independent States have subsequently been developed.

NSD 36      06 FEB 90      United States Arms Control Policy (U)

COMMENT      START treaty signed, ratified and in force.

NSD 39      01 MAY 90      COCOM Policy towards Eastern Europe and Soviet Union (C)

COMMENT      Overtaken by events with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Changes made by COCOM and implemented in U.S. regulations.

NSD 40      14 MAY 90      Decisions on START Issues (U)

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NSD 45 20 AUG 90

U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi  
Invasion of Kuwait (C)

COMMENT  
Storm.

OBE by operations Desert Shield and Desert

NSD 54 15 JAN 91

Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the  
Gulf (U)

COMMENT  
supersede

Accomplished by Desert Storm. Findings  
references to Iraqi leadership.

NSD 55 26 MAR 91

Change 1 to NSD 48 - Nuclear Weapons  
Deployment Authorization for FY 1990 and  
FY 1991 (C)

COMMENT  
have been

All nuclear weapons authorized for withdrawal  
withdrawn.

NSD 59 14 MAY 91

Disposition of Reagan Administration  
Policy Papers (U)

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